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ABSTRACT 
Lang, Katherine A. M.Sc. University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, December 2006. 
Cognition, Agency Theory and Organizational Failure: A Saskatchewan Wheat 
Pool Case Study. 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Murray E. Fulton 
 
The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool went from being the largest grain handler in 
western Canada in the mid 1990s to undertaking a $405 million debt restructuring in 
January 2003. Provincial grain handling market share had been over 60 percent for two 
decades prior to the Pool becoming publicly traded in 1996. With the share conversion, 
the Pool began a capital expenditure program in an effort to adapt to industry 
deregulation and to compete with the multinationals that were entering western Canada. 
This program was not successful. SWP’s long-term debt increased five fold over the 
period 1996–1999 and consecutive multi-million dollar net losses were incurred 
followed by the debt restructuring. 
This thesis uses dominant logic theory and the principal-agent problem to 
analyze what went wrong at SWP. Theory suggests organizations faced with major 
industry change may have difficulty revising their dominant logic, which leads to 
organizational failure. Not only is there a tendency to hold on to established beliefs, but 
the creation of new beliefs is prone to error because of bounded rationality. The 
existence of a principal-agent problem can worsen an organization’s ability to revise its 
dominant logic.  Information asymmetry and the principal’s trust of the agent can lead to 
inaccurate beliefs and ineffective strategies being approved.  
The results of personal interviews with twenty-one past management and elected 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool personnel and grain industry affiliates are presented and 
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analyzed in a case study format. The results suggest that deregulation of the grain 
handling industry and the anticipated arrival of multinational competitors pressured the 
Pool to respond quickly to major industry change.  The Pool had difficulty revising its 
dominant logic; it retained outdated beliefs and accepted inaccurate new beliefs. 
Interviewees described how some investments were built on erroneous beliefs and 
lacked complete due diligence.  Evidence suggests the principal-agent problem was also 
at play.  The need for confidentiality after the share conversion increased information 
asymmetry, and management took advantage of the board’s lack of experience as 
investments extended beyond the farm gate. The principal-agent problem in conjunction 
with an inaccurate revised dominant logic is a reasonable explanation for the Pool’s 
failure. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Problem 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (SWP) was for a long time the largest grain handler in 
western Canada, enjoying over 60 percent provincial market share from 1972 to 1992.  In 
the 1990s, the Pool’s dominance was eroded.  This erosion was linked to a number of 
major changes in the agricultural industry and the grain-handling sector.  These changes 
included the removal of the Western Grain Transportation Act (formerly the Crow Rate) 
in 1995, the subsequent removal of a prohibition on rail line abandonment, and the threat 
of entry of new competitors. At the same time the Pool was contending with the reality 
that a large portion of its membership was set to retire within the next decade requiring 
the repayment of $100 million in equity. The Pool underwent an equity share conversion 
in 1996 to create a more permanent source of equity and allow it to respond to industry 
change. To adapt to these changes the Pool began an ambitious capital expenditure 
program to modernize its elevator network and to better position itself vis-à-vis the 
diversified multinationals – namely ConAgra, ADM, Louis Dreyfus and Bunge – that 
were entering western Canada.  This program was not successful.  The Pool’s long-term 
debt increased five-fold over the period 1996–1999, its market share decreased 
significantly and it began incurring consecutive multi-million dollar net losses.  Within 
four years the Pool’s total debt was $987 million (SWP Annual Report 2000).  Both the 
Chief Executive Officer (Don Loewen) and Chief Operating Officer (Bruce Johnson) 
were asked to resign in June 1999; Board President Leroy Larsen retired the following 
year.  Rapid divestiture from many of the investments the Pool had acquired post-share 
conversion could not bypass a $405 million debt restructuring in January 2003. This 
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thesis analyzes why the Pool’s investment decisions and strategies, in response to 
changing industry dynamics, led to organizational failure. 
1.2. Existing explanations on the Pool’s failure 
Literature exists on the reasons behind the Pool’s organizational failure. Articles 
in popular farm press include a number of opinions as to why the Pool failed (Ewins 
2002; Motiuk 2005).  Co-op historian, Brett Fairbairn, is quoted as saying the Pool “tried 
to do too much in too short a time and tried to do the wrong things” (Ewins 2002).  
International investments in Mexico, Poland and England were described by David 
Schroeder, of Dominion Bond Rating Service, as being “out of [the board and 
management’s] area of expertise” (Ewins 2002).  Spending was described as uncontrolled 
and “undisciplined… [with] questionable financial due diligence” (Ewins 2002; Motiuk 
2005).  Blame for the Pool’s failure is laid on both the board members and the 
management.  Motiuk questioned “where was the board when SWP was making its 
dubious financial investments in Poland, Mexico and elsewhere…”.  In Ewins’ article, 
both management and the board are described as lacking “proper experience” and 
“expertise in …law, finance, marketing, and consumer demand” (p. 5).  
Gatin (1999) gained insight into the impact of SWP’s share conversion by 
conducting nine interviews with board members, management and industry affiliates.  
Interviewees were questioned on ten areas ranging from policy decision-making, the role 
of Class B shareholders, satisfaction with restructuring, changes in the Pool’s focus, 
adherence to co-op principles and the Pool’s vision for the future (p. 49).  The interviews 
took place between February and June 1997, which was a high time for the Pool.  Share 
prices were above $15.00 and peaked later that November at $24.20 per share. Revenues 
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exceeded $4 billion and the Pool’s mission statement was to become “the most dynamic 
agri-business co-operative in the world” (SWP Annual Report 1997).  The interview 
responses reflected the Pool’s successes, as board members and management showed 
enthusiasm and a positive attitude towards the share conversion and its impact on the 
Pool.  However, the industry affiliates that Gatin interviewed felt the Pool had changed in 
an unfavourable light.  Policy making decisions were said to now rest with the Chief 
Executive Officer instead of being formed at the grassroots level (p. 85).  The industry 
affiliates felt the role of members and delegates was diminishing (p. 87) and that at times 
it seemed the “management [were] running astray with the company” (p. 90).   
Lang and Fulton (2004) linked declining member commitment to the Pool’s 
decreasing market and financial performance.  Examples of declining member 
commitment spanned the last three decades.  There was an increase in the number of 
delegate positions filled by acclamation suggesting members were less interested in being 
involved in the co-op. Farmer requests for differential pricing in 1982 were ignored, 
which may have contributed to lost market share as farmers began to patronize grain 
companies that were offering incentives and volume discounts.  The Crow Rate debate 
further divided farmers and negatively impacted the loyalty of livestock producers who 
believed they would be better served by a removal of the Crow Rate, while the Pool 
lobbied for the Crow’s retention. 
1.3. Purpose and Objectives 
Since 2000, several large agricultural co-operatives in Western Canada and the 
United States, including Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, have battled impending bankruptcy or 
have ceased operations.  Tri Valley Growers, AgWay, Farmland, and the Rice Growers 
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Association are all co-operatives from the United States that either filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection or ceased operations between 2000 and 2002 (Anderson and 
Henehan 2002; Fairbairn 2003b; Fulton and Gibbings 2003; Keeling 2004; Sexton and 
Hariyoga 2004).  Within Canada, Dairyworld Foods was bought out by Montreal dairy 
processor and cheese producer Saputo Inc. in February 2001 (Saputo website).  In 
November 2001, Agricore, formed through a 1998 merger of Alberta Wheat Pool and 
Manitoba Pool Elevators, merged with United Grain Growers to form Agricore United 
(Agricore United website). It is worthy to mention that United Grain Growers is not 
without its own financial hurdles. UGG was a producer-owned co-operative that became 
publicly traded on July 28, 1993. In 1997, there was a failed attempt by AWP and MPE 
to takeover UGG, instead UGG entered an alliance that gave ADM 45 percent ownership 
in the publicly traded co-op (UGG 1997; Ewins 1997b). 
The purpose of this research is to show why SWP failed financially.  The main 
objective of this thesis is to determine how the Pool went from being a successful 
agricultural co-operative with a healthy balance sheet and over 60 percent provincial 
market share to incurring multi-million dollar net losses and nearly halving its market 
share all within one decade (1993–2003).  Pool members, government, investors, financial 
institutions, and the co-operative sector have been looking for explanations as to how a 
viable and financially successful co-operative lost its market share and profitability. 
Determining the origins of the Pool’s organizational failure can lead to lessons 
learned for use by other co-operatives.  Views on the changing dynamics of the grain 
industry, the Pool’s response to those changes through its capital investments and the 
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decision-making processes on which the investments were based are required to 
determine the origins.  Analysis of the decision-making processes and underlying 
assumptions for decisions may better inform other agricultural co-operatives facing 
similar circumstances as the Pool.  Establishing if there is any connection between the 
decision-making processes in this co-operative and its organizational structure, 
governance and underlying culture may lead to suggestions for change among co-
operatives of similar structure. 
In Chapter 2, two propositions are put forward as explanations for the Pool’s 
organizational failure. A case study approach is employed in this thesis to test the two 
propositions.  Past management and elected personnel from the Pool along with grain 
industry affiliates were invited to participate in personal interviews and questioned on 
their thoughts and views about the changes in the grain industry and the Pool’s responses 
to those changes.  The identities of all the interviewees are remaining anonymous, which 
encouraged the interview participants to be more willing to partake in the interviews.  The 
findings of the interviews are complemented with historic recounts of grain industry 
change and Pool performance. 
1.4. Organization of Thesis 
This thesis is composed of eight chapters.  Previous studies on organizational and co-
op failure are discussed in Chapter 2.  The two research propositions are presented at the 
end of Chapter 2.  A review of cognition and agency literature and a description of the 
theoretical framework are included in Chapter 3.  The methodology of the thesis and 
corresponding interview results are described in Chapter 4.  An historical review of the 
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western Canadian grain handling industry – with special focus on the players and 
regulations – is given in Chapter 5.  Chapter 5 will also include the impact of deregulation 
that began in the 1980s and the other major industry changes.  A review of the 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool’s formation, market and financial performance, governance 
structure and responses to grain industry change from 1980 until 2000 is covered in 
Chapter 6.  The interview responses are analyzed in a case study format in Chapter 7.  
The propositions are tested for validity at the end of Chapter 7.  Chapter 8 concludes the 
thesis with a review of the linkages between the failed American co-ops and 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool.  The linkages will be used to offer lessons learned and 
recommendations for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2:  STUDIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND CO-OP FAILURE 
2.1. Introduction 
Although the focus of this thesis is co-op failure, it is valuable to look at research 
on the failure of non-co-ops. Organizational failure can be linked to an organization’s 
cognitive models and the way it creates knowledge from information. Cognitive 
processes explicitly include a reliance on past actions and experiences to make decisions. 
Drawing from past successes and failures can cause problems if the new environment 
does not resemble any of the organization’s or the decision-makers’ past experiences. 
Major industry change is a prime example of where established knowledge and past 
experiences are less reliable for current decision-making. In addition, prolonged success 
can weaken an organization’s capacity to recognize and react to change. The following 
examples show how successful organizations have failed under the pressures of industry 
change. 
2.2. Research on Organizational Failures 
Shimuzu and Hitt (2004) argue that continued financial success can reinforce the 
mindset and strategies of an organization, making an organization blind to needed 
change.  An organization will proceed with similar strategies, views and decisions if 
these have proven successful multiple times over; in addition, deviation from these 
routines will not be welcomed.  The downside of this behaviour is that managers can 
become insensitive to new information, preventing the organization from being able to 
recognize major changes on the horizon and the need to respond to those changes (p. 46).   
Long-standing success can build overconfidence and hubris in an organization, which 
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may result in substantial loss (p. 44).  As an example, Motorola’s success in analog cell 
phones resulted in management underestimating the potential for digital technology.  
Management “discouraged new investment to develop digital phones” because they 
believed the digital cell phone would be bulky and impractical (p. 46). 
The idea of an organization being blind to change and unable to adapt to new 
industry practices is also shown by Sanderson and Taylor (1999).   Sanderson and Taylor 
(1999) examine why successful companies that had been listed in the Times Top 1000 
Companies in the 1970s were no longer operating by 1990 (p. 661).  They conducted a 
case study on Dunlop Holdings, a once famous tire company.  A series of unsuccessful 
decisions led to a steady decline in Dunlop Holdings’ profits and market share from 1975 
to 1985 and eventually it sold off all of its divisions (p. 665).  Sanderson and Taylor’s 
central thesis was that a company’s culture impacts its view of the environment and 
filters what information becomes internalized by management and valued as knowledge.  
Information has to be within the scope of the management’s past experiences if it is to be 
retained as knowledge.   
Sanderson and Taylor (1999) relate culture to strategy by drawing from Johnson’s 
(1992) dominant paradigm and Bettis and Prahalad’s (1995; 1986) dominant logic.  The 
dominant paradigm is comprised of the underlying values, strategies, and behaviours that 
control an organization’s decisions.  A dominant logic is an organization’s lens on the 
environment that determines what is important.  Sanderson and Taylor speculated that 
Dunlop Holdings had a dominant paradigm or way of looking at the world that prevented 
it from interpreting or valuing new information necessary for change.  Dunlop Holdings 
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was bypassing important new information because this information was not closely 
enough linked with management’s past experiences.  As a result, the company was behind 
in innovations and was involved in an unsuccessful merger (p. 665).  Money losing 
strategies were not altered; instead problems were attributed to inclement weather and 
unfair competition.  This is a clear example of how the dominant paradigm prevented the 
company from adapting to new information.  Inaccurate strategies prevailed because the 
new information, needed for adaptation, was outside the scope of management familiarity 
and therefore not applied. 
2.3. Research on Co-op Failures 
Research on co-op failures aligns with the research on non-co-op failures.  Three 
co-ops from the United States – Tri Valley Growers (TVG), AgWay and the Rice 
Growers Association – each have had articles written on their financial difficulties 
(Sexton and Hariyoga 2004; Anderson and Henehan 2002; Fairbairn 2003b; Keeling 
2004).  Each article chronicles the events and decisions that took the co-ops from being 
very successful to claiming bankruptcy or ceasing operations.  Similar to Shimuzu and 
Hitt (2004) these articles reveal that co-ops that have had prolonged success can fail 
under industry change because they do not react effectively.  Strategies and views built 
on success and overconfidence tend to be inaccurate after vast industry change occurs. 
Fulton and Gibbings (2004) stress the importance of cognitive processes and 
effective knowledge creation for adaptation during industry change.  They show how a 
co-op’s “perspective and understanding of events” is connected with its performance (p. 
172).  Specifically, they review the circumstances that led two once successful co-ops – 
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AgWay and Farmland Industries Ltd. – to file for bankruptcy protection in 2002.  
Parallels between AgWay and Farmland Industries Ltd. – heavy leveraging, numerous 
business lines, loss of member commitment, lack of oversight by board members, lack of 
separation between CEO and board, and problems restructuring or consolidating – are 
identified as contributing factors to the co-ops’ failures (p. 173-174).  These co-ops did 
not correctly interpret the changes or understand the events that were underway in their 
sectors, which led them to adopt unsuccessful business strategies (p. 176).  The co-ops’ 
cognitive structures did not accurately adapt to industry change.  Fulton and Gibbings 
(2004) inclusion of the relationship between the board members and CEO as a factor in 
the co-ops’ difficulties suggests the principal-agent problem may also have played a role 
in the failure. 
Industry change tests an organization’s ability to adapt effectively.  Dominance 
and success within an organization were shown by Shimuzu and Hitt (2004) to cause 
blindness for upcoming change and hubris leading to failure.  Besides inaction an 
organization may undertake unsuccessful strategies, which suggests the organization’s 
dominant paradigm includes inaccurate views of the environment (Sanderson and Taylor 
1999).  When faced with rapid change an organization may either be too ignorant or too 
inexperienced to make the right decisions. Decision-making will also be negatively 
affected if there is a lack of experience and knowledge among the board members and 
management. 
The articles on TVG, AgWay, and Rice Growers Association were reviewed for 
commonalities in the co-op failures.  Eight common factors were identified and the 
general findings are summarized in Table 2.1.  In Chapter 8, these co-op failures will be 
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compared against the case study results on the Pool’s failure.  Determining linkages 
between these co-op failures and the Pool’s failure can lead to a better understanding of 
how and why co-ops can run into problems when faced with change.  
2.3.1. Tri Valley Growers 
Tri Valley Growers (TVG) operated as a fruit cannery and tomato-processing co-
op in the state of California for 37 years before it filed for bankruptcy protection in 2000.  
In terms of market dominance, Tri Valley Growers was the largest canner in California in 
1998.  Sexton and Hariyoga (2004) examined the co-op’s operations and linked its failure 
to a series of unsuccessful strategies and missed opportunities in the tomato processing 
industry in the 1990s.   
There was a state-wide shift in production locations for tomatoes and an increase 
in processing done at the production sites (Sexton and Hariyoga 2004, p. 21).  Tri Valley 
Growers’ plants were not geographically aligned with its producers resulting in higher 
shipping costs than its competitors.  Tri Valley Growers was not geographically aligned 
with its producers because it had chosen to expand its operations over the years by 
purchasing failed co-ops and gaining their dispersed memberships.  The co-op had nine 
processing plants in California and a reprocessing plant in New Jersey.  Unable to make 
the necessary investments in plant modernization and relocation because the co-op was 
carrying a high debt-to-equity ratio, TVG missed out on the growing markets for salsa 
and barbecue sauces (p. 21).  Rather than exiting the tomato business, which had been 
considered in 1994, a new focus was put on branded and peeled products where strong 
competitors already controlled the market. 
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Table 2.1. Common factors among three co-op failures. 
Source: a Sexton and Hariyoga 2004; b Keeling 2004; c Fairbairn 2003b; d Anderson and Henehan 2002 
 Tri Valley Growersa Rice Growers Associationb AgWayc,d 
Industry 
Change 
Shift in production areas; increased 
demand for pasta, salsa and bbq 
sauces; new processing technology 
Declining government support; 
Domestic branded rice expected to 
grow; bulk export markets declined 
Change in market conditions; 
Increased concentration in farming; 
Decline in pelleted feed demand 
Dominance California’s largest canner in 1998; 
largest fruit processor in California 
Controlled +70% of Californian rice 
acreage during 1970s and 1980s 
Largest ag supply and marketing 
co-op in US during 1970s and 
1980s 
Unsuccessful 
Strategies 
Purchased failed co-ops; Missed 
bulk paste market; underutilized 
plants; raised prices which declined 
sales 
Involved in too many product lines; 
$3 million loss after first year of 
long-grain premium program; 
Koreagate 
Diversified where it had no 
previous experience; Belief that it 
could make any business work; 
Focus on size 
Member 
Loyalty 
Fruit producers upset that profits 
used to subsidize losing tomato 
division; growers not loyal 
Producers sent bills in 1985; 
Membership decreased 94% in 14 
years to 150 members 
Loss of 23,000 members over 12 
years; Lost connection with 
members when it closed stores 
Diversified Olives; Peaches; Pears; Tomatoes; 
154 peeled products; 22 sauces; 61 
pastes 
Only major California producer of 
short, medium and long grain rice; 
bulk and retail markets 
Retail/Grocery; Energy; Food 
Preservation; Futures Trading; 
Dairy; Seed; Leasing; Airlines; 
Refining 
Board 
Decision-
Making 
“Blinded to economic realities”; 
Lacked strong business orientation 
and control over management 
Lack of oversight, education and 
financial expertise; failed to 
supervise management; ill-equipped 
to scrutinize 
2001 changed election process to 
gain “business-oriented” directors 
with “sound business skills” 
Management 
Decision-
Making 
CEO made radical cost-cutting 
measures; Executives lacked food 
processing experience 
Ineffective management; Did not 
fully evaluate decisions; remiss in 
planning for future contingencies 
Selected and poorly executed wrong 
strategies 
Financial 
Trouble 
High debt-to-equity ratio prevented 
facility upgrades; long-term debt 
quadrupled; overpaid growers in 
1998 
Net profit declined 94% from 1981 
to 1990; 12 D-E Ratio in 1989; 
missed payroll in 2000; unpaid debt 
lawsuits 
Highly leveraged; Selling 
successful businesses to generate 
cash flow; Losses 8 out of 19 years, 
1984 – 2002 
Failure Filed Ch. 11 in July 2000 Bankrupt in 2000 Filed Ch. 11 October 1, 2002 
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A new CEO in 1995 attempted to restructure Tri Valley Growers as a new 
generation co-op.   Decisions by the new CEO to terminate knowledgeable plant 
supervisors and hire new executives with “little prior experience with co-operatives or 
food processing” were described as radical cost-cutting measures (Sexton and Hariyoga 
2004, p. 23).  Member loyalty had been declining on the tomato side of the co-op; it 
began to decline on the fruit side of the co-op as well because producers were frustrated 
that their profits were being used to subsidize the losses in tomato processing.   
Sales began to decline and long-term debt rose; the CEO was fired in 1998 and 
the company was bankrupt before its official filing in July 2000 (Sexton and Hariyoga 
2004, p. 23).  Blame has been pointed at the co-op’s leadership, poor management 
decisions and its “failure to come to grips with the grower end of the tomato business” (p. 
24).  Blame has also been pointed at the board members.  A former CEO of Tri Valley 
Growers and the CEO of Pacific Coast Producers were quoted in the article as saying the 
board “seemed blinded to economic realities” and was “lacking a strong business 
orientation”, respectively (p. 23).  
2.3.2. AgWay 
AgWay was the largest agricultural supply and marketing co-op in the United 
States during most of the 1970s and 1980s.  It had been operating for 32 years when it 
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on October 1, 2002.  Anderson and Henehan 
(2002) point out “red flags” that signaled AgWay’s unsuccessful strategies and failing 
finances.  
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Anderson and Henehan (2002) noted that the co-op became caught up in the idea 
of being big because of “historic momentum” that started in the 1940s.  The co-op’s size 
and power may have been the source for AgWay’s unrealistic attitude that it “could 
manage any type of business, even when others could not” (p. 3).  An example of this 
unrealistic attitude was AgWay’s 1980 purchase of a fluid milk business.  The co-op had 
no prior experience in the fluid milk industry and had previously vowed to remain out of 
the dairy industry.  The authors go on to describe how the culture was instilled in the 
directors and management.  This deeply rooted culture meant that “old traditions and 
strategies may have outlived their usefulness or detracted from their willingness to 
change” (p. 3).  In the years prior to the bankruptcy filing, AgWay was highly leveraged 
and experienced net losses and numerous write-downs.   
AgWay altered its method for electing board members in January 2001 in an 
attempt to gain more “business-oriented” directors with a “big picture view” and “sound 
business skills” (Anderson and Henehan 2002, p. 7).   This reasoning suggests that the 
previous governance structure did not provide the required skill set.  Outside directors 
were also introduced at this time, but they were not familiar with the agriculture industry 
and resigned in June 2002 (p. 7). 
Anderson and Henehan (2002) concluded that determining what went wrong at 
AgWay involves looking at all the key players with influence on the co-op’s decisions 
and resulting success or failure (p. 11).  When the accelerated changes in agriculture 
came about, AgWay was not prepared; the authors point blame at members for asking too 
much of their co-op, members influencing directors to avoid making tough strategic 
decisions, and management selecting the wrong strategies (p. 11). 
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Fairbairn (2003b) followed up on the work by Anderson and Henehan (2002) with 
detailed recounts of AgWay’s efforts to increase in size and create new business lines 
under CEO, Donald P. Cardarelli (p. 5).  Cardarelli wanted to grow the company and 
ensure profitability for the members.  Fairbairn raised an obvious flaw; Cardarelli should 
have wanted to ensure profitability for the co-op and not its members (p. 7).  From 1995 
to 1998, AgWay reorganized its three agriculture components – AgWay Agricultural 
Products, Country Products Group, and AgWay Retail Services – through integration and 
revamping store appearances.  AgWay then invested in natural gas, pathogen-free dairy 
heifer barns, dairy nutrients, food preservation products, produce operations, brokering 
and a new retail chain.  Many of these investments were divested from in 2002 in an 
attempt to refocus and strengthen the co-operative (p. 15).  Retail store closures resulted 
in declining membership because members lost connection with AgWay (p. 18). 
2.3.3. Rice Growers Association 
The Rice Growers Association (RGA) was a marketing co-op for rice based out of 
California.  In terms of market dominance, RGA was handling approximately 70 percent 
of California’s rice crop in the 1980s.  Its market share fell to five percent by 2000, a 
direct result of declining membership.  That same year the co-op closed its doors after 80 
years of business.   
Keeling (2004) conducted a case study on RGA, including SWOT analyses on 
three major decisions and a comparison of RGA with its largest competitor, Farmer’s 
Rice Co-operative.  Keeling complemented this research by conducting personal 
interviews with management, employees and members of RGA. A mail-out survey to 
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determine why California co-ops have been struggling and ways co-ops could improve 
was also administered.   
The co-op had a loyal membership until members were sent bills in the late 1980s 
to cover losses incurred by the co-op (Keeling 2004, p. 4).  Membership fell from 2,200 
members in 1986 to 250 members in 1993, to a low of 120 to 150 members in 2000 – a 94 
percent decline in membership over 14 years.  The co-op’s decision to issue bills to its 
members to recoup losses it had incurred had negative repercussions as member 
confidence and trust eroded. 
A new CEO in 1985 attempted to shift RGA away from bulk rice to value-added 
markets that included strong competitors such as Uncle Ben’s (Keeling 2004, p. 17).  
Keeling mentions a “diversify or declare bankruptcy” mentality being at play within the 
co-op (p. 15).  Management was openly criticized when it first began strategies to 
develop branded rice products; instead of re-evaluating their decision, management 
responded by saying, “those who succeed in business are the ones who innovate” (p. 19).  
Interviewees’ dissatisfaction with management was revealed in the survey portion of the 
interview; 96 percent of survey respondents agreed that “poor decision making by 
management” was a contributing factor to RGA’s failure (p. 42).  One interviewee 
indicated that RGA was “focusing so much attention and money on penetrating the small 
differentiated market, [that] RGA likely would neglect its interest in the bulk market” (p. 
16). 
Responsibility is also put on the board members as interviewees felt the board 
failed to supervise management (Keeling 2004, p. 2).  Former directors admitted they 
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were lacking management and financial expertise (p. 30).  While former managers 
described the board as “passive and ill equipped to scrutinize the business decisions it 
was charged with” (p. 30).  In the survey portion of the interviews, 74 percent of 
responses strongly agreed that RGA’s failure was partly due to a “lack of attention to 
cooperative issues by the Board of Directors” (p. 42).   
2.4. Propositions 
Cognition problems can be linked to the co-op failures discussed above.  Each of 
the co-ops from the United States was once a dominant player in its core industry with 
diversified business lines.  Industry change required the co-op’s to devise new strategies 
that proved unsuccessful and led to financial failure.  In all three co-ops strategies were 
pursued under the helm of a new CEO. This is important because the CEO’s cognitive 
models play a role in the strategies pursued by the co-op. Each of the three co-ops 
discussed above puts responsibility for their failures on the board and management 
decision-making. Board member inexperience and ineffective management are also cited 
as reasons for the failures. 
An organization’s managers, board members, and employees each have their own 
knowledge structures or cognitive models.  These structures broaden and strengthen 
through life experiences and will include views, expectations, and beliefs. An 
organization will also have cognitive models built from business experiences and 
knowledge gained from its employees. An organization will rely on its cognitive models 
and the cognitive models of its key decision-makers to interpret information and make 
decisions. As new scenarios present themselves, an organization will search its 
 18
knowledge structures to find out how it had dealt with similar experiences in the past and 
then formulate a plan of action for the situation it is currently facing. However, if 
industry change is rapid the organization and its decision-makers may be unable to find 
past experiences in their cognitive frameworks that correlate with the current situation. In 
such a situation the views and beliefs of new senior managers may hold particular 
prominence, particularly if they appear to be part of a well-thought out new vision of the 
industry and the organization’s place in the industry. 
In some instances, organizations that have had long-standing success may become 
too accustomed to a way of thinking so the need for change is overlooked. The 
organization instead continues with views and strategies that are no longer appropriate for 
the new environment in which it operates. In either of these two cases, the organization’s 
inability to effectively respond to the new developments within its industry can lead to 
organizational failure. Tri Valley Growers continued with its losing tomatoe processing 
division; AgWay carried an attitude that it could make any business work; RGA ignored 
criticism and continued a strategy to develop branded products that competed directly 
with well-established Uncle Ben’s.   
Governance issues also play a role in an organization’s strategies and decisions.  
The co-op articles identified that board members lacked the required skill set to evaluate 
business strategies and monitor management.  Board members are charged with 
overseeing management; they must monitor management and be able to properly assess 
investment proposals.  The relationship between board members and management is 
important; if board members are passive and management is aggressive the balance of 
power can shift and the board can lose control. 
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Based on the experience of the American co-operatives, two propositions are put 
forward as explanations for why the Pool experienced organizational failure.  Each 
proposition is tested for validity by finding supporting or refuting evidence in the 
interview responses received from the twenty-one personal interviews conducted with 
former Pool management, former SWP elected personnel and former grain industry 
affiliates. 
2.4.1. Proposition 1 
If an organization is locked into a way of thinking or is unfamiliar with its new 
operating environment it may be unable to effectively respond to new threats and 
opportunities.  Another term for an organization’s “way of thinking” is its “dominant 
logic”.  Over time successful strategies, standard operating procedures, and business 
models become embedded in an organization and represent the dominant logic (Bettis 
and Prahalad 1995; Prahalad 2004). The dominant logic assists with cognition and 
includes the past experiences of the organization as well as the past experiences of key 
decision-makers. There will be key decision-makers that can influence the decisions of an 
organization because of their charisma or strong-will. When the environment undergoes 
rapid change, an organization can sometimes find it difficult to alter the elements of its 
dominant logic. It may continue with beliefs and perceptions from its old dominant logic 
that are no longer accurate for the new environment.  It may also, through the help of key 
decision-makers, develop a new dominant logic.  The organization runs the risk that 
reliance on outdated old strategies or inaccurate new strategies can be ineffective and 
lead to failure.  
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Part of this inability to adapt is because management and board members have 
limits to what can be learned especially when the future is largely unknown due to drastic 
industry change (Simon 1991). Drastic industry change means decision-makers have no 
familiarity with the present situation, so reliable solutions from the past do not exist. It is 
then up to the organization and the key decision-makers to decipher the new information, 
without any prior exposure, and to formulate new strategies. There will always be the 
chance that the strategies chosen are ineffective because the organization is dealing with 
a large degree of unknowns.  
Proposition 1 is that the Pool’s dominant logic prevented effective adaptation to 
industry change and significantly contributed to its financial failures.  Senior 
management’s effort to become a globally recognized agri-business cooperative was 
unsuccessful.  Elements of the Pool’s old dominant logic were still relied on as the 
industry changed.  A revised dominant logic contained outmoded views and beliefs that 
were no longer appropriate for the new grain-handling environment. In addition, some of 
the new views – growth at all costs – were also not effective. The Pool’s strategies in 
response to deregulation in the 1990s led to organizational failure because of the views 
and beliefs held by the Pool and some of its key decision-makers.  
2.4.2. Proposition 2 
The governance structure of an organization and the relationship between the 
board and management plays a major role in the decisions and strategies undertaken by 
the organization.  Theoretically the board has power over management.  The board 
provides strategic direction and management brings forward investment opportunities to 
achieve the strategic direction for the organization.  It is the board’s responsibility to 
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assess and give final approval on any investments.  The board cannot fully monitor 
management nor does it have the same exposure to information as management. 
Information asymmetry creates opportunities for hidden action – i.e. a principal-agent 
problem is at work. 
Proposition 2 is that a principal-agent problem existed between Pool senior 
management and the board members.  Information asymmetry and the inability of board 
members to fully monitor senior management allowed senior management to gain 
approval on investment proposals that should have been rejected by the board.  
Management failed to act in the interest of the organization. The board had grown to trust 
senior management, which increased the likelihood of a principal-agent problem.
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
3.1. Introduction 
This thesis draws from cognition and agency theory to explain how organizational 
failure can occur as a result of major industry change.  Cognition theory explains how 
knowledge is created from information.  Organizations rely on knowledge creation to 
make decisions and devise strategies.  To remain successful organizations need to 
recognize and correctly interpret information relating to change.  The source of an 
organization’s knowledge is from its employees.  Organizational knowledge is housed 
within its dominant logic.  Major industry change can cause problems for organizations 
because the appropriate action is often outside the established frames of reference. Stated 
another way, if industry change is so drastic that an organization has no past experiences 
that parallel the current situation it may not know how to react. As new and critical 
information comes to an organization it may filter it out because without any resemblance 
to its past the information is deemed irrelevant (Bettis and Prahalad 1995).  An 
organization may also ignore the information because it conflicts with established beliefs 
(Akerlof and Dickens 1982). 
The relationship between a board of directors and management – such as in a co-
operative – is subject to the principal-agent problem.  The principal (board of directors) 
hires the agent (management) to undertake actions on the principal’s behalf (Arrow 
1985).  The principal wishes for the agent to undertake actions that meet the interests of 
the principal.  If interests do not align and the principal cannot fully monitor the agent 
and is less informed than the agent, the agent can behave opportunistically.  The agent 
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may also “screen” or “hide” unfavourable information from the principal, which 
increases the information asymmetry (Monsen and Downs 1965).  
This chapter starts with the concept of knowledge creation and how it is stored 
within knowledge structures.  The formulation and content of knowledge structures and 
their limitations follow.  Following this discussion is the importance of an employee’s 
knowledge structures on the decisions made in an organization.  Individual knowledge 
structures are linked to an organization’s dominant logic.  The elements of a dominant 
logic will be outlined.  Why organizations find change difficult is looked at in terms of 
organizational blindness and a deeply rooted dominant logic. 
An examination of agency theory comprises the second half of this chapter.  
Adverse selection and moral hazard are two outcomes of the principal-agent problem.  
The implications of moral hazard and information asymmetry on the board-management 
relationship are discussed.  Information screening increases information asymmetry and 
promotes the principal-agent problem.  Trust can escalate information asymmetry when 
the principal lacks business knowledge and skills, but trusts the agent. 
The relationship between cognition and agency theory will conclude the chapter. 
It is the interaction of cognition and agency theory that forms the theoretical framework 
for this thesis. 
3.2. Cognition Theory 
The distinction between information and knowledge is that information must first 
become knowledge before it is valued and used by individuals (Sanderson and Taylor 
1999).  It is knowledge, and not information, that an individual uses to make decisions.  
Information becomes knowledge as it is sorted and categorized into frames according to 
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“perceived similarities with other objects or events” from an individual’s background and 
past experiences (Fulton and Gibbings 2004, p. 167; Van De Ven 1986; Loasby 1976).  
These frames comprise a knowledge structure or cognitive model.  The knowledge 
structure includes rules and expectations about the world that are used to focus attention 
and make decisions (Fulton and Gibbings 2004, p. 168; Choo 2002).  When an individual 
encounters a new experience with new information, he/she refers back to similar 
situations from his/her past and the knowledge gained from that past experience.  The old 
knowledge will be used to interpret the new information and determine the appropriate 
action.  
Knowledge is neither fully complete nor fully accurate.  Individuals have different 
backgrounds and experiences; therefore no two individuals will have the same knowledge 
or insights (Loasby 2001).  Put another way, different backgrounds and insights means 
individuals can interpret the same information differently and view the same environment 
differently.  Individual mindsets and insights are subjective and the variation between 
individual insights means knowledge can never be known to be true or complete (Loasby 
2002).   
3.2.1. Bounded Rationality 
Knowledge is incomplete and inaccurate because there are limits to what an 
individual can know.  There is too much information for a single individual to 
comprehend.  An individual has rates and limits on the amount of information he/she can 
“receive, store, retrieve and process…without error” (Williamson 1973, p. 317).  The 
information that we do intake is prone to error because the future and all of its probable 
outcomes is uncertain (Loasby 1976).  Simon (1955) introduced the term “bounded 
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rationality” when referring to the limits on what an individual can know. Bounded 
rationality limits individuals from adapting optimally in complex environments because 
the full range of possibilities is unknown (Simon 1991).  Limitations on the amount of 
information that an individual can process means each individual will select the 
information that best aligns with their past experiences or knowledge base and discard the 
excess information.   
3.2.2. Knowledge Structures 
Transforming information into knowledge is the process of learning.  To learn, an 
individual draws from patterns, structures, and categories established from past 
experiences (Loasby 2001; Langlois 2001).  An individual’s background, experiences and 
activities are sorted into “schemas” (Markus 1977) or “knowledge structures” (Walsh 
1995). Throughout the cognition literature several terms – knowledge structures, frame of 
reference, cognitive framework, schema – are all used for the same concept. These terms 
all represent the structures created to organize an individual’s experiences for future 
reference in interpreting incoming information. Markus (1977) defined “schemas” as 
cognitive knowledge structures regarding specific concepts, entities and events used by 
individuals to encode and interpret incoming information efficiently.  Walsh (1995) 
defined a “knowledge structure” as a mental template consisting of organized knowledge 
about an information environment that enables interpretation and action in that 
environment (p. 286).  
Stated in another way, frames or slots within the mind hold similar knowledge.  
When sorting and categorizing information, the frames and slots are searched and like 
knowledge is inserted in the most similar frame.  These frames or slots collectively 
 26
represent a knowledge structure.  The knowledge structure controls the way an individual 
views the world.  The knowledge structure plays a role in focusing an individual’s 
attention; accepting information that fits existing memory patterns or that can easily have 
existing patterns extended to encompass it (Salgado et al 2002).  If information conflicts 
with a knowledge structure, it can be deemed irrelevant and is disregarded (Witt 1998; 
Walsh 1995; Lord and Foti 1986). 
Knowledge structures provide a template to map future experiences, control 
information processing, fill missing gaps in information, and facilitate problem solving, 
goal setting and goal execution (Taylor and Crocker 1981).  They are the mechanism by 
which information becomes knowledge and helps individuals develop perceptions and 
interpretations of the environment in order to make decisions. 
3.2.3. Knowledge of Decision Makers 
An organization must rely on its employees’ knowledge structures and views of 
the environment in order to make decisions.  The employees’ knowledge becomes the 
organization’s knowledge.  The inaccuracies and incompleteness of the knowledge also 
become those of the organization.  Having relevant background and experience among 
employees is therefore very important for an organization. What the decision-makers 
know and believe will influence the strategies an organization pursues. 
There are key decision-makers in every organization.  In a traditional hierarchical 
organization with top-down decision-making, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and 
senior management control the business decisions and hold the effective power in the 
organization.  An organization must be mindful that its thought processes involve more 
than just the individual mind of the CEO (Fairbairn 2003c). If an organization’s 
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governance structure includes a board of directors elected by its shareholders, it is the 
legal responsibility of board members to monitor the CEO and senior management.  The 
knowledge and experience of board members and management is most influential in 
creating the organization’s knowledge; it is important that they possess the backgrounds 
and insights necessary to ensure that the organization survives and adapts successfully to 
change.   
3.2.4. Organizational Knowledge Structures 
Like its employees, an organization must work within a framework or structure of 
assumptions and procedures if it is to function at all (Loasby 2002).  Simon (1991) states 
an organization can only learn through what its current employees learn or by gaining 
new employees with new insights, ideas and knowledge.  March (1991) supports Simon’s 
view by stating that an organization stores knowledge in its procedures, norms, and rules 
and that knowledge is accumulated as its employees learn.  March (1991) also states that 
learning is a two-way process; employees will gain from an organization’s knowledge 
through instruction and training while an organization’s knowledge grows from each 
employee’s knowledge and beliefs (p. 74). 
When an organization’s employees come together and share their individual 
knowledge structures, a collective knowledge structure emerges (Walsh 1995, p. 295).  
This group-level knowledge structure has been referred to as organizational code (March 
1991 p. 74), a dominant paradigm (Sanderson and Taylor 1999), or a dominant logic 
(Bettis and Prahalad 1986; 1995). 
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3.2.5. Dominant Logic 
A dominant logic is an organizational knowledge structure built from its 
employees’ knowledge structures (Bettis and Prahalad 1986; 1995).  It serves as an 
information filter, directing attention on “relevant” information and discarding 
“irrelevant” data based on the contents of the knowledge structures.  The filtration of 
relevant and irrelevant information is subjective.  Organizations in the same industry 
undertake different strategies because organizations not only filter information differently 
but they also interpret information differently.   
The dominant logic consists of an organization’s beliefs, views, values, strategies, 
and culture, all of which impact the way an organization views the world (Bettis and 
Prahalad 1995; Sanderson and Taylor 1999).  The dominant logic is an organization’s 
“lens” for its environment.  Prahalad (2004) further describes the dominant logic as the 
“DNA of the organization” with recipes for success, business models and standard 
operating procedures. As described by Johnson (1992), the information that “filters” into 
an organization helps to build competitive strategies, values and expectations, power 
structures, performance measures, reinforced behaviours and rituals and routines. 
Figure 3.1 is a visual representation of a dominant logic and its various elements.  
The representation uses a filter to show that the dominant logic acts as an information 
filter.  The arrows represent information available to the organization.  New information 
passes through the filter and is “purified” as irrelevant information does not pass through 
the filter. The information that makes its way through the filter and out the top can be 
thought of as knowledge and can serve to guide decisions and influence behaviour. 
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Figure 3.1. The dominant logic of an organization. 
Source: Author’s own interpretation. 
 
Bettis and Prahalad (1995) used the existence of a dominant logic to explain why 
organizations have difficulty changing even when they see change in the environment.  A 
long period of success and stability reinforces the dominant logic and can result in deeply 
rooted views, expectations, and standard operating procedures.  Tasks, decision-making 
and information processing become routine for an organization.  The positive impact of 
this routine is that individuals thrive on regularity and will become efficient at repetitive 
tasks (Loasby 2001; Van De Ven 1986).  This makes intuitive sense because knowledge 
structures are an individual’s attempt to put structure and routine to the environment.  In 
mastering routines, individuals and organizations learn what information can be ignored 
because it has less influence or is irrelevant (Salgado et al 2002).  Routinization becomes 
a problem for the organization in periods of major change as the filtration process will 
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continue to filter out what it considers irrelevant information; the dominant logic may not 
adjust to industry changes making the organization susceptible to making inappropriate 
decisions.  
The longer an organization operates in a stable environment the more 
standardized are its routines and procedures.  This aids in the simplifying and speeding 
up the decision-making process (Bettis and Prahalad 1995, p. 11).  An organization will 
tend to anticipate the future to be very similar to the current and past environment (Bettis 
and Prahalad 1995, p. 11; Amburgey et al 1993).  This can be detrimental to an 
organization if there is major industry change, as the future will no longer represent the 
past.  Standard operating procedures, beliefs and models that were previously successful 
are now outdated and may no longer be accurate.  If a dominant logic is deeply engrained 
it may be too difficult to change (Bettis and Prahalad 1995). 
Prahalad (2004) emphasized the need for market leading organizations to reassess 
traditional assumptions over time or the organization will be blind to new threats and 
opportunities (p. 172).  The term “blind” refers to an organization ignoring information 
that has had less influence and an inability to see important developments outside its 
current range of vision (Walsh 1995; Salgado et al 2002; Loasby 2002).  An organization 
can also be blinded by the strategies it adopts; if great effort is expended to adopt a new 
strategy the organization may fail to recognize information beyond the scope of the 
strategy.  This is linked to cognitive dissonance – key decision-makers want to believe 
they have chosen the correct strategy and will intentionally blind themselves to 
information that suggests otherwise.   
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3.2.6. Cognitive Dissonance 
Individuals can choose their beliefs and perceptions, and once chosen they persist 
over time (Akerlof and Dickens 1982).  For example, it is human nature to believe that 
one’s self is intelligent and makes correct decisions.  A way to ensure one’s beliefs are 
correct is to intentionally ignore or reject information that does not support their beliefs.  
An individual’s ability to create persistent beliefs about the state of the world and ignore 
information that contradicts those beliefs is known as cognitive dissonance (Akerlof and 
Dickens 1982).   
Akerlof and Dickens (1982) used the example of workers in unsafe job 
environments to portray cognitive dissonance.  The workers prefer to believe their job is 
safe because only unwise individuals hold jobs that are dangerous (p. 308). The problem 
with creating a belief that the job is safe, when it is not, is that the worker may make 
“costly judgment errors” such as not wearing safety equipment (p. 308; 310).   
Cognitive dissonance also applies to an organizational setting.  Key decision-
makers will believe they are intelligent and can successfully lead the organization.  
Information that indicates a past decision was poorly timed or was the incorrect will be 
overlooked because it conflicts with this belief.  This helps explain why some 
organizations, despite evidence of net losses and declining market share, continue with 
the same business strategies.  Akerlof and Dickens (1982) claim that as the magnitude 
and difficulty of a decision increases, so does the belief that the decision is good for the 
organization (p. 310). 
Knowledge structures with inaccurate perceptions can persist because cognitive 
dissonance may cause key decision-makers to purposely ignore information that indicates 
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the perceptions are incorrect (Akerlof and Dickens 1982).  Cognitive dissonance 
therefore helps to maintain elements of a dominant logic. 
3.2.7. Adapting to Change 
If industry change is incremental, an organization is often able to slightly adjust 
its dominant logic because the information filter will accept information that is similar to 
past information (Salgado et al 2002). To adapt to industry change, new strategies and 
decisions are required. When industry change is drastic, however, information is no 
longer familiar and the organization has difficulty discerning between important and 
unimportant information (Salgado et al 2002, p. 176).  The dominant logic may not be 
able to deem any information as relevant therefore preventing adaptation to the new 
environment.  A continued reliance on the old dominant logic can lead to failure for the 
organization.  
If an organization is able to recognize the need for change it will create a new 
dominant logic.  In this process there will be a tendency to use elements from the old 
logic, particularly where they support key elements of the new logic. Key decision-
makers will have a significant influence on the formation of new views and expectations. 
An organization can bring in new people to key decision-making positions in order to 
gain different knowledge and experiences for incorporation into a new dominant logic.  
Organizations may also have to contend with the relationship between 
management and board members.  The board relies on management to handle the daily 
activities of the organization.  Management can take advantage of this reliance and 
pursue its own interests if the board has less information and an inability to fully monitor 
all of management’s actions.  This is known as the principal-agent problem. 
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3.3. Agency Theory 
An agency relationship is when a principal hires an agent to carry out a task on 
the principal’s behalf (Arrow 1985).  A classic example of the agency relationship is 
when the shareholders (principal) of an organization hires management (agent) to carry 
out the day-to-day activities of the organization to achieve the interests of the principal.  
If the interests of the principal and agent do not align, the “relationship” can become a 
principal-agent problem.  If the agent’s actions cannot be observed by the principal 
without a cost and if the agent has more information than the principal then it is possible 
for the agent to pursue their own interests rather than the interests of the principal (Tirole 
1989; Milgrom and Roberts 1992).  Thus, the two important assumptions for a principal-
agent problem are information asymmetry and costliness to obtain information. 
In businesses, and particularly co-operatives, the principal-agent problem 
typically arises in two situations. The first is the relationships between the members and 
the elected board of directors, with the members as the principal and the board as the 
agent. The second is the relationship between the board of directors and senior 
management, with the board as principal and senior management as the agent. Most of 
the focus of this thesis will be on the second of these two situations. 
Central to the principal-agent problem is information asymmetry. There can be 
information asymmetry between board members (principal) and management (agent) 
because board members do not possess the same business knowledge as management and 
they do not have the same information available to them. Managers have daily contact 
with the business side of the organization, whereas board member contact with the 
organization is at board meetings. Management is also more informed because they are 
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hired for their expertise (Lipsey et al 1997). In large complex organizations, board 
members must rely on management for an information synopsis.  When the agent has a 
deeper knowledge than the principal there is information impactedness; the agent can 
distort any information they disclose because it is costly for the principal to reach 
information parity (Arrow 1969). 
3.3.1. Adverse Selection 
The principal-agent problem involves two distinct behaviours – moral hazard and 
adverse selection (Arrow 1985; Tirole 1989; Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Adverse 
selection is the ex ante hiding of information. This concept can be explained with an 
example from life insurance. Individuals tend to know if they are at higher risk for dying 
prematurely because of unhealthy habits (i.e. smoking) or family history of disease (i.e. 
cancer).  These individuals will not wish to disclose this information to a life insurance 
company because the insurance company will refuse to provide insurance or will charge 
high premiums (Arrow 1985). Adverse selection is the result of “precontractual 
opportunism” where one party has private information before entering into a contract 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992). For the purposes of this thesis, moral hazard more aptly fits 
the Pool’s situation than adverse selection; the focus will now turn to moral hazard. 
3.3.2. Moral Hazard 
When an agent’s efforts are not directly observable by the principal and the agent 
has limited liability there is incentive for the agent to shirk on the effort that is exerted 
towards meeting the principal’s goals; this is known as moral hazard (Arrow 1985, p. 39; 
Eisenhardt 1989). A common example is vehicle insurance.  An insured driver can be less 
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cautious because their driving habits are not directly observable by the insurer and a 
small deductible will cover any losses incurred in the event of an accident.  Hidden action 
is the non-insurance term for moral hazard (Arrow 1985).   
An agent may be intentionally careless because his/her interests do not align with 
the principal and the agent is not fully liable for the consequences of his/her actions 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 168). It is human nature for an individual to pursue their 
self-interest (Monsen and Downs 1965).  The interests of the principal are to ensure 
profitability of the organization, increase share value and maximize the long-run value of 
the organization (Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 181).  The interests of the agent may 
include pursuing their own “goals of status, high salaries, expensive perks, and job 
security” (Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p. 168).  Differing interests can cause the agent 
with critical information to intentionally report information that is either incomplete or 
inaccurate which can limit the principal’s ability to make appropriate decisions (Milgrom 
and Roberts 1992). 
3.3.3. Information Screening 
Intentionally withholding information is also known as information “screening”.  
Screening is a necessary function of organizational size, but it leads to inefficiencies 
when there is a difference in motives (Monsen and Downs 1965, p. 231). Monsen and 
Downs (1965) proposed that large hierarchical organizations that have ownership and 
management functions carried out by two separate groups – the board of directors and 
management – risk a situation where management acts in their own self-interest rather 
than in the interest of shareholders.  The shareholders’ goal is to generate a steady income 
from dividends and appreciation of the stock price.  The management’s goal is to 
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maximize lifetime income through salary increases, stock options, performance bonuses 
and promotion (p. 225).  
To prevent the discovery that management’s actions do not fully reflect 
shareholder interests, management can screen information.  Board members “typically 
know far less about the firm’s situation than managers” because they remain “remote 
from the firm’s actual decision-making” (Monsen and Downs 1965, p. 225).  Board 
members rely on reports from management to learn about the organization.  The only 
way to know if profit and stock growth has been maximized is to compare performance 
with similar organizations.  As long as management ensures the board’s targeted stock 
price increase and dividend payout are achieved, the board will not suspect that 
management’s efforts are in pursuit of self-interests (p. 226).   
Screening may occur within each level of an organization.  To achieve goals of 
wage increase and promotion, employees must gain approval from their superiors; 
likewise, senior-level managers will need to gain approval from the board of directors.  
Achieving a stock price increase and paying out dividends is part of the approval process.  
“Screening” information so that only favourable data is passed on to superiors is the other 
part to gaining approval. Not sharing unfavourable information with superiors can lead 
key decision-makers to make ineffective or improper decisions because they have not 
been made aware of all the pertinent issues.   
Employees may begin to keep their concerns hidden and screen information rather 
than jeopardize their employment. Bartunek and Ringuest (1989) found that employees 
who held different beliefs from their superiors received less recognition for their efforts 
and were more likely to leave the organization than employees who did not raise dissent.  
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It is management’s responsibility to “motivate subordinates” and initiate change in the 
organization (Mintzberg 1971, p. 105).  As a result, management may feel it is in their 
best interest to release employees who disagree with the direction of the organization.  
3.3.4. Trust 
Trust is “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party 
based on the expectation that the party will perform a particular action important to the 
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the other party” (Mayer et al 1995, 
p. 712).  Sabel (1993) defined trust as the “mutual confidence that no party to an 
exchange will exploit another’s vulnerabilities” such as adverse selection and moral 
hazard.  When there is trust, the principal is confident the agent will do what is best for 
the organization and its membership. 
A principal’s belief that an agent is trustworthy can exacerbate the principal-agent 
problem.  In order for a large, hierarchical organization to function efficiently there is 
delegation of responsibility.  Trust is placed in the individuals given responsibility 
because full supervision is impractical (Mayer et al 1995).  Trust is common in exchange 
relationships (Barney and Hansen 1994) even though it is difficult to distinguish between 
true and false claims of trustworthiness (Williamson 1985). The agent can exploit that 
trust because the principal is unable to fully monitor the agent. 
Trust is based on perceived characteristics of loyalty, competence, consistency, 
reliability, and integrity (Mayer et al 1995).  Trust can emerge if the principal is 
“susceptible to the advice, information and apparent experience” of the agent (Loasby 
2002).  If an employee’s performance of a task is satisfactory, a manager’s perception of 
the employee’s trustworthiness increases (Mayer et al 1995).  Likewise, if an agent has 
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been performing well for a period of time, the principal has reason to trust that 
satisfactory performance will continue.  An employee with a proven track record will be 
given increased responsibility (through promotion) with the expectation that success for 
the organization will continue.  Influential or charismatic organization leaders can build 
trust into an organization’s culture and the trust can be sustained long after the leader has 
left the organization (Barney and Hansen 1994).   
3.4. Co-ops and principal-agent relationships 
When applying the principal-agent to an agricultural co-operative, it is useful to 
think of a chain of principal-agent relationships within the organization. In the first part 
of the chain, the farmer-member is the principal and the elected board members are the 
agent. The board, in turn, is the principal and senior management is the agent in a second 
part of the chain. Breton (1995) applies principal-agent theory to superior-subordinate 
relationships in hierarchical organizations; each level within an organizational structure 
can be viewed as a principal-agent relationship.  The concept of layers of principal-agent 
problems is found in Monsen and Downs (1965) explanation of information screening 
that occurs between the levels of a hierarchical organization.  
In a co-op the farmer-members are the ultimate principal with the elected board 
members serving as the agent. For the purposes of this research the focus will be on the 
principal-agent relationship between the elected board members and the management; in 
this relationship the board members (principal) hire management (agent) to handle the 
day-to-day activities of the co-op. This focus on the board-management relationship is 
chosen because it is commonly the focus of work done on organizations that are not co-
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operatives and because it is believed that it is at this level that issues of dominant logic 
arise. 
The member-board relationship is, however, critical to a co-op’s success. A co-op 
is a nonprofit business voluntarily owned and controlled by members as well as operated 
by and for the members (Fulton 2003). A co-op is different from investor-owned firms 
because it has “members that regularly use and purchase the good or service provided by 
the organization that they themselves created”(Fulton 2003, p. 3). Individuals will 
become members of a co-op because the co-op is seen to achieve the individual’s wants 
and needs.  Member loyalty or linkage is derived from a trust and a perception that the 
co-op is an efficient agent of its members (Fairbairn 2003c, p. 7). Members will need to 
feel informed about the co-op’s business and financial performance to retain loyalty to 
the co-op; this is what (Fairbairn 2003c) refers to as transparency (p. 12). Without linkage 
and transparency members will not feel their interests are being served and may decrease 
their patronage. Members receive information about the co-op from the elected board 
members and delegates. If the board-management relationship suffers from the principal-
agent problem, the member-board relationship will likely also be affected. 
Satisfying co-op members is more difficult than satisfying shareholders of an 
investor-owned firm. Cook (1994) states that the role of the CEO in a co-op is more 
difficult than that of a CEO in a for-profit firm.  Since co-op members are both the 
owners and users of the co-op they want to see the organization profit and they want 
favourable prices for the good and services sold or received. Co-op managers need to 
maximize profit and producer surplus. In addition, co-op members are not homogenous; 
Richards, Klein and Walburger (1998) found that agricultural co-op members value co-op 
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goals differently. For example, young farmers (under 35 years of age) care more about 
business performance than social aspects of co-ops (Richards, Klein and Walburger 1998, 
p. 27).  The reality is that a co-op manager’s compensation is based on the co-op’s 
financial performance. Therefore, managers are “not likely interested in making decisions 
that would indirectly benefit members, since such actions are almost invariably less 
profitable for the co-op” (Fulton 1989, p. 15). Co-op managers can be expected to 
withhold information on what they would consider “poor” business, which erodes the 
board members’ power and leads to information asymmetry and the principal-agent 
problem. 
The divergence of interests between a principal and agent has also been referred 
to as the control problem in agricultural co-operatives (Cook 1995).  The principal lacks 
control over the agent because it cannot fully monitor and evaluate efforts.  Staatz (1987) 
noted that cooperatives will reach a point in size and complexity that makes it impossible 
to fully monitor managerial behaviour, regardless of the board members’ talents (p. 50).  
The problem can increase in agriculture co-operatives because they lack a publicly traded 
share that would serve as an indicator of financial health (Cook 1995). Featherstone and 
Al-Kheraiji (1995), along with Hailu (2005), present a test of the agency problem in co-
operatives. 
3.5. Summary and Conclusions 
Cognition and agency theory come together to provide a theoretical framework as 
to why a co-operative can fail under industry change.   In a co-operative, the board of 
directors and management are the key decision-makers.  The knowledge and experience 
of current and previous board members and management is embodied in the co-op’s 
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cognitive processes or dominant logic.  New management and board members bring new 
experiences and knowledge to the co-op. The cognitive processes of key decision-makers 
are used when interpreting information and devising strategies for the organization.  
Drastic industry change can mean a co-op’s established standard operating 
procedures, beliefs and strategies are no longer accurate. If the new environment is 
foreign to the co-op and its decision-makers, knowing how to react can be onerous or 
completely overlooked because the co-op is blind to the impending change. The 
dominant logic needs to be rebuilt.  The co-op will need to rely on its key decision-
makers to help build a new dominant logic. The personalities of key decision-makers can 
affect the rebuilding process; for example, hubris can hamper the co-op’s change 
capacity.  
The principal-agent problem brings an added dimension to the difficulty in 
changing the dominant logic and reacting to change.  Management can behave 
opportunistically to achieve their own interests because board members are unable to 
fully monitor management and typically do not possess the same information as 
management.  
The board has to trust that management will carry out the direction and strategies 
of the co-op.  Over time trust can build between the board and management.  If board 
members trust management they trust management’s beliefs and views and hold them as 
their own, in this way inaccurate beliefs can spread among decision-makers. Inaccuracies 
in beliefs and knowledge leads to a flawed dominant logic and errors in the cognitive 
processes which can lead to ineffective decision-making. 
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Senior management brings forth investment proposals based on the direction set 
by the board members. The board members are the final check and balance for a co-
operative and they need to conduct adequate analysis to ensure the correct decision is 
being made.  However, the board cannot ascertain if management has exercised complete 
due diligence on investment proposals.  There may also be opportunity for management 
to undertake activities without the board’s full knowledge. 
Co-op board members need to possess some financial and analytical skills so they 
can conduct adequate analysis of the investment assumptions and projections.  
Agricultural co-operatives with farmer-elected board members, who are farmers 
themselves, may not have the knowledge and business skills that senior managers possess 
(Ernst and Young 2002, p. 30).  If board members substitute trust for business acumen, 
they will believe that management provides accurate projections and assumptions.  One 
result of such behaviour is approval being granted to investments that are not feasible. 
The theory around cognitive processes, dominant logic and cognitive dissonance were 
built into Proposition 1 outlined in Chapter 2. Principal-agent theory and the role of trust 
were embodied in Proposition 2. To assess these proposals a case study approach was 
used – the elements of the case study are discussed in the following chapter. After a 
thorough discussion of the grain industry deregulation in Chapter 5 and a historical 
recount of the Pool’s decision-making from 1970 until 2000 in Chapter 6, the interview 
responses and their connection to the theory presented in this chapter are shared in 
Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Introduction 
A case study research strategy was used to test the two propositions of this thesis 
(refer to page 17).  Key principles for successful case study research – multiple evidence 
sources, an evidence database, and a chain of evidence – and their implementation in the 
thesis research will be discussed.  A description of the data sources, data collection and 
analysis, and interviewee selection processes are included in this chapter.  Twenty-one 
personal interviews served as a major data source for this thesis.  A discussion of the 
interview design, timeline and participation rate conclude the chapter. 
4.2. Case Study Research 
When answering “why” and “how” research questions, such as why did the Pool 
fail financially, case studies are a preferred research strategy (Yin 1994).  A case study 
approach using survey data, interviews and published documents were used to research 
the agricultural co-op failures discussed in Chapter 2.  Case studies can analyze a single 
situation or case and the findings can be used to draw conclusions on similar scenarios.  
Determining why the Pool failed financially can assist in devising plans and strategies for 
co-ops facing parallel situations. 
There are six major sources of data for case studies.  A high quality case study 
should include multiple sources of evidence (Yin 1994).  Documentation and archives are 
important for most case studies and include newspaper articles, memoranda, meeting 
minutes, personnel records, annual reports, and previous studies or surveys on the event 
in question (Yin 1994, p. 80).  Participant and direct observation are often used when the 
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topic of interest is ongoing and not an historical event (p. 86-87).  Physical artifacts tend 
to be collected during the observation period.   Interviews are one of the most important 
sources of case study information (Yin 1994, p. 84).   
Open-ended interviews are a common approach because they ask both specific 
fact-based questions as well as questions aimed at gaining the interviewees opinion about 
an event.  Interviewees can serve as informants providing insight on the topic of interest 
that is possible only because of their direct involvement with the event in question.  Yin 
(1994) suggests audio recording interviews to ensure an accurate rendition of the 
responses.  Timely transcription, coding and analysis are necessary in order to avoid 
forgetting, oversimplifying or losing interest in the interview responses (Miles 1979).  
The same individual collecting the data should also code and analyze the data (Glaser 
1978).  It is important to use a formal database to reduce the volume and to code the data 
into themes, which can be easily retrieved at a later date (Yin 1994).   
When presenting case study evidence, sufficient citation of the data sources is 
required to gain the reader’s confidence that the subject has been thoroughly researched.  
Interview data should corroborate others sources of data; creating a chain of evidence 
using multiple sources of evidence increases the acceptance of a case study (Yin 1994, p. 
92-94).  When using interviews as a data source an effort has to be made to avoid 
becoming dependent on one interviewee’s responses; aggregating the responses into 
categories identifies views and opinions that are shared among interviewees thereby 
increasing the validity of the interview responses.  In the same respect, data that supports 
and challenges the propositions should be presented in the case study to show that the 
investigator is not biased and selective in the evidence (Yin 1994, p. 149). 
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4.3. Case Study Application 
Case study evidence was sourced from SWP annual reports, SWP press releases, 
published books on the Pool, newspaper and magazine articles, a Master’s thesis on the 
Pool’s share conversion, and personal interviews.  These multiples sources of evidence 
provided supporting evidence to the interview responses and are included in the written 
case study in Chapter 7.   
Data collection through personal interviews proved to be a key source of case 
study evidence. Interviewees were either past directors or management employees of the 
Pool or were past grain industry participants.  Each interview followed a semi-structured 
list of questions.  Interviewees were asked the same set of questions and were welcome to 
comment outside these specific questions.  The interview responses provided insight into 
the events leading up to the Pool’s financial troubles and corroborated with evidence 
from other sources.   
To analyze the interviews, responses were coded and aggregated into main themes 
related to the two propositions, which is the process recommended by Stake (1995) and 
Yin (1994).  To ensure consistency in the coding, the graduate student (Kathy Lang) 
administered the interviews, transcribed the audio recordings and coded the responses.  
Two coding databases were generated - a Microsoft Word document and a Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet - for easy retrieval and review of interview responses.1  Coding themes 
included industry change, decision-making, trust, beliefs, investments, analysis, and 
power.  The word-processed document was replaced with a coding spreadsheet that 
simplified searching and sorting for applicable quotes.  The spreadsheet contains 330 
individual quotes that were used to write the case study analysis.   
                                                
1 Coding software is available (e.g. NVIVO) but it was not utilized in this research. 
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All interview responses in the written case study have a footnote indicating a 
corresponding numbered transcript from which the response came. Each interviewee was 
given two random transcript numbers to ensure anonymity. The footnoting was done to 
show that multiple interviewees made the same point and that no one interviewee was 
overly referenced. 
4.4. SWP Interviews 
Every effort was made to conduct the interviews in-person; only one of the 
twenty-one interviews was conducted over the telephone.  Participants were deliberately 
selected on the basis of their past affiliation with the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool or the 
grain handling industry.  Due to the specific nature of the interview selection, potential 
participants were approached individually in order to limit any feelings of coercion to 
participate or not participate. 
Interviewees included former SWP senior executives, managers, employees, 
elected board members and grain industry participants.  Several years have passed since 
the events of major interest to the research occurred.  This passage of time and the major 
personnel changes that have occurred at the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool meant that the 
former executives and board members this study was interested in were no longer with 
the organization.  As a result, it was felt that the interviewees would be in a position to 
comment on the historical decisions made by the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool.   
The aim of the interviews was to have participants outline how they perceived 
decisions made by the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool and why they believed the decisions 
were made in the fashion that they were made.  Interviewees were asked about the model 
or culture that they believed was at work in the co-operative, as well as how this model or 
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culture influenced the questions that were asked internally, the data that was collected, 
the conclusions that were reached and the actions that were taken. The questions posed to 
the interviewees were intended to guide the participants and to garner their thoughts on 
the decision-making processes of SWP.  Participants were encouraged to let their 
responses go outside the expected scope of the interview if they felt their stories were 
important to the events. 
Prior to conducting the personal interviews approval from the University of 
Saskatchewan’s Behavioural Ethics Committee was required.  Approval of the study’s 
procedures for data collection, storage, and use as well as guidelines for respecting 
interviewee’s anonymity was granted on July 15, 2004. 
4.4.1. Interview process 
Initially potential interviewees were contacted by phone and only saw the 
interview questions at the time of the interview. By the seventh interview, potential 
interviewees were emailed or faxed the questions and the Interview Consent Form prior 
to making a decision on whether or not to participate in an interview. The script and 
questions used for each semi-structured interview can be found in Appendix A.  Allowing 
potential interviewees to see the questions before committing to an interview enabled 
them to make an informed decision on whether or not to participate based on the 
questions that were being asked and their ability to answer them.  It also gave the 
interviewees a chance to compose their thoughts and prepare answers to the questions 
prior to the interview.  The consent form was included so each potential interviewee 
knew how the interview would proceed as well as how the interview responses were 
going to be used.  The Interview Consent Form is found in Appendix B. 
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Each interview took between 60 and 90 minutes to conduct.  Each interview was 
audio recorded and then transcribed.  Transcribing an interview generally took between 
five and six hours.  Voice recognition software could not be used; even though the 
technology has improved immensely, most products are still only able to recognize one 
person’s voice.  Once an interview was transcribed, the transcription was forwarded by 
mail or e-mail to the interviewee for review and editing.  The interviewee could drop out 
of the study without penalty at any time during the actual interview or after the 
transcription was sent for review.  Interviewees returned their edited transcripts along 
with a signed Interview Transcript Release Form to complete the interview process.  
Interviewee edits were incorporated into the electronic copy of the transcript.   
The Interview Transcript Release Form (Appendix C) gave each interviewee the 
opportunity to indicate the level of anonymity they wanted to retain – 95% of the 
interviewees chose to remain anonymous with none of their remarks attributed to them by 
name.  In writing the case study, interview responses could be attributed to an unnamed 
individual such as a manager or board member or to a composite profile, which is the 
same approach used by Fairbairn (2003a).  Whenever possible responses were aggregated 
and stated as “several interviewees commented that” or “several board members felt”.  
Keeping identities and remarks anonymous puts interview participants at ease knowing 
that their identity is kept in confidence and it resulted in the interviewees being more 
willing to share thoughts and views. 
4.4.2. Selection of potential interviewees 
The list of interviewees was not randomly selected.  A list of board members and 
management was compiled by reviewing the 1980-2003 SWP Annual Reports.  This 
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process generated a list of ninety-seven potential interviewees.  Consultation with Dr. 
Murray Fulton (thesis advisor) narrowed the list to approximately twenty-five potential 
interviewees; selection was based on importance of position – e.g. Board President, 
Board Vice-President, CEO – and Dr. Fulton’s personal perception regarding the 
willingness of certain individuals to participate.  Hand selecting the individuals to 
participate in an interview poses a risk of selection bias because the individuals could be 
purposely selected based on their perceived ability to offer insights that support the 
research propositions.   
To reduce the selection bias the other thesis committee members, Dr. Richard 
Gray and Ken Rosaasen, were invited to suggest additional people to interview. This 
meeting occurred on December 22, 2004. On January 10, 2005, committee members were 
provided with a list of thirty-five individuals who would be or had already been 
approached for an interview – the names of who accepted or declined an interview were 
not disclosed to the committee.  The purpose of sharing this list was to ensure that the 
potential interviewees represented a balanced cross-section of management and board 
members.  This was a one time occurrence as the committee did not review the list a 
second time; committee members were satisfied that a sufficient range of management 
and elected members would be approached.  Taking into account committee member and 
interviewee suggestions, the final list of potential contacts was thirty-nine individuals.  
Only the thesis advisor and the graduate student (Kathy Lang) know which individuals 
from the list of thirty-nine potential interviewees accepted a request for an interview.   
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4.4.3. Participation Rate 
Twenty-two personal interviews were conducted with past Pool senior executives, 
management, elected members and grain industry participants.  Thesis Advisor Dr. 
Murray Fulton participated in thirteen of the interviews.  There was a 78 percent 
acceptance rate of interview requests.  Twenty-eight individuals from the list of thirty-
nine potential interviewees were approached for an interview; three immediately 
declined, three initially accepted then declined prior to their interview, and twenty-two 
accepted and completed interviews.  Responses from twenty-one of the interviews are 
presented and analyzed in this thesis; one of the interviewees did not complete the 
Transcript Release Form making his/her interview responses ineligible for use in the 
thesis.   
Eleven individuals on the potential interviewee list were not contacted for various 
reasons; two would not return phone messages requesting an interview, active phone 
numbers could not be found for two others, and the remaining seven were not contacted 
due to timing reasons. 
Interviews began September 22, 2004 and the final interview was conducted April 
30, 2005.  The completion date for the interviews was four months longer than the 
projected timeframe outlined in the ethics application.  Scheduling conflicts were part of 
the reason for the interviews taking longer than anticipated to complete.  The interview 
period was also prolonged because additional interviews were not scheduled until 
transcribing was current. 
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CHAPTER 5: WESTERN CANADIAN GRAIN HANDLING INDUSTRY 
5.1. Introduction 
Several key regulations and governing bodies were put in place by the federal 
government early in the 20th century that helped develop the grain economy.  The federal 
government shaped the prairies through the provision of the National Policy to settle the 
west and build a railway connecting eastern and western Canada.  The Dominion Lands 
Act of 1872 offered a quarter-section of land for ten dollars provided settlers built a home 
and broke the land (Fowke 1957).  The Crow’s Nest Pass Agreement (1897) paid 
Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) $3.4 million in land, mineral rights and cash to complete 
a railway to the mineral-rich Kootenay area of British Columbia.  In exchange for the 
government assistance, CPR agreed to move grain at fixed freight rates in perpetuity 
(Fulton et al 1989, Fowke 1957).  The Canada Grain Act (1912) combined earlier acts – 
the 1900 Manitoba Grain Act and the 1904 Federal Grain Inspection Act – to oversee 
grain inspections, grading and loading platform construction (Fowke 1957).  
Strong producer lobbying over the years has seen the government take ownership 
in infrastructure, provide capital assistance, introduce regulations, and assume control of 
grain marketing. By the 1970s the government began to try to deregulate and move to a 
more commercially-oriented grain transportation system.  Lobbying efforts by the Prairie 
pools and farm lobby groups held off statutory freight rate removal from the 1980s until 
1995.  However, globalization and free-trade agreements pressured countries to reduce 
government subsidies and support.  In the 1990s the WGTA was repealed, railways 
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moved rapidly to further abandon branch lines while elevators hurried to relocate to the 
main lines. 
The history of prairie agriculture is full of change.  In order to gain an appreciation 
for the amount of change being faced by the Pool and the other grain handling companies 
this chapter summarizes some of the major events throughout the 20th century. The aim 
of this chapter is to show that the change required all grain companies, including the 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, to adjust their strategies for the new environment. 
5.2. The Crow Rate 
On September 6, 1897 the Canadian Pacific Railway Company (CPR) and the 
federal government signed an agreement for the construction of a railway from 
Lethbridge, Alberta through Crow’s Nest Pass to the mineral-rich area near Nelson, 
British Columbia (Fowke 1973, p. 54; Library and Archives Canada website).  
Compensation for building the railway included a $3.4 million cash subsidy and 3.75 
million acres of land containing lumber and minerals (Hall 1977, p. 36). In return, CPR 
agreed to rate reductions on eleven commodities.  Of most relevance to the grain industry 
was the reduction of eastbound rates for grain and flour by three cents per hundredweight 
with the new agreed upon rate holding in perpetuity (Crow’s Nest Pass Agreement). The 
rate effective September 1, 1899 from Regina was 20 cents per hundredweight (Hall 
1977, p. 36). For a time - October 7, 1903 until May 31, 1918 - the CP charged rates 
below the effective rates because CN Rail had reduced its rates and CP Rail had to follow 
suit in order to remain competitive (Hall 1977, p. 36). From 1918 until 1924, the War 
Measures Act suspended the Crow rate (Hall 1977, p. 37). In 1925, the rates were made 
 53
statutory at 20 cents per hundredweight under the Railway Act and were applied to any 
existing and future points on any railway west of Thunder Bay for grain and flour moving 
east to export position (Hall 1977, p. 38).2 Grain and flour moving to the Pacific coast 
was added in 1927 and the Port of Churchill was added in 1931 (Hall 1977, p. 38). The 
Crow Rate, as it is commonly referred to, accelerated and expanded the wheat economy 
and encouraged the production of bulk grains.  
5.3. Farmer Lobbying 
Producers proved early on that they could band together to exert effective 
pressure on the government to have their needs met.  Early in the 1900s farmers became 
involved in grain handling.  Fowke (1957) describes how “agrarian protest” made 
demands for increased government control and resulted in legislation such as the Canada 
Grain Act.  Producers felt the grain trade was dominated by a monopolistic or 
oligopolistic structure.  The line elevator companies were believed to collude on prices, 
weights, grades and dockage (Fowke 1957, p. 117). The 1904 Federal Grain Inspection 
Act was put in place to resolve these issues, but producers felt active involvement in the 
grain handling industry was also needed.   
One of the first steps farmers took was to create the Grain Grower’s Grain Co. in 
1906 to protect grain at terminal position.  Next farmers raised capital and built their own 
elevators.  By 1910 there were sixty farmer-owned elevators – 26 in Manitoba, 29 in 
Saskatchewan, and 5 in Alberta (Fowke 1957, p. 127).  All the elevators were owned 
separately. The municipal and farmer-owned elevators did bring some necessary 
competition, but patronage was lacking. Shareholders and directors could be found 
                                                
2 The statute put an end to CP Rail’s literal interpretation of the Crow’s Nest Pass Agreement; CP was only honouring 
the Crow rate on lines that existed when the Agreement was initially signed in 1897 (Hall 1977, p. 38). 
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hauling to line companies (p. 131). It seemed “farmers went where they believed they 
were getting the best terms” (p. 135). 
The Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company and United Grain Growers 
(formed through the 1917 amalgamation of Alberta Farmer’s Co-operative Elevator 
Company and Grain Grower’s Grain Company) received advances from their respective 
provincial governments to cover 85 percent of the cost to construct or purchase elevators 
that would be owned and managed by farmers (Fowke 1957, p. 147-148).  These 
elevators helped to make special binning and fair grading normal practice.  By 1920, 
these farmer-owned elevators had representation at 50 percent of the Prairie shipping 
points (650 elevators) and controlled one-third of the terminal capacity.  
Farmers constantly pressured the provincial and federal government to take 
control of the market and have ownership in the elevator system. The government was 
not interested in public ownership.  Persistence paid off, however, as farmer lobbying led 
to the 1913 federal government construction of inland terminals in Moose Jaw, Calgary, 
Saskatoon, and Edmonton along with a terminal at Port Arthur in eastern Canada (Fowke 
1957, p. 162).  Farmers were not the only ones asking for government support and 
involvement.  During WWI, demands for milling exceeded the available supply and the 
prices rose from $1.90 per bushel to $3.00 per bushel on the Winnipeg Grain Exchange 
(WGE).  The Winnipeg Grain Exchange asked the federal government to step in; wheat 
futures stopped trading from September 1917 until July 21, 1919 (Fowke 1957, p. 170).  
To control movement of grain, the Board of Grain Supervisors was put in place to sell 
grain at fixed prices.  Once the war ended in November 1918 the government wanted to 
quickly withdraw from the grain business and let the open market resume.  But 
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speculative movements within the first ten days of futures trading forced the government 
to establish the Canadian Wheat Board.  The CWB had a one-year monopoly on foreign 
and domestic sales of wheat and flour. Wheat futures trading on the WGE resumed 
August 18, 1920.  By the fall the CWB’s monopoly power was removed despite 
producers’ interests in making it permanent.  Together the Western Grain Growers, the 
Canadian Council of Agriculture and western legislatures made repeated presentations 
calling for the reinstatement of the CWB (Fowke 1957, p. 262-263). 
Farmers protested the Exchange, arguing speculation led to depressed prices that 
“injuriously affects the farmer and the community” because the price of grain is 
depressed in the fall when farmers are selling the bulk of their crop (Fowke 1957, p. 189). 
In all actuality the price slump experienced each fall may have had more to do with 
farmers “dumping” between 70 and 75 percent of their wheat production on the market 
during the three-month harvest period in order to generate much needed cash flow; the 
over-supply would have suppressed prices. Wheat growers wanted to see the Winnipeg 
Grain Exchange and the open market replaced by a government agency that would 
control prices. Three federal royal commissions were initiated to review farmer 
complaints. The commissions found that speculation was an integral part to the proper 
functioning of the futures markets (Fowke 1957, p. 188-190). The Royal Grain Inquiry 
Commission (1925) found that at times speculators magnified price fluctuations causing 
society to suffer, but overall speculative activity tended to stabilize and reduce 
fluctuations (p. 189). The Stamp Commission (1931) agreed with the findings of the 
1923-1925 Commission describing the futures market as a “distinct benefit to the 
producer in the price which he receives” (p. 193).  
 56
5.4. Advent of the Prairie Pools 
Producers decided to establish provincial wheat pool elevators to have a producer-
owned and producer-controlled alternative to the open market. They would have rather 
had a “governmental monopoly agency which would provide not an alternative to, but an 
exclusive replacement for, the open market system” (Fowke 1957, p. 198).  The aim of 
pooling was to narrow the spread between the local selling price for Canadian wheat and 
overseas prices (p. 207). Establishing a marketing agency that would pool grain and sell 
the stocks evenly over the crop year was anticipated to lead to a higher average price (p. 
209). 
In August 1923, American co-op advocate – Aaron Sapiro – gave pooling co-op 
sales pitches to farm leaders across the Prairies stressing the need for “orderly marketing” 
(Fairbairn 1984; Fowke 1957).  Through a pool, grain would be marketed throughout the 
crop year and the revenues pooled so all farmers would receive the same price for each 
grade of grain regardless of when they delivered (Fowke 1957, p. 197).  Producers would 
receive an initial payment at time of delivery followed by adjustment, interim and final 
payments as the crop year progressed and expected prices for grain became more certain.  
The concept of pooling was already being used by egg producers in Prince Edward 
Island, fruit growers in British Columbia, cheese factories in Ontario, and by marketing 
organizations all over the United States (p. 198). The co-op movement was also well 
established in the United States with 1,800 co-ops being formed in 1920 alone (Fowke 
1957, p. 213). 
Five-year contracts representing 50 percent of a province’s seeded acreage were a 
stipulation before a pool could commence operations. Pooling campaigns began for each 
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of the three Prairie Provinces. The Alberta Wheat Pool reached the required contracted 
acreage target before Manitoba and Saskatchewan; it began operations in 1923. 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool had to hold two pooling drives before the 50 percent acreage 
target was attained. Both SWP and Manitoba Pool Elevators were ready to market 
farmers’ grain in the 1924-25 crop year.   
5.4.1. Central Selling Agency 
In its early years, the SWP was integrated functionally with the Alberta and 
Manitoba pools.  The Prairie Pools jointly owned and controlled the Central Selling 
Agency (CSA), which marketed grain on farmers’ behalf from 1924 until 1931.  The 
CSA had offices throughout Canada and the world; 28 offices in 15 importing countries 
(Fowke 1957, p. 221).  The CSA was into its second round of five-year delivery contracts 
when a series of global events caused the federal government to take control of CSA 
operations in 1930.  
Troubles began to emerge when in 1928 Canada produced a large, poor quality 
wheat crop that only increased the already large surplus world wheat stocks.  There was a 
48.4 million bushel carryover into the 1929-30 crop year.  The CSA set the initial 
payment at $1.00 per bushel.  Speculative flurry led to the New York stock market crash 
on October 29, 1929 now known as “Black Tuesday” (Fowke 1957).  By the end of the 
crop year prices were below $1.00 per bushel.  This meant the CSA had overpaid its 
140,000 members a total of $22 million (Fowke 1957, p. 251).  These debts accrued to 
the Pools and took the next 20 years to pay off (see Table 5.1). 
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Table 5.1. Debt from the Central Selling Agency’s 1929-30 overpayment. 
Province $ millions of overpayment Date paid off 
Manitoba $3,364,722 October 1949 
Saskatchewan $13,265,054 September 1949 
Alberta $5,520,162 June 1, 1947 
TOTAL $22,149,938  
Source: Fowke 1957. 
 
For the 1930-31 crop year the pools had their provincial governments secure the 
bank advances against any losses. The initial payment started at $0.70 per bushel, but was 
reassessed and dropped to $0.50 per bushel by November 11, 1930 as futures prices 
continued to decline (Fowke 1957, p. 248).  The banks became reluctant to advance funds 
to meet CSA’s margin calls.  By the end of November 1930 the federal government had 
become involved, guaranteeing the pools’ advances and assuming control of the Central 
Selling Agency (p. 249). The federal government appointed J.I. McFarland as General 
Manager of the CSA with the key responsibility of disposing the pool stocks.  The 
overseas offices were closed and by June 1931 McFarland had liquidated the entire crop 
(Fowke 1957, p. 251).  The pools operated on a voluntary basis for the next four years 
until the establishment of the Canadian Wheat Board in 1935.  
5.5. Canadian Wheat Board 
During the depression years of the 1930s wheat prices dipped below $0.40 per 
bushel; these were truly years of economic hardship for Prairie farmers. With the 
dissolution of compulsory pooling in 1931, “Pool officials turned to the federal 
government with a request for the restoration of a national wheat board” (Fowke 1957, p. 
252). The federal government had always felt the open market and WGE were the right 
 59
instruments to facilitate cash and futures trading (Fowke 1957, p. 199).  Producers 
wanted government control and a re-establishment of the Canadian Wheat Board that had 
operated from 1919-1920.  Lobbying efforts by western agricultural leaders, western 
premiers, and pool leaders led to the CWB’s re-establishment in 1935.  A desirable 
feature of the CWB was the initial price, which served as a price floor, and a government 
guarantee to cover any losses should the realized price drop below the initial.  In 1935 the 
CWB was voluntary which led producers to cherry-pick between the open and pooling 
market.  The dual market resulted in losses in 1935 and 1938 and no deliveries in 1936 
and 1937 because the open market price was higher than the CWB initial.  The 
government attempted to rid itself of the responsibility for marketing western grain but it 
was met with “a storm of protest from the West” (Fowke 1957, p. 268).  The federal 
government tried to get out of wheat selling but failed. 
The start of World War II meant Europe was out of the export market leaving a 
large wheat market to contend with.  The CWB had been committed to “Mutual Aid” and 
bulk sales to Britain.  In order to meet these commitments the CWB was granted 
monopoly on the marketing of wheat in 1943; oats and barley were added in 1949 
(Fowke 1957; p. 278).  Multi-year international export agreements in 1946 and 1949 
signaled that the CWB was here to stay. In the 1960s the CWB began signing multi-year 
multi-million tonne sale agreements with nations such as China and the Soviet Union 
(CWB website). Export agreements still continue to be signed between the CWB and 
nations such as China. 
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5.6. Unprofitable Statutory Rates 
The advent of long-haul trucking of goods in the 1950s meant a greater share of 
the railways’ business was hauling grain – a money-losing business according to the 
railways.  Small wooden-crib elevators with one-time capacities of 30,000 bushels 
scattered the prairies because they had to be within a day’s travel of the farm during the 
horse and wagon days (Weatherald 2004). Essentially the Prairies had a network of 
elevators up and down miles of branch lines with the aim of being six to ten miles apart. 
At the peak there were 5,474 licensed elevators and each required three turnovers per 
year to remain profitable (Fowke 1957, p. 129).  
Serving all the branch lines at 1925 rates was no longer tolerable to the railways.  
The downside was that if railways began to remove service, the elevators would have to 
consolidate.  The Snavely Commission on the Cost of Moving Grain by Rail (1975) 
estimated that the cost of transporting grain was 2.6 times higher than the statutory rate 
being paid by producers (Snavely 1976, p. 205). The statutory rates only covered 38 
percent of the total rail costs of grain movement so railways were incurring annual losses 
of $89 million by carrying grain (Harvey 1980).  By 1977, the distribution of railway 
costs was farmers, 32.4 percent; government, 18 percent; and railways, 49.6 percent 
(Harvey 1980, p. 8).   
Rail companies began to renege on branch line maintenance; major delays and a 
lack of capacity became major problems for grain transportation. Pressures heightened on 
the federal government and provincial governments of Alberta and Saskatchewan to 
invest in rolling stock and branch line upgrades.  Between 1972 and 1986 the federal 
government acquired 14,000 hopper cars for use in western Canadian grain handling 
 61
(Estey 1998, p. 28). The Canadian Wheat Board purchased and entered long-term leases 
on 4,000 hopper cars and the provincial governments of Alberta and Saskatchewan each 
purchased 2,000 cars (Estey 1998, p. 28).3 
The MacPherson Commission (1959-1961) raised the issue of branch line 
abandonment and the Commission’s recommendations led to the National Transportation 
Act (1967). Prior to 1933, railways were allowed to abandon branch lines at will; under 
the National Transportation Act the government instituted a moratorium on branch line 
abandonment (Hall 1977, p. 53). In December 1974, a basic network of 12,413 miles of 
track was protected until 2000 and another 6,283 miles was protected until 1976 (Hall 
1977, p. 60).  As compensation for maintaining service on branch lines that railways were 
prohibited from closing, the federal government subsidized the operating costs and 
assumed the rehabilitation of guaranteed lines.  The Hall Commission (1975-1977) was 
responsible for determining an action plan on the 6,283 miles protected until January 1, 
1976. The Hall Commission recommended 2,165 miles be abandoned over the next three 
years, 1,813 miles be protected under the basic network until 2000, and 2,344 miles be 
placed under the Prairie Rail Authority (Hall 1977, p. 521). 
5.7. Producer-Ownership: WIT 
The 1970s was also a time when the lobbying groups became strongly divided on 
grain handling issues.  The Palliser Wheat Growers, later known as the Western Canadian 
Wheat Grower’s Association, formed in 1970.  This group of farmers felt there were 
inefficiencies in grain handling; elevators were viewed as being rewarded for storage 
                                                
3 In the 1996 Federal budget the government stated interested in selling its hopper cars.  The railways and the Farmer 
Rail Car Coalition have wanted to purchase the cars but no deal has come to pass.  In May 2006, the Federal 
government announced it is retaining its hopper fleet (FRCC website). 
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rather than for grain movement (Driver 2001).  Several issues drove farmers to enter the 
grain handling business.  They believed wheat should be graded on the basis of protein 
levels (higher protein should obtain a premium) (Herman 2003, p. 37).  Cleaning grain to 
export standards was seen as an activity that should occur at point of origin so that 
farmers would not pay freight on dockage and could sell the dockage as feed on the 
Prairies.  Lastly, the ability to load unit trains (25 or more cars) was seen as an efficiency 
gain for the system; this view was one that the railways shared (they had rail incentives 
implemented in the 1983 Western Grain Transportation Act) (Herman 2003). 
The Palliser Wheat Growers felt they were not receiving the service they deserved 
and they were “hungry for a more responsive, competitive system” (Herman 2003, p. 37).  
In its early stages of development, the terminal group was met with opposition from 
SWP, National Farmer’s Union, the provincial government, and churches along with 
support from some in federal government (Herman 2003, p. 38).  The opposition 
stemmed from the belief that inland terminals would drive consolidation and bring an end 
to the CWB, small towns and rail lines. Inland terminals were not a novel idea; the 
United States already had at least one hundred inland terminals in operation and an 
additional five to seven were being constructed each month (Herman 2003, p. 35). In 
spite of this opposition, 1,450 farmer-shareholders moved ahead with the building of the 
first producer-owned inland terminal in Canada.  The one-million bushel inland terminal, 
Weyburn Inland Terminal Inc. (WIT) officially opened for business on November 4, 
1976. 
Weyburn Inland Terminal (WIT) had its first handling agreement with Cargill.  
Cargill was also new to western Canadian grain handling having just entered through its 
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1974 purchase of National Grain Ltd. (Fairbairn 1984).  Cargill and WIT were in 
agreement until 1980, when UGG made an arrangement with WIT (Driver 2001).   
Financial difficulties experienced early on nearly led to WIT being purchased by 
SWP in 1986 (Herman 2003, p. 42).  The Weyburn Inland Terminal is in its 30th year of 
business, has no long-term debt and net income of $2.7 million (WIT Annual Report 
2005).  Weyburn Inland was the first of eleven inland terminals built in Saskatchewan.  
Sixteen years passed before a second producer-owned inland terminal was built in the 
province; ten terminals were then built over a 9-year span.  
5.8. Crow rate debate 
Interest in abolishing the Crow Rate initially surfaced in 1974 when Otto Lang, 
the Minister responsible for the Canadian Wheat Board, commented that the Crow Rate 
was a detriment to railroads and producers (Khakbazan 1999).  Livestock producers 
agreed with Minister Lang that the Crow Rate discouraged feed grains from remaining on 
the Prairies to be used as a cheap feed source for the developing livestock sector (Fulton 
et al 1998; Tyrchniewicz 1984; Rosaasen 1983; Wilson 1983).  Indeed the Snavely 
(1973-75) and Hall (1975-77) Commissions revealed the railways were losing money 
moving grain because farmers only paid “one half-cent per ton per mile” which 
accounted for only 38 percent of the total cost to ship grain to port position (Ewins 
1981a; Harvey 1980). The Snavely Commission estimated railway losses from handling 
grain totaled $89.3 million in 1974 (Snavely 1976, p. 206).  
There was strong opposition to changing the Crow Rate.  The Transportation 
Agency of Saskatchewan published books in 1977 entitled “Why The Crow Can’t Go” 
(Khakbazan 1999).  Pool delegates openly voiced their opposition to Crow Rate change.  
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Nevertheless, in March 1980, Transport Minister Luc Pépin launched an effort to revise 
the Crow Rate.  There was a realization among farmers that freight rate change was 
inevitable; the result was that Pool delegates accepted the impending reality, knowing 
that inflexibility would lock them out of discussions.  At the Pool’s annual meeting in 
November 1980, delegates voted in favour of negotiation.   
The Pool’s change in position did not sit well with the National Farmer’s Union 
(NFU) or the Saskatchewan government.  The NFU, in partnership with the 
Saskatchewan government, hosted a “Keep the Crow Rally” and encouraged Pool 
members to vote out delegates who supported the Crow negotiations (Ewins 1981b).  The 
NFU even passed a resolution asking for Pool President Ted Turner to resign because of 
his decision to negotiate on the Crow Rate.  The Saskatchewan Agriculture Minister 
(MacMurchy) publicly stated that the Crow Rate was a deal for the West from 
confederation and it must remain in place “for all time” (Ewins 1981b).   
5.8.1. Gilson Recommendations 
In February 1982, Clay Gilson was appointed to negotiate with farmers to develop 
a consensus among farm groups on a transportation policy (Fairbairn 1984).  The Pool 
came to the table with seven points that had to be met before the Pool would engage in 
negotiations.  The Pool wanted the Crow rate extended to all Canadian grains and 
processed agriculture products, the rates were to remain statutory and distance-related, 
any short falls were to be paid directly to railways, and there should be a federal 
government guarantee on railway performance, branch line upgrades and rolling stock 
(SWP Comm. Division 1982).  A policy incorporating these seven points was viewed by 
some as “totally unrealistic and hopelessly contradictory” (Fairbairn 1984, p. 227).   
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Gilson released his report and recommendations four months later.  The 
recommendations called for the farmers to pay increasing portions of the costs.  A 
volume cap of 30.4 million tonnes was also included in the recommendations.  An annual 
$644.1 million payment to cover freight costs would be paid to farmers (Fairbairn 1984, 
p. 231).  Using the Gilson recommendations, Pepin announced the new transportation 
policy which included direct payments to farmers, with producers covering 81 percent of 
the costs by 1990, and incentive rates (Tyrchniewicz 1984; SWP Comm. Division 1983).  
The Pool described Pepin’s policy as “a cruel blow to western agriculture” and Pool 
members vowed to “actively try to influence the thinking of all MPs” (SWP Comm. 
Division 1983).  
The Prairie Pools with support from Quebec lobbied the government all winter 
long which led to a revision of the proposal due to a “wall of opposition” (Norrie 1983).  
Instead of the subsidy being paid to farmers, it would now be paid directly to the railways 
– one of the Pool’s seven requirements.  Freight rates would be linked to grain prices and 
special crops and their products would be included under the statutory rates.  While this 
pleased Pool members, the Prairie Farm Commodity Coalition, UGG, and the Manitoba 
Farm Bureau were angered that the subsidy would not be paid directly to producers.  The 
farm lobby groups were out-lobbied by the Pools and a rivalry emerged between them.  
Pool Vice President Garf Stevenson publicly commented that paying the railways is what 
grain farmers want; “the commodity coalition lost the argument and the sooner they 
accept that the better” (Wilson 1983). 
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5.8.2. Western Grain Transportation Act 
The Western Grain Transportation Act (Bill C-155) replaced the Crow Rate on 
August 1, 1984.  The Act provided for a payment amounting to the 1981-82 railway 
revenue shortfall of $658.6 million to be paid annually by governments to railway 
(Vercammen 1996a).  This annual subsidy was known as the Crow Benefit. The WGTA 
incorporated distance-based rates, which meant that all delivery points with the same 
hauling distance to port had the same maximum rate per tonne. For example, all delivery 
points 976 to 1,000 miles from port position had the same freight rate ($32.07 per tonne) 
regardless of whether the point was on a low-cost mainline or a high-cost branch line 
(Vercammen 1996a).  The rates also included a 20 percent contribution to the railways’ 
fixed assets (Vercammen 1996a). Government contributions decreased over the next 
decade until contributions were 48.3 of the total freight charge by 1995-96 (Vercammen 
1996a, p. 3). 
Incentive rates that favoured 25-plus car units were included in the WGTA, which 
encouraged consolidation of the elevator network. As part of the WGTA, the National 
Transportation Agency monitored railway performance and reviewed rail abandonment 
requests.  Three-year branch line plan submissions were part of the rail abandonment 
process and were intended to be a paperwork hurdle that would discourage branch 
closures (Transport Canada 1999b; Fulton et al 1998). 
5.9. Government Support and Trade Agreements 
Agricultural policy and agricultural protection has a 200-year history throughout 
Europe and North America (Fulton and Storey 1990).  For example, in the early 1800s 
both France and Great Britain had import duties on grain (p. 198).  Governments were in 
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the pursuit of free trade in the early 20th Century, but that changed after the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Governments wanted to avoid a repeat of the economic burdens 
experienced by farmers in the Depression years, so they discarded the opinion that the 
open market should control agriculture and began to extend financial support to farmers 
(Fulton and Storey 1990, p. 202-203). Throughout Europe and North America 
government financial support was extended to support farm prices and incomes. 
The 1962 introduction of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) enabled the 
European Community to move from being a net importer to a net exporter by the 1982-83 
crop year. In 1984, the U.S. introduced the Export Enhancement Program in order to fight 
for market share (Fulton and Storey 1990, p. 205). A price subsidy war between the 
United States and Europe from 1985 to 1990, negatively affected world grain prices. The 
federal government announced the Special Canadian Grains Program in 1986, which 
would see a $1 billion deficiency payment go to grain farmers to compensate for the 
lower prices resulting from the US-EC price wars (Rosaasen et al 1990).4  This program 
was replaced with GRIP (Gross Revenue Insurance Program) and NISA (Net Income 
Stabilization Act) in 1991.  These price support programs were implemented to stabilize 
producer revenues and counter the massive grain subsidies in Europe and United States.5   
Trade agreements between Canada, United States and Mexico began in the late 
1980s.  The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA or FTA) was 
implemented on January 1, 1989; its aim was to eliminate tariffs over the next ten years, 
increase market access and decrease subsidies.  In January 1994, through the North 
                                                
4 This program was extended and increased in 1987. In 1986, lentil, pea, mustard, and canaryseed acres were excluded 
(Rosaasen et al 1990, p. 13). 
5 AIDA (Agriculture Income Disaster Assistance) was offered from 1999 to 2000 when it was replaced by CFIP 
(Canadian Farm Income Program) which ran from 2000-2002. CAIS (Canadian Agricultures Income Stabilization) 
replaced CFIP and NISA in 2003. 
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mexico was added to the free trade 
agreement between Canada and the United States resulting in the world’s largest free 
trade bloc. In the same year the Uruguay Round’s GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade) became embodied in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Doha Round 
of WTO negotiations began in November 2001 and extend beyond the timeframe of 
interest for this research.  The goal of all these agreements was to reduce and eventually 
remove barriers to trade such as tariffs and producer subsidies. 
5.10. WGTA Abolished 
The WGTA was abolished August 1, 1995. The Crow Benefit was considered an 
export subsidy by the international community and therefore not acceptable under GATT 
(Vercammen 1996a, p. 3). In addition, the “transportation subsidy was also a sizable 
financial commitment for a cash-strapped federal government…that was no longer able 
or willing to maintain its financial commitment to grain producers” (Vercammen 1996a, 
p. 3; Department of Finance 1995).  Farmers received a one-time payout of $1.6 billion to 
compensate for the loss of the WGTA.  The Canada Transportation Agency (CTA) was 
put in place under Bill C-14.  Railways now had greater freedom to restructure rates and 
to abandon grain dependent branch lines.  Maximum freight rates were set by the CTA 
for the first five years. Upon the removal of the subsidy, freight rates paid by farmers 
more than doubled in the first year.  Figure 5.1 shows the freight rate paid by farmers for 
wheat shipped from Saskatoon to Thunder Bay/St. Lawrence; rates more than doubled, 
increasing from $13.37 per tonne in 1994-95 to $35.01 per tonne in the 1995-96 crop 
year. For Board grains, the CWB implemented a catchment area approach to calculate 
basis deductions and ended the pooling of seaway costs (Gray 1996). 
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As of August 1, 2000 railways adhere to a revenue cap set by the CTA.  Railways 
are also encouraged to provide one-year’s notice of branch line closures. 
 
Figure 5.1. Wheat freight rates paid by farmers, from Saskatoon to Thunder 
Bay/St. Lawrence, 1981-2006. 
Source: SAF Agricultural Statistics. 
5.10.1. Changing cropping choices 
The increase in freight rates has farmers rethinking their transportation 
alternatives and their cropping choices. Increased transportation by long-haul trucking, 
selling to processing plants, feeding to livestock and growing higher valued crops all 
became viable alternatives.  Wheat is the principal crop grown on the Prairies; acres sown 
in Saskatchewan reached a high of 21.74 million in 1986 and were a reported 14 million 
acres in 2005 (CANSIM).  As Figure 5.2 shows wheat has always surpassed the 
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provincial acres sown to oats and barley.  Regulation supported the evolution of the 
elevator handling system in western Canada to become efficient in the bulk handling of 
grain.  The first movement away from cereal crops came with the emergence of rapeseed 
in the 1960s.  By 1969, one million acres of rapeseed was planted in Saskatchewan 
because it was a feasible rotational crop offering higher returns to farmers (Fairbairn 
1984, p. 191).   
 
Figure 5.2. Seeded acres of wheat, oats and barley in Saskatchewan, 1908–2005. 
Source: CANSIM. 
 
Next to arrive were the pulses – peas, lentils, chickpeas and beans – in the late 
1970s and early 1980s.  In 1980 there were 30,000 acres of field peas sown in Canada, 
the acres sown to lentils, chickpeas and beans were so insignificant that data was not 
collected (Gray and Scott 2003, p. 3).  However, the latest statistics show that over 40 
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percent of Saskatchewan census farms include pulses in their crop rotation (Gray and 
Scott 2003, p. 3).  Saskatchewan is the leading producer of peas, lentils and chickpeas in 
Canada (Saskatchewan Pulse Growers website).  Pulses require special cleaning and 
handling as well as containerized shipment – services not available through the bulk 
handling elevator system – which allowed for the development of specialty crop 
processing plants.  Today there are more than 130 specialty crop processors in 
Saskatchewan (Gray and Scott 2003, p. 5).  Acres that were traditionally sown to cereal 
crops, such as wheat, began shifting into oilseed and specialty crop production as shown 
in Figure 5.3.  As the figure indicates, spring wheat acres began a downward trend in the 
mid-1980s while canola and specialty crops have been increasing since the 1970s. 
 
Figure 5.3. Wheat, canola and specialty crop seeded acres in Saskatchewan, 1944-
2005. 
Source: CANSIM 
Note: Specialty crops includes seeded acres for peas, lentils, chickpeas and canary seed. 
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5.10.2. Tariff Cap Rates 
A year before the removal of the WGTA the Canadian Grain Commission (CGC) 
changed the way elevator tariff rates were set.  Until 1994, the CGC controlled the 
maximum rates an elevator could charge a farmer for handling, elevation and cleaning 
(Fulton et al 1998, p. 37).  Elevators are now required to file maximum fees to the CGC 
each crop year.  Grain companies will price discriminate between provinces and locations 
in which they operate facilities.  For several years, grain companies would have lower 
tariffs in Saskatchewan than in Alberta or Manitoba because they had to keep their tariffs 
in line with what SWP was charging.  By 2000, companies began to set standard fees for 
all their facilities across western Canada and producers were compensated with trucking 
allowances as they seemed to react more favorably to a trucking incentive than to lower 
handling fees (Pratt 2000). 
5.10.3. The Estey-Kroeger Process 
In December 1997, Justice Willard Estey was appointed by the Minister of 
Transport to conduct a review of the grain handling and transportation system with the 
intention of making the system more commercially oriented (Transport Canada 1999a).  
The Estey report (released December 21, 1998) had fifteen key recommendations. 
Recommendations included: 1) clean grain to export standards on the Prairies; 2) 
discontinue the Car Allocation Policy Group; 4) modify the cap on rail freight rates; 5) 
increase entry access for potential rail service providers, and; 6) eliminate harvest quota 
(Transport Canada 1999b).  Recommendation 14 called for the CWB to no longer have 
an operational or commercial role in grain handling and transportation; instead grain 
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companies would bid on tenders to carry out the collection of grain from farmers and 
movement of grain to port for CWB sales contracts (Estey Final Report, p. 55). 
Mr. Arthur Kroeger was appointed in May 1999 to manage a consultative process 
to implement twelve of the fifteen recommendations by the start of the 2000-01 crop year 
(Transport Canada 1999a).6  The Estey-Kroeger recommendations resulted in Bill C-34, 
which amended the Canada Transportation Act and made way for change in grain 
handling and transportation in western Canada.  Bill C-34 resulted in caps for railway 
revenue generated from grain transportation.  Another outcome was grain tendering; in 
finding a way to implement Recommendation 14 the Working Group on Commercial 
Relations suggested the CWB retain its role in grain handling and transportation but also 
introduce tendering and performance awards based on a grain company’s share of 
producer deliveries (Kroeger Report 1999).  A 3-year memorandum of understanding 
between the CWB, the Western Grain Elevators’ Association (WGEA) and the Inland 
Terminals Association of Canada (ITAC) to tender 25 percent of grain cars and use zone 
allocation for the non-tendered cars resulted.7 Tendering works in conjunction with 
incentive rates; grain companies make bids to guarantee cars and to qualify for rail freight 
rebates ranging from $0.75 per tonne for loading 25 cars to $3.00 per tonne for loading 
100 cars (Vercammen 1996b).   
Lastly, a provision for easier access for new rail operators has seen some positive 
movement.  Short line companies have been able to operate on abandoned branch lines 
that interchange at CP and CN mainlines.  Great Western Railway Ltd., Southern 
                                                
6 The Federal Government chose to retain three of Estey’s recommendations for further review (Transport Canada 
1999a). 
7 Tendering increased to 50 percent of sales volumes in 2002-03, but decreased to 20 percent the following crop year 
(and it still remains at this level) (Ewins 2003). Transportation savings were $51 million in the 2003-04 crop year and 
$26.6 million in the 2004-05 crop year (Ewins 2006a). 
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Manitoba Railway, Carlton Trail Railway, Alberta RailNet Inc., Burlington Northern 
(Manitoba) Ltd. and Central Western Railways are all shortline companies operating in 
western Canada (Railway Association of Canada website).  However, CP and CN remain 
the only main line service providers despite applications from Ferroequus Railway and 
OmniTRAX (OmniTRAX website). 
5.11. Elevator Consolidation 
Consolidation has been ongoing since the 1970s; elevators aged, farmers’ method 
of delivering grain changed from three tonne trucks to B-trains, rail line incentives for 
larger train spots encouraged rationalization, and branch lines were abandoned.  The 
pressure to consolidate increased significantly upon the removal of the WGTA in 1995.  
Grain dependent branch lines were no longer protected and grain companies quickly 
moved to rebuild their elevator networks on the main lines. 
High throughput elevators that could load cleaned grain for 25 to 100 cars within 
12 hours became common to the industry.  Figure 5.4 shows the number of Prairie 
stations, Saskatchewan stations and Saskatchewan Wheat Pool stations from 1980 until 
2006. Dominion Bond Rating Service in its annual report on prairie grain handling 
believes “the era of rampant elevator abandonment is over” (Pratt 2006).  Over the last 
decade, licensed primary grain elevators decreased from 1,340 in 1995 to 335 in 2006.  
Storage capacity declined to a lesser degree from 6.6 million tonnes to 5.13 million 
tonnes, which reflects the closure of small elevators.  Interesting to note, Cargill President 
Kerry Hawkins predicted in 1994 that there would be no more than 600 elevators in 
western Canada by 2005 (Wilson 1994).  At the time, Cargill was planning to “invest 
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more than $1 billion to revitalize their handling systems” over the next decade (Wilson 
1994).  
 
Figure 5.4. Number of licensed primary elevators: Prairies, Saskatchewan, and 
SWP, 1980–2006. 
Source: Canadian Grain Commission; SAFRR Agricultural Statistics; SWP Annual 
Reports. 
 
Note: The large drop in Prairie primary elevators from 1984 to 1985 was due a change in 
CGC’s reporting rules.  Operators of primary elevators were now allowed to license two 
or more adjacent facilities under the control of a single manager as a single primary 
elevator. 
 
Table 5.2 shows the top ten grain companies by primary storage capacity on the 
Prairies for each of the last five decades and for 2006.  The top 10 grain companies have 
consecutively included Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, Alberta Wheat Pool and Manitoba 
Pool Elevators (Agricore since 1998), Parrish and Heimbecker (since 1970), Pioneer, 
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United Grain Growers, N.M. Paterson and Sons and Cargill (since 1980).  Saskatchewan 
Wheat Pool consistently ranked number one and held between 24 and 28 percent of the 
primary storage capacity (CGC 1960; 1970; 1980; 1990; 2000). As of 2006, Agricore 
United held the largest percentage (24.5 percent) of primary storage capacity on the 
Prairies, bumping SWP to second place with 22 percent. 
In western Canadian grain handling there has always been the major grain 
companies that owned the bulk of the primary storage capacity. In the late 1990s, 
however, new entrants made a strong effort to break into the industry.  In 2000 Louis 
Dreyfus (7th) and ConAgra (9th) were ranked among the top ten grain companies on the 
Prairies in terms of storage capacity; these companies had entered the grain handling 
industry in western Canada two years earlier. The producer terminals are reported 
individually in the Grain Elevators in Canada report, which disguises their size and 
presence in Saskatchewan.  If considered together producer terminals owned 14.6 percent 
(411,110 tonnes) of the primary storage capacity in Saskatchewan in 2006, second only 
to Saskatchewan Wheat Pool which owns 30 percent (CGC GEIC 2006). 
  
Table 5.2. Top 10 Prairie grain companies by primary storage capacity, 1960-2006.a 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2006 
1. SWP (24%) 1. SWP (24%) 1. SWP (28%) 1. SWP (26%) 1. SWP (22.4%) 1. Agricore United 
(24.5%) c 
2. AWP (15%) 2. Federal (20%) 2. AWP (21%) 2. AWP (20%) 2. Agricore (22%) 2. SWP (22%) 
3. UGG (12%) 3. UGG (17%) 3. UGG (18%) 3. UGG (16%) 3. UGG (11.9%) 3. Pioneer (12.3%) 
4. Pioneer (10%) 4. AWP (12%) 4. Pioneer (14%) 4. Pioneer (12%) 4. Pioneer (8%) 4. Cargill (9.1%) 
5. Searle (8%) 5. Pioneer (10%) 5. MPE (7%) 5. MPE (8%) 5. Cargill (7.5%) 5. Paterson (6.5%) 
6. Federal (7%) 6. MPE (7%) 6. Cargill (6%) 6. Cargill (6%) 6. AgPro (7.4%)b 6. Louis Dreyfus (6%) 
7. MPE (6%) 7. National (6%) 7. P&H (3%) 7. P&H (3%) 7. P&H (3.7%) 7. P&H (5.8%) 
8. Alta Pacific (6%) 8. Paterson (2%) 8. Paterson (3%) 8. Paterson (3%) 8. Paterson (3.7%) 8. WIT (2.1%) 
9. National (6%) 9. P&H (1%) 9. WIT (0.29%) 9. AgPro (3%) 9. Louis Dreyfus 
(2.7%) 
9. NWT (1.2%) 
10. Paterson (2%) 10. Robin Hood (1%) 10. Continental 
(0.14%) 
10. AB Terminals 
(2%) 
10. ConAgra (1.9%) 10. Bunge (1.1%) 
a Prairies includes Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta. 
bAgPro is a subsidiary of SWP. After 2000, its storage capacity has been included in the SWP’s overall storage capacity. 
cIn 2001, Agricore merged with UGG to form Agricore United. 
 
Source: Canadian Grain Commission Grain Elevators in Canada several years. 
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5.12. New Competition 
The rebuilding and repositioning period following the removal of the WGTA 
enabled new entrants to enter the western Canadian grain handling industry.  Existing 
grain companies had to relocate on main lines and increase the throughput capacity of 
their elevators in order to qualify for unit train rebates from the railways.  At the same 
time multinational companies, namely ConAgra, Louis Dreyfus, ADM and Bunge, along 
with producer-owned inland terminals began springing up across the Prairies and adding 
to the competition mix. 
5.12.1. Producer-owned inland terminals 
Sixteen years after WIT started operations, a second producer-owned terminal – 
North East Terminal (NET) – opened near Wadena, Saskatchewan in 1992.  The reason 
for the 16-year lag between WIT and the ten other terminals was because farmer 
investors wanted a “proven record of success at WIT before embarking on their own” 
initiative (Herman 2003, p. 44).  Many of the inlands partnered with existing industry 
players in order to gain access to port facilities; Cargill partnered on four of the facilities 
and Agricore United on two terminals (Herman 2003). Table 5.3 lists the producer-owned 
inland terminals in Saskatchewan, including the year they began operation, their storage 
capacity and any joint owners at time of start up.   
In an attempt to remove the remove the reliance on grain companies for port 
access, five producer-owned inland terminals – Terminal One – made a bid on the old 
UGG terminal at the port of Vancouver in early 2005.  The deal fell through in August 
2005 because the Terminal One group could not secure the required 1.6 million tonnes of 
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grain supplies.  The shortage was due to many of the producer-owned inlands being 
locked into handling agreements with other companies at the port (Ewins 2005a; Ewins 
2005d). 
Table 5.3. Producer-owned inland terminals of Saskatchewan, as of 2004. 
Facility Name Location Year Storage Capacity Joint Owner 
CMI Terminal Naicam 1999 23,320 Agricore United 
Gardiner Dam Terminal Loreburn 1999 17,000 Agricore United 
Great Sandhills Terminal Leader 1999 16,500 SWP 
Mainline Terminal Ltd. Moosomin 1997 31,340 Cargill 
Mid-Sask Terminal Watrous 1997 23,800 Pioneer 
North East Terminal Wadena 1992 35,920 Cargill 
North West Terminal Unity 1996 63,000 Pioneer 
Prairie West Terminal Plenty 1998 44,580 – 
South West Terminal Gull Lake 1997 52,000 Cargill 
Terminal 22 (1998) Inc. Balcarres 1998 32,500 Cargill 
Weyburn Inland Terminal Weyburn 1976 107,900 – 
Source: Herman 2003; Canadian Grain Commission 2004-2005. 
Note: Parrish and Heimbecker purchased Mainline Terminal in 2005.  
5.12.2. Multinational Competitors 
In terms of multinational agribusiness companies in western Canadian grain 
handling, Cargill had been on the scene since 1974 with its purchase of National Grain 
and the construction of two large concretes in Elm Creek, Manitoba and Rosetown, 
Saskatchewan.  Cargill is a privately owned business with headquarters in Minneapolis, 
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Minnesota and operations in 61 countries.  Cargill started in grain storage in 1865 but has 
been diversifying and expanding globally since the 1950s.  Annual sales revenues totaled 
$71 billion in 2005 (Cargill website).  In Canada, Cargill is involved in beef and poultry 
processing, grain handling, crop inputs, animal nutrition, malting barley (Prairie Malt), 
sweeteners, road salt, chocolate, egg processing and the trading of coal, weather 
derivatives and electricity (Cargill Canada website).  Cargill AgHorizons currently 
operates 31 elevators in western Canada and ranks fourth in primary grain storage 
capacity (CGC 2006).   
Archer-Daniels-Midland Company (ADM) is based out of Decatur, Illinois and 
generated net sales of $35.9 billion in 2005 (ADM website).  ADM is an agribusiness 
involved in the processing of crops into food ingredients, animal feed ingredients, 
nutritional products, renewable fuels and natural industrial chemicals (ADM website).  
To source crops for processing, ADM acquired 45 percent share of United Grain Growers 
(UGG) in 1997 and currently owns a 28 percent share of Agricore United.  In 2004, 
ADM owned four primary elevators – two in Saskatchewan and two in Manitoba (CGC 
GEIC 2004).  As of 2006, ADM only owns one elevator in each province (CGC 2006). 
ConAgra Foods Inc. is headquartered in Omaha, Nebraska and is a producer of 
nearly 80 brands of packaged and frozen foods for retail, the foodservice industry and 
food processors (Murray 2005). Well-known brands include Orville Redenbacher’s, 
Hunt’s, Reddi Wip, Chef Boyardee, Healthy Choice, Pam (ConAgra Foods website).  
The company’s annual net sales were $11.6 billion in 2006 (ConAgra Annual Report 
2006).  ConAgra made the decision to move downstream to source raw product and 
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constructed four grain terminals in western Canada (CGC 2004).  In 2005, ConAgra sold 
its four terminals to James Richardson International (Ewins 2005c). 
Established in 1851, Louis Dreyfus is a multinational diversified company with its 
headquarters in Paris, France and annual sales over $20 billion (Louis Dreyfus website).  
This family-owned company has operations in 53 countries; activities include the 
“processing, trading and merchandising of various agricultural and energy commodities” 
(Louis Dreyfus website).  Louis Dreyfus has diversified into particleboard manufacturing, 
telecommunications, real estate, ocean vessels, and forestry management.  This company 
made its debut in western Canada in 1998 with its steel bin construction.  Louis Dreyfus 
currently owns nine elevators – three in Alberta, two in Manitoba and four in 
Saskatchewan – and has the sixth largest total primary storage capacity on the Prairies 
(CGC GEIC 2006).   
Bunge is a multinational diversified company with commodity trading roots in 
Amsterdam, Argentina and Brazil.  Bunge expanded into United States in 1935.  Global 
headquarters were moved to White Plains, New York in 1999.  The company has been 
diversifying up the food production chain since the 1970s.  Bunge is notable in that it 
only handles oilseeds – flax, canola, and soybeans.  Although Bunge Canada only has 
two primary elevators (both located in Saskatchewan) it is Canada’s largest oilseed 
processor with four canola processing plants in western Canada and one canola/soybean 
processing plant in Ontario (Bunge Canada website).  Through its 2002 purchase of 
Cereol, Bunge acquired CanAmera (a former SWP subsidiary) allowing it to establish its 
oil processing network in Canada (Pratt 2002).  Globally, Bunge is the world’s leading 
oilseed processor, the world’s largest producer and supplier of fertilizer to South 
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American farmers, and the world’s leading seller of bottled vegetable oils.  In 2005, 
Bunge’s net sales were $24 billion (Bunge website). 
As of August 1, 2006 ADM, Bunge and Louis Dreyfus together accounted for 14 
primary elevators (4 percent of Prairie elevators) averaging 28,640 tonnes storage 
capacity for a total of 401,000 tonnes of storage capacity (7.8 percent of the total Prairie 
storage capacity).  In less than ten years these companies were able to successfully enter 
western Canada and provide strong competition in the grains and oilseeds handling 
industry.  By choosing to enter western Canada at the peak of deregulation and 
consolidation, the companies were able to build at viable points on the main lines.  
5.13. Challenges to CWB 
Challenges to the CWB’s grain marketing monopoly arose in the 1990s.  Some 
producers wanted more say in the CWB’s affairs while others wanted the CWB’s single 
desk selling powers to be removed entirely.  Producers began to question the CWB’s 
marketing powers, wanting more choice on where to market their wheat and barley.8  In 
November 1995, an Alberta farmer plebiscite found 66 percent in favour of a dual-market 
for barley and 62 percent in favour of a dual-market for wheat (MacArthur 1996).  
Several producers were charged and even spent time in jail for trying to haul grain into 
the U.S. without CWB export permits, unlawfully taking seized trucks from Canada 
Customs compounds, and protesting at a Lyleton, Manitoba border crossing (Tjaden 
1997; Rampton 1996).  The Western Canadian Wheat Growers Association, Farmers for 
Justice, the National Farmer’s Union and Citizens Concerned About Free Trade 
                                                
8 In 1989, oats was removed from CWB control. In 1993, the federal government instituted a continental barley  market 
for a period of 30 days (Schmitz et al, 1997). 
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(CCAFT) were some of the groups that were key in driving the debate on the CWB’s 
future.   
The CWB had been a crown agency overseen by five Commissioners – three were 
federally appointed.  Bill C-4 was passed in June 1998 giving producers more control 
over the direction of the CWB. In December 1998, the CWB began operating with a 
shared governance structure, a farmer-elected board of directors and an appointed CEO.  
The fifteen-member board has ten farmer-elected members and five federally appointed 
members (President, CEO and three others).  This legislation brought about the most 
dramatic changes the CWB had seen in nearly half a century. 
5.13.1. Trade agreements challenge CWB 
The CWB’s single-desk marketing has come under scrutiny from the United 
States ever since the signing of the FTA in 1989.  The U.S. government has alleged that 
Canadian durum wheat exports are in violation of the agreement.  In 1993, the North 
Dakota Wheat Commission accused the CWB of using freight subsidies and predatory 
pricing to gain unfair trade advantages (Dakers and Frechette 1998).  In mid-January 
1994, the United States requested the International Trade Commission review Canada’s 
durum sales practices; only 3 of 105 sales were at prices below the U.S. price.  Since 
1990, legal costs for the fourteen U.S. trade challenges brought against the CWB have 
cost $17 million.  
Under the WTO, the CWB is viewed as a state-trading enterprise.  The United 
States and European Union are arguing that state-trading enterprises qualify as export 
subsidies; essentially the U.S. and E.U. want to see an end to the CWB.  The 2004 WTO 
Framework Agreement explicitly states that there needs to be an elimination of export 
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subsidies, export credit guarantees, government financing, and exporting state trading 
enterprises (WTO 2004). There is a current commitment to end export subsidies by 2013, 
which will include the removal of the government guarantee on initial payments and 
borrowings (CWB website).  
The current Conservative government has expressed desire to see the removal of 
the CWB by July 2008 (Migie et al 2006), but farmers have strongly indicated that the 
CWB’s fate should remain a decision for farmers to make (Ewins 2006c).9 The CWB Act 
requires a vote by producers to end the single desk. The changes being proposed for the 
CWB make for interesting and uncertain times in the agriculture industry. 
5.14. Farm Demographics 
Farmer demographics have also been changing – average age, education and farm 
size are all increasing (AAFC 2005).  Figure 5.5 shows the number of farms in 
Saskatchewan (in Census years) and the average farm size in acres from 1916 to 2001.  
The number of farms peaked at 142,391 in 1936 and has declined by 64 percent over the 
last 65 years to 50,598 in 2001.  By 2001 the average Saskatchewan farm had reached 
1,280 acres in size, up from 845 acres in 1971.  The average farm size has increased by 
over 360 percent from 1916 to 2001.  Some people in the agriculture industry suggest 
average farm size will reach 3,000 to 5,000 acres and will be corporate farms rather than 
the traditional family-owned and operated farm (Paul et al 2004).  Furtan (2006) suggests 
farms ranging from 30,000 to 50,000 acres may become the average if the current trend 
towards an industrial farm structure continues. 
                                                
9 Federal Agriculture Minister Chuck Strahl announced in November 2006 that a producer plebiscite will be held for 
barley in January 2007 (AAFC website). To date there has been no mention for a plebiscite on wheat. 
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Figure 5.5. Number of farms and average farm size in Saskatchewan, 1916–2001. 
Source: SAF Agricultural Statistics. 
The level of education obtained by farmers has also increased.  The 1996 Census 
reports that 37 percent of Saskatchewan farm operators have post-secondary education.  
In the 2001 Census that same statistic had increased to 40 percent of Saskatchewan farm 
operators.  Fifty percent of young farmers have some post-secondary education, which 
increases the potential to continue learning, adopt new management practices and 
increase the financial performance of an operation (AAFC).  Programs by the federal 
government, such as the 2005 CASS (Canadian Agricultural Skills Service) provides 
financial support to farmers to broaden their skill set.  
As profit margins decrease, farmers need the knowledge to determine optimal 
marketing options and prices for their commodities.   Farmers will search out the best 
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price for their crop production and will look for grain companies to offer trucking and 
grade incentives (Ewins 2005b).   
5.15. Overcapacity 
During the 1990s grain companies were relocating to main lines, producer-owned 
inlands were being built and American multinationals were entering the Prairies. As grain 
companies opened high throughput elevators (HTE) they had to close their smaller 
wooden facilities. Closing the older elevators on branch lines and relocating to the main 
lines was not an overnight job. The process was lengthy and it led to industry being 
overbuilt (Schroeder and Chim 2003; Schroeder et al 2001). Closures were delayed as 
grain companies attempted to lessen the producer backlash. The Pool especially found 
that “some of the most loyal pool members [began] delivering to other companies” 
because they were angry that their local facilities were being closed (Briere 2000). 
Continuing the closure of smaller elevators incapable of loading a minimum of 25 cars 
would alleviate some of the overcapacity, but it was believed that there had also been 
over-construction of high throughput elevators. 
A typical HTE averages 25,000 metric tonnes storage capacity and can load 50 or 
more cars in 8 to 12 hours (CGC FAQ 2004; Schroeder and Chim 2003).  For an HTE to 
breakeven it should turnover its capacity at least 10 times (Schroeder and Chim 2003).  
As of August 1, 2006 74 elevators on the Prairies qualified as HTE's on the basis of 
storage capacity (>25,000 tonnes) and accounted for 54 percent (2.8 million metric 
tonnes) of the total Prairie storage capacity (CGC GEIC 2006).  
Figure 5.6 shows the number of primary elevators and storage capacity on the 
Prairies from 1995 to 2005.  The number of primary elevators increased slightly in the 
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first two years but has continually decreased since 1997. As the graph shows, the number 
of elevators has decreased 74 percent from 1995 to 2005 while storage capacity has only 
decreased 21 percent. Dominion Bond Rating Service is now saying “the bulk of the 
rationalization is complete” (Ewins 2006b).  DBRS’s Anil Passi believes another round 
of consolidation could be expected if there is “deregulation of the rail car allocation and 
grain marketing systems” (Ewins 2006b).  Agricore United, SWP, and Pioneer control a 
commanding 75 percent of the prairie grain handling market share (Ewins 2006b).   
With the changes being proposed to the CWB, there is likely to be ramifications 
to all areas of the grain industry that could trigger another round of consolidation. On 
November 7, 2006 the Pool announced its intentions to make a bid to purchase Agricore 
United; the formal bid was sent on November 28, 2006 (SWP News Release). Agricore 
United has publicly announced it will formally reject the Pool’s hostile takeover bid 
(Ewins 2006d). These merger discussions are an example of the consolidation Passi was 
describing. 
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Figure 5.6. Prairie primary elevators and storage capacity, 1995-2005. 
Source: CGC Grain Elevators in Canada 2006. 
 
Note: The large drop in Prairie primary elevators from 1984 to 1985 was due a change in 
CGC’s reporting rules.  Operators of primary elevators were now allowed to license two 
or more adjacent facilities under the control of a single manager as a single primary 
elevator. 
5.16. Summary 
The only thing constant is change; this statement is fitting for the grain industry 
which has been evolving and modifying since its inception. It is impossible to describe all 
the changes that the grain handling companies have faced in the last century, let alone the 
last few decades. From the agrarian protest for government involvement in grain handling 
in the early 1900s to the Crow rate change of the mid-1980s to the CWB debates of the 
1990s, producers have played a key role in shaping the grain industry of today.  Lobbying 
resulted in regulations and regulatory bodies, the WGTA, CGC, CWB, and CTA which 
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foster and support the Prairie grain economy. Producers wanted to be rewarded on the 
basis of protein and to clean grain before shipping instead of being penalized at port for 
the dockage; these practices became increasingly common because producers set the 
example by opening their own inland terminal to meet these needs.  Producer lobbying 
staved off for awhile the removal of the WGTA and hence the wave of rail line 
abandonment that would ensue which gave grain companies a little extra time to 
determine a game plan on how to rebuild their elevator networks.   
This chapter surveyed the major regulatory changes in grain handling throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s. Of central importance to this research project is how the grain 
handling companies, and specifically the Pool, adapted to the new environment that 
emerged. The changes were drastic enough that business models did not exist for the 
grain industry that was emerging and grain handling companies needed to develop new 
models based on changes that had occurred and that were anticipated.  
The shift to differential freight rates and the end to branchline protection forced 
grain companies to rebuild their elevator networks. The removal of freight rate subsidies 
had been on the horizon since the early 1980s. It was expected that livestock production 
and value-added processing would flourish on the Prairies as the price of grain fell with 
the removal of the subsidy. Grain companies, like the Pool, invested in feed mills and 
intensive livestock production based on these expectations. The removal of the WGTA in 
1995 led to a new playing field for grain companies. A new elevator network with new 
players and new rules for competition had to be learned. Trucking incentives are one 
example of how grain companies now have to compete for producers’ business.  The car 
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tendering process also challenges grain companies to be competitive; an elevator must 
prove it can bring in grain and be cost-efficient if it wants to receive cars.  
Government’s desire to be less involved in agriculture and to let market forces 
determine outcomes had wide-ranging implications. Canada’s signing of trade 
agreements such as CUSTA and NAFTA has lead and will continue to lead to increased 
vertical and horizontal coordination, decreased government support and structural 
changes in agriculture production as comparative and competitive advantages are 
realized. For example, the signing of CUSTA and NAFTA has led to a single Canada-
United States malt barley market as import restrictions and tariffs were reduced 
(Buschena et al 1998). Not only did the type of barley grown in Canada change (more 2-
row sown than 6-row), but the industry players shifted.  Several U.S. firms acquired 
interest in Canadian firms; the number of firms was cut in half and eight firms now 
control 97 percent of malt production in the United States and Canada (Buschena et al 
1998, p.7). 
There were opportunities on the horizon that grain companies with the capacity to 
challenge assumptions and revise their cognitive models may have been able to 
anticipate. One opportunity was consumer demand for identity preservation and 
traceability.  In 1995, Warburton began using identity preserved (IP) contracts with 
Canadian farmers to obtain specific varieties of wheat for its bakery (Kennett et al 1998).  
Segregating the IP grain from conventional grain required supply chain coordination.  
Grain handling in western Canada had been built to store and handle bulk grain 
shipments; grain companies that took the initiative to allow for segregation could capture 
benefits from being able to accommodate processor demand for IP grain. 
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Interestingly, the next wave of change is arising.  In a June 22, 2006 Western 
Producer article both Agricore United and Saskatchewan Wheat Pool announced plans to 
expand and diversify.  Both grain companies have “done an admirable job of paring 
themselves down to lean, mean grain handling machines”…”the infrastructures have 
been built out and most of the old country elevators have been closed” and now it is time 
to start expanding again (Pratt 2006). SWP says it is simply looking for “stand-alone 
opportunities or joint ventures and partnerships to expand the opportunities for our 
shareholders” (Pratt 2006). In December 2006, the Pool submitted a bid to purchase 
Agricore United (Ewins 2006d). Agricore United has reportedly invested in a dairy 
mineral manufacturing plant and an oat processing plant, and has purchased two 
independent farm supply retailers (Hursh 2006).  The difficulties experienced over the 
last decade are not easily forgotten as Grain Services Union general secretary, Hugh 
Wagner, hopes the Pool’s expansion plans are executed more successfully than its last 
efforts (Pratt 2006).  
The next chapter will review how Saskatchewan Wheat Pool responded to 
industry changes during the period of 1970 until 2000; a particular focus will be on its 
decisions and strategies in the 1990s. During the deregulation and consolidation of the 
1990s the Pool made some critical investment decisions which led to financial problems.  
To mitigate its financial problems, the Pool underwent a large debt restructuring and 
divestiture from many of its diversified business lines. 
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CHAPTER 6: SWP EVENTS FROM 1970–2000 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter begins with an overview of the Pool’s formation and the evolution of 
its democratic structure.  Following this is a review of the financial and market 
performance of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool over the last three decades (1970–2005).  
The Pool’s net earnings (or losses), market share, and long-term debt will be presented to 
show the rise and fall of these performance indicators.  As the previous chapter has 
shown the entire grain industry was faced with massive deregulation and consolidation in 
the 1990s.  The Pool’s response to deregulation was diversification and handling system 
restructuring.  During this time the Pool also contended with merger discussions with the 
other two Pools and the eventual decision to become publicly traded in 1996. 
The reason the focus is on the changes within the grain handling industry as 
opposed to looking at all the business lines the Pool was involved in – newspaper, oilseed 
processing, malt processing, farm supplies, flour milling, etc – was because the Pool’s 
core business was grain handling.  It was deregulation within the grain handling industry 
that forced the Pool to rebuild its handling system and increase the importance of 
diversification. 
6.2. Formation of SWP 
In 1923 a co-operative aficionado from the United States, Aaron Sapiro, was 
invited to the Prairies to speak to farmers on pooling co-operatives. Sapiro stressed that in 
order for a co-op to even begin operations farmers, representing a minimum 50 percent of 
the province’s total wheat acreage, had to sign five-year delivery contracts with the Pool 
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(Fairbairn 1984, p. 23).  The initial 1923 pooling drive in Saskatchewan fell short of its 
target. A second drive commenced in February 1924 and successfully led to 45,725 
contract signers, representing the targeted fifty per cent of wheat acreage in 
Saskatchewan, being locked into five-year contracts with the pool (Fairbairn 1984, p. 40).  
On June 26, 1924 the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool became operational and ready to accept 
deliveries in the 1924-25 crop year.10  
Initially the three sister Pools – Manitoba, Alberta and Saskatchewan – all 
marketed their grain through the Central Selling Agency and the “pooled” revenues were 
paid out to members.  The grain was gathered by existing grain companies with which the 
Pool had handling contracts.  Multi-year contracts with companies such as the 
Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevator Company were a struggle to achieve, so SWP 
decided to build its own elevators.  The first elevator was built in Bulyea, Saskatchewan 
in 1925 (Fairbairn 1984, p. 63).  The following year, Saskatchewan Co-operative 
Elevator Company sold 451 of its elevators and three terminals to the Pool on August 2, 
1926 (Fairbairn 1984, p. 67).  When the Central Selling Agency had its marketing 
authority halted by the federal government in 1931, the Pool became solely a grain 
handling co-operative.  The Pool boasted a membership of 74,000 producers (Class A 
shareholders) in the 1990s and has been handling producers’ grain for over 80 years.11 
6.3. Pool Management 
Since 1967 the Pool’s board members have appointed a Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) and management group to oversee the day-to-day activities of the co-operative.  
                                                
10 The official title was actually Saskatchewan Co-operative Wheat Producers; it was switched to Saskatchewan Wheat 
Pool in 1953 (Fairbairn 1984, p.167). 
11 Membership shares no longer exist because the Pool became a federal corporation in February 2005, effectively 
dissolving its co-operative status. 
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Prior to appointing a CEO, the managers from each of the Pool’s operating divisions 
reported separately and independently to the board of directors.  The management group 
is responsible for choosing investments for the co-operative’s commercial side; the 
investment choices are in line with the direction set by the board members.   
The Pool had a commercial and policy side until 1996.  The head of the Policy 
Division was the Corporate Secretary.  The head of the Commercial Division was the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO).   Both heads reported to the board members on their 
respective divisions and both had equal power, at least in principle.  The Corporate 
Secretary was concerned with agriculture policy, the membership and listening to 
member needs.  The CEO was concerned with investing retained earnings in order to 
generate cash flow for the co-op.   
As outlined in the SWP’s 1998 Annual Report the management was “responsible 
for the day-to-day management of the business of the corporation and for implementing 
the operational policies, budget and strategic plans approved by the Board” (p. 60). After 
the 1996 share conversion a portion of senior management’s compensation was based on 
the achievement of performance targets.  
6.4. Pool’s Dual Role 
The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool became well known for operating as a dual-
purpose organization.  Its core business was providing grain storage, grain handling and 
supplying crop inputs to its members and returning dollars in the form of patronage 
refunds.  But the Pool also represented farmers on agricultural policy.  The Pool 
undertook lobbying efforts and direct discussions with all levels of government on issues 
such as railway transportation costs, taxation and health services.  Until the 1990s, the 
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Pool was widely perceived as the most powerful agricultural lobbying and interest group 
in the province.  An example of the Pool’s lobbying strength and influence on other farm 
groups was Federal Transport Minister Pépin’s expressed relief at the Pool’s acceptance 
to negotiate on the Crow rate in the 1980s because he knew the Pool had to be on side in 
order for the other grain companies to follow suit (Wilson 1980). 
A shift away from policy involvement started when the Pool became publicly 
traded in 1996. The dual head structure did not conform to the traditional hierarchy of a 
corporation so the head of the Policy Division (Glen McGlaughlin) was removed from 
the organization’s structure and the head of the Commercial Division (CEO Don 
Loewen) became the sole figurehead for the co-op.  As a publicly traded entity the Pool 
became more commercially oriented to attract investors and slowly moved away from 
policy involvement.  The visibility of the policy division substantially decreased to the 
point where the Pool is no longer involved in policy debate.  The lobbying voice for 
producers has been replaced by groups such as APAS (Agricultural Producers 
Association of Saskatchewan) and the Canadian Wheat Board (Fulton 2006). 
6.5. Pool’s Democratic Structure 
In the SWP’s democratic structure, members elected delegates in their respective 
sub-districts; the delegates from each district then elected a representative to the Board of 
Directors (2000 SWP Annual Report).  Board members openly communicated with 
delegates to ensure that all farmer-members had their views heard by the co-operative.  
Delegates were made aware of any potential investments and were asked for their 
opinions on the impending decisions.  This open dialogue and communication ceased 
after the share conversion in 1996 because leakage to the media and investment 
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community on potential investments could negatively impact share values or result in 
insider-trading allegations. 
The mandate of the board as indicated in the SWP 1998 Annual Report is to direct 
the management of the business by establishing an overall strategy, “hiring skilled 
management who report to the Board”, “keeping informed about the Pool’s business”, 
and “holding management accountable for its actions” (p. 58). Up until 2000 there were 
sixteen farmer-elected board members representing 16 districts and 122 sub-districts 
(SWP Annual Report 1998).  In March 2000, the Pool announced that the number of 
farmer-elected seats would decrease to twelve and two outside advisors would be 
appointed to assist board members (2001 SWP Annual Report).  The intent was to add 
expertise in finance, banking, international trade and marketing that was potentially 
lacking around the board table (Ewins 2000). 
The structure was changed again in 2003, as a requirement of the SWP’s debt 
restructuring agreement, to eight delegate-elected board members and four independent 
board members elected by the delegates from a list of nominees selected by the Corporate 
Governance Committee (SWP Annual Report 2003).  The most recent change to the 
board structure occurred in March 2005 when the Pool became a corporation under the 
Canada Business Corporations Act; the board now consists of four farmer board-
members, seven appointed directors from the investment community, and the CEO (SWP 
News Release 2005; Sanford 2005). 
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6.6. SWP Financial and Market Performance 
Figure 6.1 shows the real net earnings and share of provincial grain handlings for 
SWP from 1974 to 2005.  Figure 6.1 also shows the chief executive officers for the same 
time period along the top of the figure; the board chairmen are listed along the bottom.  
The Pool’s net earnings (solid line in Figure 6.1) peaked in 1981 at $157.2 million 
(constant 2005 Canadian dollars).  Net earnings continually declined from 1982 onward 
to a low of $7.7 million in 1989.  There was a modest recovery in earnings throughout the 
1990s as net earnings ranged between $21.3 and $58.1 million.  In 1999, the Pool posted 
its first net loss of $14.7 million; annual net losses were incurred until 2004. In 2000, the 
Pool experienced its largest net loss in real terms ($101.7 million).  
The SWP’s provincial market share of grain handlings (dotted line in Figure 6.1) 
reached 67 percent after its 1972 joint takeover of Federal Grain enabled the co-op to 
have a virtual monopoly at 217 elevator locations (Fairbairn 1984, p. 200).  Market share 
remained relatively stable into the 1990s; for example, in 1992 the Pool’s share of 
provincial grain handlings was 61.2 percent (1992 SWP Annual Report).  Market share 
has fallen significantly since 1999, which is the same timeframe for the Pool’s most 
dramatic decline in net earnings.  The Pool’s share of provincial grain handlings in 2003 
was 33 percent (Schroeder and Chim 2003). In the 2005 SWP Annual Report, provincial 
market share was stated as 35 percent. 
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Figure 6.1. SWP real net earnings (constant 2005 $ CDN) and provincial market 
share of grain handlings, 1974-2005. 
Source: SWP Annual Reports several years. 
 
Figure 6.2 shows the Pool’s long-term debt (measured in constant 2005 Canadian 
dollars) from 1974 to 2005 and the majority of capital investments in each of the last 
three decades.  Capital investment in the 1990s was significant, with investments in this 
decade outnumbering the previous two decades combined.  One of the major capital 
investments in the 1990s was Project Horizon, a $270 million upgrade and consolidation 
of the Pool’s grain handling division (1998 SWP Annual Report). The Pool also made its 
first foreign direct investments in the 1990s, with the purchase of facilities in England, 
Poland and Mexico (1997 SWP Annual Report). 
The solid line in Figure 6.2 is the Pool’s long-term debt from 1974 to 2005. Long-
term debt was relatively constant from 1974 to 1996 and never rose above $161 million. Turner Stevenson Larsen Wiens Ba
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The numerous acquisitions in the 1990s resulted in a rise in long-term debt from $96.3 
million in 1996 to nearly $540 million (in real terms) in 1999. A management change in 
2000 resulted in the sale of several major business lines, which decreased long-term debt 
by $320 million from 2001 to 2003. 
 
Figure 6.2. SWP long-term debt and acquisitions, 1974–2005. 
Source: SWP Annual Reports several years. 
 
6.7. 1996 Share Conversion 
One reason the Pool was able to take on this debt was its move to become 
publicly traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange in April 1996 (SWP Investor Relations). 
The Pool believed that in order to maintain market share and remain competitive in the 
newly deregulated environment it had to continue diversifying its activities and 
modernize its grain handling facilities.  Nearly half of the Pool’s members were set to 
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retire in the 1990s – and in doing so they would take their retained member equity with 
them. It was believed that the required investment capital combined with the equity 
repayment would likely result in a capital shortage (CBC Saskatchewan). 12  The Pool’s 
solution was to convert the retained member equity to tradable Class B shares, thus 
providing a much more permanent source of equity (SWP Equity Conversion). The share 
conversion did not result in additional equity initially, but it did create a more stable 
source of equity that financial institutions were willing to lend against. Additional capital 
($110 million) was raised through a share offering in 1998. 
6.7.1. Prairie Pools Merger Discussions 
Prior to Saskatchewan Wheat Pool making the decision to become a publicly 
traded co-operative it had had numerous discussions with its sister Pools to devise a plan 
to become one prairie-wide co-op.  The co-ops had proved they could work successfully 
together; Western Co-op Fertilizers Ltd., Prairie Pools Inc., and XCAN Grain Ltd. were 
all three-way joint ventures.  The last efforts to merge the three Pools were in 1994 with 
renewed discussions in 1997 and 1999 (Ewins 1997a; WP Saskatoon Newsroom 1999; 
WP Editorial 2001).  The Saskatchewan Wheat Pool was larger than the other two Pools 
combined.  The talks failed because agreement could not be reached on governance 
issues. Sask Pool officials had made it clear that a merger would be on their grounds; 
“any new company would be run by SWP executives, would have its head office in 
Regina, would operate under Sask Pool legislation, would be part of SWP’s stock plan, 
would use SWP computers and infrastructure, and so on” (Ewins 1997a). 
                                                
12 The SWP anticipated having to pay out more than $100 million in equity (SWP Equity Conversion 1994). 
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Saskatchewan Wheat Pool had been researching other ways it could improve its 
financial structure.  On July 14, 1994 Pool delegates voted 110 in favour and 27 opposed 
to becoming publicly traded entity (Ewins 1994). This vote split was significant because 
80 percent in favour was required for an amendment to the Act; 110 out of 137 delegates 
is 80.3 percent.  The SWP stock (SWP.B) began trading on the TSE on April 2, 1996. 
6.7.2. Class A and B Shares 
The conversion to a publicly traded co-operative resulted in the creation of two 
classes of shares: Class A (voting) and Class B (non-voting).  The Class B shares were 
traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange.  Only active farmers were eligible to own Class A 
shares.  Prior to full conversion, members had to advise the Pool if they wanted to retain, 
increase, or sell their shares based on their current equity balance. Each member who 
chose to convert their equity received one Class A share worth a par value of $25 and for 
every $12 of their remaining equity balance they received one Class B share (Ewins 
1996c).  Only active farmers could own Class A voting shares, which entitled the 
member-owner to one vote when electing delegates and the right to participate in Pool 
Committees (SWP Equity Conversion 1995, p. 8).  
The Class B non-voting shares conferred a different set of rights.  Class B 
shareholders were entitled to an annual dividend if the board of directors declared one, an 
invite to the annual shareholder’s meeting, and a vote on issues such as amalgamation, 
sale of assets, and creation of new share classes.  Initially, Class B shareholders were not 
allowed to own more than 10 percent of the total issued and outstanding shares.  This 
limit was intended to keep majority control of the Pool with the farmer membership.  An 
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amendment in 2002 allowed for “Higher Ownership Limit” to be granted in special 
circumstances (Bill No. 304 of 2002). 
6.7.3. Share Values 
At the start of share trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange Saskatchewan 
farmer-members owned just over half (53 percent) of the Pool’s capital. There were 29.6 
million Class B shares issued; 15.7 million to farmers; 6.4 million to non-Saskatchewan 
investors; 6.1 million to Saskatchewan investors; and 1.1 million to SWP employees 
(Briere 1996a).13 
Shares opened on April 2, 1996 at a value of $12.00 and rose to a closing price 
high of $24.20 on November 21, 1997. From that point forward, share values steadily 
declined to around $9.00 in 1999 and then to a low of $0.18 on March 26, 2003 (see 
Figure 6.3).  For two years – from the beginning of February 2003 until re-evaluation as 
part of the restructuring to become a federal corporation on March 28, 2005 – Pool shares 
did not trade above $0.60. Dividends of $0.40 per share were paid from 1997 to 1999, but 
have been withheld since 2000. 
                                                
13 There was a second share offering in 1998 for five million shares at a price of $20.65 per share (McMillan 1998). In 
February 1999, $150 million was raised through a debt offering using five-year notes (McMillan 1999). 
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Note: The spike in 2005 coincides with the Pool’s move to become a federal corporation 
and the subsequent re-evaluation of stock. 
Source: CFMRC TSE 
Figure 6.3. Price of Saskatchewan Wheat Pool shares on TSE, 1996–2005. 
6.7.4. Share Update 
In February 2005 the board of directors approved a recapitalization plan to further 
decrease the Pool’s debt.  The plan was accepted by Class A and B shareholders and 
resulted in the consolidation of the two share classes into a single common share with no 
ownership limit on the shares (Ewins 2005b; Sanford 2005).  Class A shareholders were 
paid the value of their Class A share ($25).  For each Class B share a shareholder owned 
as of April 22, 2005 they were given the right to purchase one and one third common 
shares at a value of $3.21 from April 23 until May 24, 2005 (SWP News Release April 
14, 2005).  The shares now trade under the stock symbol SWP on the TSE; share price 
has been between $7.00 and $8.00 over most of the past year.  The share consolidation 
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was part of the Pool becoming a federal corporation governed by the Canadian Business 
Corporations Act (Canadian Business Resource 2005).  Many industry observers, 
investors and farmers feel this is the last step before the Pool merges or is acquired by a 
multinational (Ewins 2005e; 2005f).14 In fact, on November 28, 2006 the Pool submitted 
a formal bid to purchase Agricore United, which some industry observers feel is in 
preparation for the day when the CWB is no longer a monopoly. 
6.8. SWP Subsidiaries 
Although grain handling and marketing has been the Pool’s core business activity, 
the Pool has diversified over the years.  The Pool’s divisions once consisted of agri-
products, agri-food processing, livestock production and marketing, and publishing.  The 
livestock production and marketing division and the publishing division were fully 
divested between 2002 and 2004.    
6.8.1. SWP Subsidiaries 
In its first year of business the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool had a subsidiary, The 
Western Producer, which became the largest weekly farm newspaper in Canada and 
remained with the Pool until 2002 (SWP Annual Report 1996, 2002).  In 1926, the Pool 
conducted its first solo takeover buying out Saskatchewan Co-operative Elevators and 
increasing its elevator complement from 89 to 586 facilities by the 1926-27 crop year.   
During the 1940s SWP had an “unprecedented surge of commercial expansion 
and diversification” (Fairbairn 1984, p. 158).  In this decade SWP: (1) merged with 
Saskatchewan Co-operators Livestock Producers Ltd.; (2) opened livestock sales yards in 
                                                
14 On November 7, 2006 the Pool announced its intention to submit a bid to purchase Agricore United. The formal bid 
was submitted on November 28, 2006. Agricore has until January 24, 2007 to reply to the offer, but has already 
indicated that the company will formally reject the Pool’s hostile takeover bid (Ewins 2006d). 
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Swift Current, Yorkton, and North Battleford; (3) opened a vegetable oil processing 
plant; (4) opened a flour mill in Saskatoon; (5) built a two-storey addition and purchased 
a new printing press for Modern Press, part of its publishing division, and; (6) helped 
found Co-operative Life insurance which is known today as The Co-operators (Fairbairn 
p.161; The Co-operators website).  The grain handling division was also expanded to 
1,162 elevators by the end of the 1940s.   
6.8.2. 1960s 
In the 1960s, SWP developed a farm service department that eventually became 
the largest retailer of agricultural chemicals in Canada.  In 1965, a joint venture with 
Alberta Wheat Pool and Federated Co-op saw the creation of Western Co-operative 
Fertilizers Ltd. which became one of western Canada’s largest fertilizer wholesalers 
(SWP Annual Report 1998).  In addition to printing newspapers, SWP also began 
printing books under its publishing subsidiary Prairie Books.  To strengthen its grain 
handling division, the Pool constructed a port terminal in North Vancouver in 1968; the 
Pool had already purchased a terminal in Thunder Bay a decade earlier.   
6.8.3. 1970s 
The growth and diversification continued into the 1970s with the formation of 
XCAN Grain Pool Ltd, a joint effort between the three Prairie Pools. 15  SWP guaranteed 
itself a dominant presence in grain handling on the prairies through the 1972 takeover 
with Alberta Wheat Pool and Manitoba Pool Elevators of Federal Grain Company.  At 
the time Federal was the largest Canadian grain company outside of the pools – and its 
                                                
15 UGG also was involved in XCAN but its share was bought out in 1973-74. 
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acquisition allowed SWP to capture 67 per cent of the province’s grain handlings, this 
amount tapered to 63 per cent by the end of the decade.  Three years later in 1975, SWP’s 
industrial division tripled its crushing capacity twice over through expansion and 
acquisition and rolled the assets under the subsidiary name CSP Foods Ltd.  CSP Foods 
grew to be one of Canada’s largest bakery supply manufacturers and distributors 
(Fairbairn 1984, p. 208; SWP Annual Report 2000).  In its livestock division, the Pool 
constructed livestock yards and a farm service centre in Regina that was deemed the most 
modern facility in North America at the time (Fairbairn 1984, p. 208). 
It was also during the 1970s that competition started entering the western 
Canadian grain handling industry.  Cargill, Continental Grain Company, and Weyburn 
Inland Terminal all started vying for the business of the prairie farmer.   Word was out 
that the government wanted to start rationalizing the grain handling system, and SWP 
knew it had to conform.  SWP’s elevator complement peaked in 1971 with 1,224 
elevators, but closures throughout the decade dropped numbers to 624 by 1982.  All the 
closures had little repercussion on market share, because the Federal Grain Company 
purchase enabled the Pool to enjoy a monopoly at 217 delivery points (Fairbairn 1984, p. 
200). 
6.8.4. 1980s 
In the 1980s, SWP initiated its diversification outside the field of agriculture, 
investing in an oil exploration company named Co-Enerco Resources Ltd. (SWP Annual 
Report 1982).  SWP also took ownership in the inoculant company Philom Bios, created 
M.C. Graphics, purchased 25 percent Northco Foods (parent company of Robin’s 
Donuts), and 90 percent of E.H. Pope Bakery (SWP Annual Reports 1980-89).  In its 
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livestock division, SWP purchased 65 percent ownership in the Stockman’s Exchange 
Ltd. in Medicine Hat, Alberta and 25 percent of Saskatoon Livestock Sales.  In its grain 
handling division, SWP entered a joint venture with Alberta Pool, Cargill, UGG and 
Pioneer to have a grain terminal constructed at Prince Rupert, British Columbia in 1982.   
The 1980s also saw the formation of Prairie Pools Inc. and the purchase of 
Western Pool Terminals Ltd.  These were joint ventures between the three prairie pools.  
Prairie Pools Inc. served as a joint lobbying group to provide a unified stance on farm 
policies.  
6.8.5. 1990s 
During the last decade of the 20th Century, SWP became Canada’s largest 
publicly traded co-operative and it used its more permanent source of capital to make the 
decade the most significant in terms of capital investment.  SWP had five divisions: 1) 
grain handling and marketing; 2) agri-products; 3) agri-food processing; 4) livestock 
marketing, and; 5) publishing and other.  Each of these divisions had significant capital 
investment in the 1990s.  Figure 6.2 (page 96) lists the major acquisitions of the 1990s; 
there were at least twenty expansions and acquisitions made throughout the decade. 
The grain handling and marketing division welcomed AgPro Grain Inc. in 1990 
which is the name used today by SWP’s eight inland terminals located in Manitoba (3) 
and Alberta (5) (CGC 2006).  SWP also had its first foreign direct investment in 1997 
under this division through four ventures: 53 percent ownership of Europort Inc. and 10 
percent investment in Europort’s terminal construction in Gdansk, Poland; 50 percent 
ownership of Comercializadora La Junta and its terminal construction in Manzanillo, 
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Mexico; 50 percent ownership of Matrix Trading Company of Newark, England, and; a 
joint venture with General Mills in Northgate, North Dakota (SWP Annual Report 1997).   
The removal of the WGTA in 1995 forced further elevator consolidation, 
dropping SWP’s elevator complement from 553 elevators in 1995 to 385 by the end of 
the 20th century.  To reposition itself, the Pool announced Project Horizon in 1997.  The 
Pool initially estimated it would spend $235 million to simultaneously construct 22 high 
throughput elevators on mainlines; the elevators would be high throughputs with storage 
capacities ranging from 25,000 to 45,000 metric tones (CGC 2006).  That estimate was 
increased to $270 million fifteen months into the project.  Five of the high throughputs 
were slated for locations in Manitoba and Alberta under the SWP subsidiary AgPro Grain 
Inc.  This marked the first time the three Pools would compete head to head. 
The agri-products division undertook a joint venture with Mohawk Oil and 
Pound-Maker AgVentures Ltd. to construct a feedlot and ethanol plant near Lanigan, 
Saskatchewan (SWP Annual Report 1991).  Another joint venture gained SWP 
ownership in PGE Canada Ltd. a company that processed and marketed borage.   The 
agri-food division saw the bulk of the new acquisitions as SWP attempted to add value to 
members’ crops.  For malting barley SWP gained 42.4 percent ownership of Prairie Malt 
Ltd. and invested $34 million in 1997 for expansion.  For oilseeds CanAmera Foods Ltd. 
joined the division in 1992.  For cereals, legumes and oilseeds investments were made in 
InfraReady Products Inc. and Bioriginal Food & Science Corporation.  By the end of the 
1990s, SWP wholly-owned both Can-Oat Milling and Dawn Foods, a food ingredient 
manufacturer (SWP Annual Report 1996; 1998).   
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In the livestock production and marketing division, the Heartland trio – Livestock 
Services, Pork Management, and Feed Mills – came under ownership of SWP.  There 
was even discussions to build up to eight 10,000 to 20,000 head capacity feedlots (SWP 
Annual Report 1998). CanGro Processors Ltd. and its aquaculture business joined SWP 
in 1997.  Forty-five per cent ownership of Fletcher’s Fine Foods (Premium Brands as of 
2000), western Canada’s largest pork processor at the time, was obtained in the 1997-98 
crop year (SWP Annual Report 1997-98; 2000).  In the publishing division, SWP 
invested in PrintWest Communications in 1992. 
6.8.6. 21st Century 
 In 2000, there was a turnover of both the Board Chairman and the Chief 
Executive Officer.16  Other than a few agreements for marketing with Toepfer 
International or financing programs with Farm Credit Canada, SWP spent the first four 
years of the century divesting from unprofitable business ventures.  In 2000, SWP sold its 
foreign interests in Matrix Trading (England) and Europort Inc. (Poland), its 35 percent 
ownership of Robin’s Foods, and its Agro Pacific Industries Ltd.  In 2001, SWP divested 
from XCAN Grain Pool Ltd., Heartland Livestock Services, and Premium Brands.  In 
2002, divesture from Western Pool Terminals Ltd., Western Co-operative Fertilizers Ltd., 
CSP Foods Ltd., CanAmera Foods Ltd., Heartland Feed Mills, and The Western 
Producer occurred.  In 2004, SWP divested from Heartland Pork Management, CanGro 
Aquaculture, and Comercializadora La Junta (Mexico). Since 2000, SWP has closed 334 
elevators and 88 “under-performing retail stores”, it has divested or exited from 29 
                                                
16 Marvin Wiens replaced Leroy Larsen as Board Chairman; Mayo Schmidt replaced Don Loewen as CEO. From June 
1999 until January 2000, Bill Hunt was the Pool’s interim CEO. Schmidt was an Executive Vice President with KBC 
Trading and Processing Co. in Stockton, California before joining the Pool (SWP Annual Report 2000, p. 2). KBC 
Trading and Processing is a ConAgra subsidiary. 
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businesses, and it has reduced its labour force by over 50 percent in an attempt “to restore 
to the Pool to a position of strength” (SWP Annual Report 2005, p. 4).17 
6.9. Summary 
The Pool has been a key player in the western Canadian grain handling industry 
for over 80 years.  Created by producers, the Pool worked hard to obtain the best prices 
for producers’ grain.  SWP also worked hard for producers’ needs – lobbying for policies 
and regulations concerning agriculture issues and beyond.  The Pool served its members 
well thus enabling it to capture a large portion of the market share.   
The Pool’s strength and member loyalty was built in a highly regulated grain 
handling industry.  Many of the acts and regulations governing rail transportation, grain 
inspection, and grain marketing were established before the Pool began operations in 
1924.  It was in the 1970s that the regulations began to be challenged.  The railways were 
pressuring for change to the Crow Rate because their costs were not being covered.  
Federal Agriculture Minister Otto Lang was on the railways’ side, believing that the 
statutory freight rates were a hindrance to producers and railways.  Strong lobbying by 
the Pool held off dissolution of statutory freight rates, but the WGTA was one step closer 
to full deregulation.  When the WGTA was introduced in 1983 the Pool was in its 
heydays; its highest net earnings occurred in 1981 and its provincial market share was 
over 60 percent. 
Change had been occurring over the decades but heavy lobbying by farm groups 
and the Pools created and maintained government involvement in the grain handling 
industry.  The 1990s was a decade of immense change –removal of the WGTA, 
                                                
17 See Appendix D for details on some of the Pool’s investments and divestments. 
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restructuring of the CWB, branch line abandonment, new grain handling competitors and 
grain car tendering were all part of the industry change.  A once highly regulated industry 
underwent drastic revision and the grain companies needed to react. 
In 1996, one year after the removal of the WGTA, the Pool became publicly 
traded and collapsed its dual-head structure.  There was a concerted effort to build the 
commercial side of the Pool and the lending power created from the share conversion 
allowed that growth to occur.  The Pool began broadening its diversification plans by 
investing in projects throughout Canada and internationally; $270 million was spent on 
Project Horizon to upgrade the Pool’s grain handling system to large concrete inland 
terminals (SWP Annual Report 1998).   
The market and financial indicators show that the Pool’s response to industry 
change did not work.  Net losses began in the 1998-99 crop year, the Pool’s 75th year of 
operation, and persisted for the next six crop years; market share fell from 61% to 35% in 
ten years (1993 to 2003), and share values dropped from a high of $24.20 per share in 
November 1997 to a close of $8.60 per share on July 31, 1999 (SWP Annual Report 
1999). The decline in share price was during a time when the Pool was investing heavily 
in new grain handling capacity.  The Board did terminate the CEO and Executive Vice-
President of the Grain Group in the 1998-99 crop year, but no plans were made to scale 
back Project Horizon as the debt to equity ratio reached 50:50.  Net losses continued, 
market share decreased further, and in early 2003 the Pool was forced into a $405 million 
debt restructuring plan and divestment from major assets. 
There are many postulations and explanations as to what went wrong at the Pool.  
The Pool was not the only grain company having to deal with the industry changes.  An 
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appropriate way to shed some light on this question is to ask those who were directly 
involved – the management and board members of the Pool and industry affiliates.  
Chapter 2 laid out two propositions as to what may be the underpinnings of the Pool’s 
financial failure.  Chapters 5 and 6 have discussed historical events surrounding the 
western Canadian grain handling industry and the Pool.  Chapter 7 will now put some 
context to those historical events by presenting interview responses in a case study forma
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CHAPTER 7: CASE STUDY RESULTS 
7.1. Introduction 
In this chapter responses from twenty-one of the personal interviews conducted 
with past SWP management, elected personnel and industry affiliates are presented and 
analyzed in a case study format.  Quotes from interviews are referenced to transcript 
numbers. Each interviewee has been given two random transcript numbers to preserve 
their anonymity. Interview quotes are attributed to unnamed individuals; a board 
member(s), a senior manager(s) or a number of interviewees.  Whenever possible, 
published material that supports interviewee statements is included to strengthen the 
argument. 
The interviews clearly indicated that board members, senior management and 
management of the Pool were aware of the changes occurring in the industry and that 
they believed they were taking steps to deal with these changes.  Interviewees revealed 
that the Pool had a strategy to remain the dominant player in the new grain handling 
industry and to expand internationally.  Management and board members felt this 
strategy could only be achieved if the Pool acted quickly.  There was a change in the 
culture and the Pool became more commercially oriented, yet many believed that the 
member loyalty established in the 1970s and 1980s remained.  As stated in the 1997 SWP 
Annual Report, one of the “keys to our success is a special relationship with our farmer-
members who have a long and intimate association with the Pool” (p. 35). Analysis and 
decision-making reflected the need for speed and led to investments that lacked adequate 
analysis and due diligence.  The Pool’s lens on the emerging industry contained elements 
 114
of an “old” dominant logic and key decision-makers held inaccurate beliefs. The new 
dominant logic and the retention of some outdated beliefs resulted in the Pool’s financial 
difficulties and 2003 debt restructuring. 
Interviewee comments about the board-management relationship suggest that the 
principal-agent problem played a role in the Pool’s financial difficulties.  The tenures of 
CEOs Ira Mumford and Milt Fair had built trust between board members and senior 
management, a trust that remained in place when Don Loewen was appointed CEO.  
Loewen had 22 years experience with the Pool and his past efforts and ambitions were 
seen as necessary to attaining the Pool’s new strategy.  Board member inexperience and 
an increasing reliance on management for explanation gave management the power to 
manipulate and mislead.  The share conversion increased the need for confidentiality and 
served as a starting point for information asymmetry.  Board members believed 
information was not being shared with the entire board and that investments were being 
made without the board’s knowledge.  While other investment decisions that seemed 
plausible later emerged as poor decisions according to some board members. The board 
of directors is the final check and balance for the co-op; if they trust senior management 
and do not know how to properly evaluate investment proposals, there is potential for a 
principal-agent problem.   
In this chapter, the elements of the Pool’s dominant logic are analyzed.  Examples 
of the beliefs, culture and decision-making processes, and their interaction with each 
other, are presented.  The Pool used its dominant logic to establish the strategies for 
competing in the new grain handling industry.  In conjunction with the dominant logic is 
the principal-agent problem.  If board members have less information than management, 
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then the knowledge and understanding of board members is negatively affected.  Board 
members can have inaccuracies in their knowledge if management intentionally keeps 
information from board members, which allows inaccurate knowledge structures to be 
sustained.  A shift in power and lack of understanding by the board worked to ensure 
management could aggressively pursue its growth strategy.  Investments made by the 
Pool during the 1990s can be linked to an “old” dominant logic, erroneous cognitive 
processes and to the principal-agent problem. 
7.2. Drastic Change – Recognition and Response 
The interviewees were asked to comment on the challenges that they recalled the 
grain handling industry facing during the period 1980–2000.  All interviewees recognized 
the drastic changes occurring in the grain handling sector – deregulation, removal of the 
Crow rate, rail line abandonment, elevator consolidation, and changing farmer needs.  
The removal of the WGTA on August 1, 1995, meant wheat was no longer king. The 
Crow rate removal basically made the Pool’s “traditional wooden elevators obsolete”.18  
The “industry had not radically changed its infrastructure for a long time”.19  A board 
member believed “the rail lines and the system was going to become highly consolidated. 
It would be a highly centralized system and very competitive, leaving vast areas with no 
service”.20  Crop mixes changed; “farmers were growing eight or ten crops rather than 
two or three, the bulk handling system that is for wheat or durum or barley was not as 
important as it had been. We saw a lot of specialty plants for pulse crops that did not use 
                                                
18 Transcript 14. 
19 Transcript 15. 
20 Transcript 11. 
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the traditional grain handling system.”21  One interviewee stated there was a time when 
80 percent of Pool handlings’ were Board grains.22 23 “There was a feeling that the Pool 
had to start looking at positioning itself commercially in a different way.  One of those 
ways was to further increase its investment in the value-added industries.”24 
A senior manager recalled that “as all the regulations fell away from the grain side 
they simply had no choice but to become much more market-driven and market 
influenced”.25  A board member similarly recalled how a “decision had to be made as to 
how far and how fast we would go to redesign country elevators”.26  All interviewees 
noted that the Pool needed to “diversify and value-add”.  This strategy was so important 
that board members and management believed the Pool would not survive if it did not 
diversify.27  The Pool would draw on its established beliefs and views to make 
investment decisions to successfully complete this strategy.  
The changes in the industry had to be faced by all existing grain companies. All 
the grain handling co-operatives, due to their lack of permanent equity, had to find 
alternative ways to raise the capital that would be required to adapt. The other three co-
ops developed capital plans similar to the Pool’s. United Grain Growers became publicly 
traded in 1993 and within three years it had invested $123 million in new plants that 
would allow it to capture freight rate incentives from loading unit trains (Ewins 1996a). 
Three additional share offerings (in 1993, 1994 and 1996) raised $56 million so UGG 
could continue to modernize and invest in new infrastructure (WP Staff 1996). Agricore - 
                                                
21 Transcript 30. 
22 Transcript 17. 
23 In 2005, 60 percent of the grains handled by the Pool were CWB grains; in all fairness, that same year 76 percent of 
WIT’s handle was CWB grains (WIT Annual Report 2005, p. 17). 
24 Transcript 21. 
25 Transcript 27. 
26 Transcript 35. 
27 Transcripts 7, 18, 4, and 17. 
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formed by the 1998 merger of AWP and MPE – had a capital expenditure budget of $200 
million in the 1998-99 crop year (Ewins 1998). Agricore CEO Gordon Cummings was 
quoted as saying, “We would like to be the leading organization both in farm inputs and 
in the grain handling business” (Ewins 1998).  
7.3. The Pool’s Dominant Logic 
Recall that an organization’s dominant logic is an assembly of beliefs, views, 
strategies and culture (Section 3.2.5 on page 28).  The dominant logic filters information 
and is the lens through which an organization views the world (Bettis and Prahalad 
1995).  Stable environments, such as the heavily regulated grain industry, can cause 
elements of a dominant logic to become engrained.  The 1970s and 1980s was a very 
successful time period for the Pool; the highest earnings in the Pool’s history were 
achieved in 1981.  When a major industry change occurs, an organization will need to 
create a new dominant logic. Key decision-makers will provide many of the new beliefs 
and views. Despite attempts to adapt, an organization has a tendency to hold on to 
established beliefs and views from past successes when developing the new logic.  
In response to the grain industry’s major wave of deregulation, rail line 
rationalization and elevator consolidation in the early 1990s, the Pool used established 
beliefs of market dominance and member loyalty to determine its role in the new grain 
handling industry and agribusiness world.  These two beliefs, along with new beliefs of 
urgency and a need for culture change, were incorporated into a new dominant logic. A 
change in the Pool’s culture allowed the beliefs of senior management to infiltrate the 
beliefs of the co-op and the board members. Although the Pool built a new logic, it 
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contained components from its old dominant logic interspersed with new beliefs that 
were not ideal for the co-op.   
7.3.1. Dominance Belief 
The Pool believed it would continue to play a major role in western Canadian 
grain handling – this was an established belief.  With strategies to expand nationally and 
internationally, the Pool extended its dominance belief to include all future investments.  
The Pool “handled a majority of Saskatchewan’s grain in 1998. Our long-term goal is to 
build on this dominant position in profitable market segments” (SWP Annual Report 
1998, p. 12). Beliefs of dominance and urgency complement each other because in order 
for the Pool to view quick expansion as the optimal strategy it needed to also believe all 
investments would be successful.   
A senior manager pinpointed the Federal Grain purchase as the start of the Pool’s 
dominance.28  The 1972 acquisition of Federal Grain boosted the co-op’s provincial grain 
handling market share over 60 percent.  As one board member stated, the Pool’s size and 
the success of some of the previous things the Pool had done influenced the risks and 
investments the Pool took on.29 “Its size did lead it on to taking bigger risks and with 
bigger risks can come bigger opportunities.”30 The Pool’s size and volumes gave it the 
opportunity to do things that other companies in the Canadian market were unable to do. 
Several of the interviewees used similar wording to describe the Pool’s dominance: it was 
the “biggest kid on the block”, the “big boy on the block”, and the “big guy on the 
                                                
28 Transcript 13. 
29 Transcript 14. 
30 Transcript 3. 
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block”.31  Interviewees recalled how Pool management and board members truly believed 
the Pool could become “the ConAgra of the North”.32 There was a belief that the Pool 
would be “one of the four or five top grain companies in the world” and would grow its 
revenues from “four to forty billion in ten years”.33  One senior manager, however, felt 
this belief of dominance was not corporate-wide and was only held by some 
individuals.34 
A sense of confidence permeated the board members and management, as 
Loewen stated, the Pool has “seen the changes coming better than a lot of companies” 
(Casey 1997).  The Pool believed it was “well positioned for the changes rapidly 
transforming the once highly regulated and stable industry” and had “taken and will 
continue to take a lead role in defining the future of this industry” (1997 SWP Annual 
Report, p. 14, 35).  Past board member Dave Sefton was certain that the Pool would 
become the “most dynamic cooperative business in the world” and would eventually have 
membership from agricultural producers around the world (Gatin 1999, p. 83). 
Other grain industry participants expressed confidence in the Pool as well, which 
served to validate management and board members’ belief of market dominance.  Scott 
Schroeder of Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) said the industry changes would 
“leave few survivors.  Saskatchewan Wheat Pool and Cargill will be the only ones—it’s a 
pretty safe bet” (Casey 1997).  In 1996, Schroeder also commented that the Pool was “a 
powerhouse that could become another ConAgra” (Briere 1996b). In 1998, at the Fourth 
Agricultural and Food Policy Systems Information Workshop, Barb Isman, Cargill’s 
Assistant Vice President of Corporate Affairs, stated that to gauge the “future of the 
                                                
31 Transcripts 10, 17, 11, and 8, respectively. 
32 Transcripts 18 and 32. 
33 Transcripts 7 and 39, respectively. 
34 Transcript 17. 
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western agricultural industry…policy analysts might use their time and resources most 
wisely if they simply talked to three companies: SWP, Cargill and…Monsanto” (p. 149).   
In November 1996, an analyst with RBC Dominion Securities estimated Pool 
stock would climb 20 percent over the next year and be worth $21.00 per share (Ewins 
1996d). Pool share prices rose as high as $24.20 in late 1997, indicating the Pool had the 
support of the investment community. One board member commented how “analysts 
were identifying that SWP [shares] should be worth $32.00” so the Board felt confident 
in the decisions and strategies being pursued.35 The share price provided a false sense of 
security and reaffirmed Pool beliefs. 
7.3.2. Loyalty Belief 
A belief of dominance required a belief of long-standing loyalty from the Pool 
membership.  Continued member loyalty was built into the projections and analysis of 
Pool investments.  Gaining and maintaining market share was necessary to achieve the 
Pool’s newly established belief of market dominance and to ensure the plethora of newly 
acquired investments were successful.   
The Pool was known as “the policy organization in the country” and its lobbying 
efforts invoked strong member loyalty.36  “People would go 20 miles out of their way, in 
the early 1980s, to do business with the wheat Pool.”37  Provincial market share was over 
60 percent for 20 years, which aided in the establishment of the loyalty belief among 
some in management and the board.   
                                                
35 Transcript 4. 
36 Transcript 19. 
37Transcript 12. 
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The Pool’s political clout was evident during the Crow rate debate of the 1980s. 
Before the federal government went ahead with any rate reform they wanted “to win 
some measure of support from the [Pool]”; they did not want to “face the outright 
opposition of the Prairie’s largest grain company and farm lobby group” (Wilson 1980). 
The high throughput elevators being built under Project Horizon would require a 
sizeable market share. The mindset was “build them and they’ll have to come because 
they just won’t go anywhere else and they’ll only support the Pool”.38 This mindset was 
part of the loyalty belief. According to one board member, in the past when elevators 
closed farmers would initially say they would never deliver another bushel to the Pool, 
but “after about two or three years they started coming back to Saskatchewan Wheat 
Pool...We thought that would happen with Project Horizon”.39  
Interviewees had differing opinions on market share.  While some interviewees 
strongly believed market share should not be relied upon in projections, others believed 
that market share would not only hold but also grow. As long as the decision-makers 
holding power in the Pool believed that market share would grow, the belief of loyalty 
would prevail.  The Pool believed it was an agricultural co-op in which “the interests of 
the company and its producers are aligned in pursuit of better ways to do business and 
new opportunities to create wealth for our shareholders” (SWP Annual Report 1997, p. 
35). Market indicators clearly showed that market share and net income were declining, 
yet assumptions explicitly included that membership would remain with the organization. 
This suggests cognitive dissonance was at play; managers and board members ignored 
information that market share was falling because it conflicted with their beliefs that their 
                                                
38 Transcript 26. 
39 Transcript 36. 
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membership was loyal.  For discussion on the Pool’s declining member commitment, see 
Lang and Fulton (2004). 
It troubled one manager that member loyalty was seen as “cast in concrete”.40  
The Pool failed to realize “that you can never take your customers or your members for 
granted because you will not survive”.41  Another management interviewee said the Pool 
“committed a fundamental error in choosing to believe the membership would stick with 
them, yet they were doing everything in my opinion to distance themselves from the 
membership”.42  According to one senior manager “as you saw the ConAgra’s and Louis 
Dreyfuses and all the producer terminals springing up, market share was inevitably going 
to decline since it just could not be maintained with all the other new entrants”.43  
The Pool’s market share declined steadily after 1992.  Some interviewees 
attributed the decline to a new generation of farmers who are the “now” generation that 
want instant gratification on the elevator ramp.44  While others felt the Pool “alienated” 
its members and did not do a good enough job of engaging people on the impending 
change and what it meant for their relationship with the Pool.45 
7.3.3. Urgency Belief 
A new belief of urgency had the Pool spending money without hesitation.  From 
1996 to 1999, the Pool invested in approximately twenty-five acquisitions and long-term 
debt grew five-fold (SWP Annual Reports).  The need for urgency, at times, outranked 
the need for adequate analysis. 
                                                
40 Transcript 10. 
41 Transcript 26. 
42 Transcript 18. 
43 Transcript 13. 
44 Transcripts 3 and 11. 
45 Transcripts 19 and 22. 
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The need for the Pool to react quickly to industry change was expressed by nine 
of the interviewees.  The Pool believed it needed to “move rapidly in order to beat the US 
competition” and it needed to become more of a global player and expand beyond 
Saskatchewan borders.46  There was a driving belief that if the Pool did not “stay at a 
significant size to be a competitor; you will become one of two things: irrelevant or 
sucked up”.47 
A June 1997 Canadian Business article quoted CEO Don Loewen as saying “if 
we don’t become a strong, global force, we will just be eaten up by the American 
[multinationals]. Quite frankly, they’ll eat our lunch.” This statement strongly suggests 
the Pool was confident in its strategies.  The Pool’s mission statement became “Growing 
global, growing together”.  As one management personnel stated, “there was this pressure 
to do things quickly and preemptively before someone else does it”.48  
The 1996 share conversion provided access to debt capital for quick expansion.  
As one interviewee described it, the Pool felt like it had a bottomless pit of money and “if 
someone was willing to give them a nickel they would take it. Simply because they 
thought they had to move that fast”.49 The knowledge structures of some of the key 
decision-makers included a belief that fast paced growth was the correct strategy. With 
the “larger amounts of capital from the public markets, not only could they make a lot of 
decisions quickly, they felt they were expected to make a lot of decisions quickly”.50 
                                                
46 Transcripts 9 and 36, respectively. 
47 Transcript 1. 
48 Transcript 27. 
49 Transcript 34. 
50 Transcript 15. 
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7.3.4. Culture 
Culture drives the vision of an organization and is reflected through attitudes, 
behaviours, and decision-making processes. The culture of an organization affects the 
working relationship between the board and management. Culture is dependent on the 
power balance between the board and management; as Pool management gained power 
the culture was increasingly influenced by management’s objectives.   
For several years the “culture of the organization was farmer oriented” and 
“member interests were on the forefront of every decision”.51  When Loewen became 
CEO in 1994, there was a distinct change in culture.52 “One could almost describe the 
change in corporate culture as 180 degrees”.53  There was a desire to fundamentally 
transform the organization.  One board member said “there were things about the 
corporate culture that people felt needed to be changed”.54  There was a concern that 
decisions were made on “Pool time” instead of “real time” and the democratic process 
made decision-making far too slow.55   
Loewen was seen as the right individual for the job of CEO.  “Don came up 
through the flourmill and CSP Foods and did a very commendable job in running that 
side of the business. When he was under the control of Milt Fair, Don was an excellent 
person.”56  Investments orchestrated by Loewen – Robin’s Donuts and CSP Foods – had 
turned out well for the Pool so the board “didn’t think he could do anything wrong”.57  
One board member explained how Loewen was hired because “he was that type of 
                                                
51 Transcripts 20 and 11, respectively. 
52 Transcript 14. 
53 Transcripts 19. 
54 Transcript 30. 
55 Transcripts 30 and 4. 
56 Transcript 25. 
57 Transcript 34. 
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individual who moved fast” and the board was told to “keep the reigns on this individual 
because he will be very aggressive and so the Pool board will have to be the balance”.58  
Loewen was “commercially ambitious which the Board welcomed because we were still 
looking at expanding our value-added and downstream activities”.59  The accelerated 
acquisitions during the 1990s were part of the mandate that Loewen had with the Board 
when he came in. “For better or worse, that is what they were looking for and that is the 
direction he led them”.60 
Loewen had a main role in changing the culture.  He was described by 
interviewees as “aggressive”, “venturesome” and “gifted at visualizing opportunities”.61  
In a 1997 interview, Hugh Wagner of the Grain Services Union described Loewen as 
“extremely purposeful and forceful…he has done more in the past 3 years to change the 
Pool than many others have in a lifetime” (Gatin 1999, p. 94).  He was “absolutely driven 
by the thought that they had to move very, very quickly that the organization would either 
be the biggest grain handling company in western Canada and be part of the North 
American scene within five years or they would be broke”.62  He had everybody “hooked 
on this idea of being the biggest and the best and a forty billion dollar company.”63  
Loewen “brought in people in the senior posts of like mind”; there was an entire “new 
senior group with the exception of the CFO”.64  In replacing management, Loewen was 
said to be removing some of the “old true guard”.65   
                                                
58 Transcript 14. 
59 Transcript 35. 
60 Transcript 17. 
61 Transcripts 21, 11 and 2, respectively. 
62 Transcript 7. 
63 Transcript 10. 
64 Transcripts 9 and 27, respectively. 
65 Transcript 34. 
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In 1996, the dual head structure of the Pool was collapsed and Loewen became 
the sole management head.  For many years the Pool operated with a Corporate Secretary 
and Chief Executive Officer – each reported to the board on their respective divisions.  
The Corporate Secretary was responsible for the Policy and Membership Services 
Division and the Chief Executive Officer was responsible for the Commercial Division.  
There had always been tension between the two heads.66  Part of the reason for removing 
the Corporate Secretary was to make the governance structure more typical of 
corporations and more attractive to investors.  With Loewen as the single head for the 
commercial and policy sides of the Pool, his power increased and as one interviewee 
stated, “the organization has never been the same”.67 
One board member described the Pool as feeling “invincible and that was driven 
by Don Loewen’s personality and a number of people around him that just felt we 
couldn’t be stopped”.68  Loewen’s strong leadership was “going to drive this home”; “the 
CEO’s job is to stop internal dissent, stop those in the company who were not consistent 
with the vision and the direction that the CEO was trying to drive”.69  Loewen’s power 
and leadership style was reflected in the investment decision-making; an interviewee 
described decision-making as “shoot from the hip” with gut feelings, at times, 
determining investment decisions.70   
Some interviewees criticized the change in culture.  What may have started as a 
“culture of vision” became a “culture of denial”.71  Another management employee used 
                                                
66 Transcripts 4 and 20. 
67 Transcript 42. 
68 Transcript 30. 
69 Transcript 15. 
70 Transcript 7. 
71 Transcript 32. 
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the words “naïveté and arrogance” to describe the corporate culture.72  These descriptors 
stemmed from the opinion that “people were put into very senior operational positions 
having no outside experience, either outside the Pool or outside a very introverted part of 
the grain industry in downtown Winnipeg”.73 The Pool was considered to be missing the 
experience and background on its board to say, “No, this doesn’t make sense” instead 
“they are going to believe the people they think should know rather than having that 
experience themselves”.74 
A culture driven by a powerful CEO and like-minded senior managers went a 
long way to changing the direction of the Pool.  Loewen was appointed CEO for his 
ability to initiate change and he did just that.  The culture and beliefs instilled by Loewen 
and other like-minded senior managers strongly influenced the analysis and decision-
making at the Pool.   
7.3.5. Analysis and Decision-Making 
As one interviewee plainly stated, “proposals and business plans were based on 
assumptions, in the end those assumptions have to take reality…[or] you are going to 
learn a very hard lesson”.75  There was “a definite deterioration in the quality of analysis” 
post-conversion.76  Some analysis was described as “suspect” because “logic was not 
always necessarily the basis for what was being done in business acquisitions”.77  
Interviewees revealed a pressure “where you didn’t rock the boat if you wanted to get to 
the top or close to the top” and “if you did not go along with the flow then you were 
                                                
72 Transcript 9. 
73 Transcript 9. 
74 Transcript 31. 
75 Transcript 19. 
76 Transcript 14. 
77 Transcript 12. 
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ostracized or you were replaced”.78 One interviewee felt that “staff does not feel 
comfortable going back and doing honest analysis. Staff is more likely to feel like it is 
their job to go out and prove it is not that bad of a decision or it is an okay decision.”79 
This links back to Mintzberg (1971) (see Section 3.3.3. on page 35); employees may 
choose to remain mum when they are in disagreement with management’s views rather 
than face losing their job. Another interviewee’s understanding of the analysis was that 
there was good analysis being done, but if certain senior managers did not like the 
analysis coming forward they would ask for the analysis to be changed.80  
Interviewee responses regarding the Pool’s attention to due diligence were varied.  
More than one interviewee believed that better due diligence could have been done.81  
Risk-analysis and proper evaluation of the downside of investments was not always 
done.82  The need to move quickly and expand resulted in project analysis being altered 
to rationalize investments.  However, this point was contradicted by other board members 
and senior managers who said “the usual financial due diligence” was being done and 
investments were “ all based on projections of an appropriate return on investment”.83  
Nevertheless, the need to move quickly to diversify and value-add affected the 
analysis and the decision-making process.  “Ideas did not get what I would regard as 
proper and adequate evaluation, if Loewen wanted to do it everyone would find a way to 
make it happen”.84  One board member explained how “the argument that was being 
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81 Transcripts 7, 19, 38, 15 and 9. 
82 Transcript 15. 
83 Transcripts 17 and 1. 
84 Transcript 39. 
 129
made was that if we did it first, no matter what we paid for it, we would prevent our 
competition from doing it and then we would be successful”.85  
The Pool’s dominant logic included beliefs from its past – member loyalty and 
market dominance – incorporated into new strategies and a new culture.  Moving quickly, 
even if that meant inadequate analysis, was senior management’s strategy to drive change 
and to become one of the top grain companies in the world.  Loewen’s charisma and 
power allowed him to shift the Pool to a market-driven, commercially-oriented 
organization.  To achieve this goal, senior management did require board approval.  
Senior management was able to use established trust and an increased information 
imbalance to move the Pool toward the vision of “ConAgra of the North”.  An abuse of 
trust and the presence of information asymmetry give rise to the principal-agent problem. 
7.4. Principal-Agent Problem 
The principal-agent problem occurs when an agent (management) uses 
information asymmetry and the principal’s (board) reliance on management to take 
advantage of the situation and achieve their own objectives. As an organization grows it 
becomes increasingly more difficult to monitor management’s actions.  Board members 
are removed from the day-to-day activities of an organization resulting in information 
asymmetry between principal and agent.  If the information asymmetry is grouped with 
board inexperience, an inability to monitor management and an implied trust in 
management, the principal-agent problem can emerge.  
Milt Fair was the Pool’s CEO from 1981 until 1993.  Fair orchestrated 
acquisitions, such as the purchase of Elders Grain and the Northern Sales terminal, which 
                                                
85 Transcript 30. 
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solidified the Pool’s market share dominance.  Milt’s ability to make successful 
investments led the board to trust management’s insight.  The board “trusted the 
management and they had grown to trust management from Milt’s days because he 
would not lead them astray” even if this meant introducing ideas to the board three or 
four times.86  Milt “did not push his weight around, he was respected in the business 
community,…and I think that is what brought on a lot of dedication”.87  When Milt Fair 
was CEO he “worked effectively with the President and the Board of Directors”.88  “CEO 
Milt Fair had the total responsibility for operations, but management was always 
available for discussions with board members”.89   
There was trust in Loewen too.  As one board member stated, the “Board and the 
CEOs were very much in tune with each other’s needs and desires and there was a good 
deal of trust – a lot of trust”.90  Some in management felt that Loewen “had the 
confidence of the board of directors and so there was really no impediments in his 
path”.91  The 1990s was full of change for the Pool; culture changed, the Pool became 
publicly traded, and senior management changed, but the trust did not change. 
Becoming publicly traded changed the board-management relationship.  The 
“need for confidentiality increased when [the Pool] went to a share offering”.92  The Pool 
had to become less specific about where it had business interests because of corporate 
governance and the risk of insider trading.93  This was a starting point for increased 
information asymmetry.  The risk of insider trading became a valid reason for not 
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91 Transcript 18. 
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adequately sharing information.  Loewen was said to have threatened that a leak would 
lead to dismissal.94  As one board member saw it “there were a lot of things shared with 
the President that never got adequately shared with the rest of the Board.  Getting things 
done became more important than sharing information”.95  In contrast, one senior 
manager said, “the amount of information we supplied was information overload at 
times” and “it was more that the board did not know the questions to ask”.96  
“The Board of Directors did not have the makeup or the people on it that would 
normally have served that check and balance to senior management, that would occur in a 
company somewhere else”.97  Part of this was because “increased board appointments by 
acclamation affected the types and quality of people that were getting put forward as 
board members”.98  As one senior manager commented, the Board seemed to be missing 
the “cynical eye on the thing that you really need”.99 An individual who “wasn’t afraid to 
ask you the simple hard questions”; it would “force you to think it through and come 
better prepared” with proposals.100  At the same time, the move to a publicly traded 
company was “a quantum shift” and “as the business got more sophisticated, and more 
complicated, and moved further away from the farm gate it got tougher” for board 
members to assess proposals.101  The volume of proposals and expected promptness for 
decisions to be made “would have been difficult even for a competent Board to stay 
abreast and do a fair job of assessing what was coming in”.102 
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There was no legal expertise, marketing expertise or financial expertise on the 
board so management had to be the expertise for the Board.103  “The board of directors is 
there to be guidance, experience and wisdom.”104 As the Pool expanded, it became 
increasingly difficult for board members to provide that expertise.105  The board members 
“could ask far more informed questions about whether or not to build grain elevators” 
than about international grain terminals.106  A board member admitted that “as we got 
more external, we had to rely more and more on our CEO and CFO and others to provide 
us with the types of insights and analysis we needed to make decisions…”107 Other 
interviewees were also well aware of this dependence on management by board members 
and the board’s inability to challenge the CEOs assumptions.108   
An increased reliance on senior management likely started with the share 
conversion discussions in 1994.  Past board member Gary Wellbrock was interviewed for 
Gatin's (1999) Master’s thesis on the Pool’s share conversion.  In his interview 
Wellbrock “explained that the SWP directors were not accountants so they needed in-
depth sessions with executive management in order to understand the financial issues 
involved with working capital and debt equity ratios” (p. 74). 
Some senior managers said “there wasn’t the person [on the Board] who would do 
the homework” because for board members it was “stepping way beyond your comfort 
zone” and “when it came to managing an entity that was worth close to a billion dollars 
in assets they were a little out of their league”.109  Others felt the board “wouldn’t have 
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received full analysis”.110  In hindsight, one board member feels the board “has to accept 
some very heavy responsibility for not having tighter control over management and 
investment”.111  Board members feel they are ultimately responsible, as another board 
member admitted that they “didn’t understand the impact that change was going to have 
on the whole operation”.112 
A lack of control over management indicates a shift in power.  With Loewen as 
CEO and Larsen as President there was “the quickest transformation of power from a 
President’s office to a CEO’s office…”113  As senior management gained power from the 
board they were able to coerce and manipulate the board.114  The board’s reliance on 
management for explanation on investments and the information asymmetry created by 
the share conversion and expanding breadth of investments aided in this transfer of 
power.  This shift closely aligns with comments made in Gatin’s (1999) thesis on the 
Pool’s share conversion.  Grain Services Union General Secretary, Hugh Wagner, noticed 
a shift in power occurring and described it as “management was running astray with the 
company” (p. 90). 
It could be argued that the share conversion further divided the goals of co-op 
members and management. Previously, farmer members would receive a share of the 
Pool’s profits based on their patronage but after the share conversion that incentive no 
longer existed. The co-op exists in the first place to serve the needs of its members. Since 
management could not be seen as favoring farmer interests over B shareholder interests, 
so there was a trend towards farmers’ interests not being met.  Management would want 
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to side with B shareholders, because they were also shareholders in the co-op. 115  
Another perk to the share conversion was the increase in senior management salaries. 
Prior to the share conversion CEO Don Loewen was earning an estimated $244,571 and 
at the time of his resignation he was earning $423,684 (Ewins 1995; Briere 1999). 
7.5. Investments 
The dominant logic and principal-agent problem are evident in the investments 
undertaken by the Pool.  The belief of urgency resulted in twenty-five new or expanded 
investments between 1996 and 1999.  Beliefs of dominance had the Pool investing 
outside Saskatchewan and in the international arena where it had no previous experience, 
while a belief of loyalty had the Pool building new concrete terminals based on the 
expectation that market share would remain constant.  There were international 
investments the board was not fully aware of which suggests that a principal-agent 
problem was at play.  The information asymmetry, lack of understanding and trust in 
management by board members allowed investments that did not make economic sense.   
There were three investments that were mentioned during nearly every interview.  
The 1997-1998 investments in international – Poland, Mexico, and England – and 
western Canadian – Project Horizon – grain handling were commented on extensively.  
The 1998 investment in Humboldt Flour Mills often served as an example of a Pool 
decision-making error.  Interviewees provided insight into the assumptions and decision-
making processes behind these investments. 
                                                
115 Over 50 percent of the Pool’s employees bought a total of 1.1 million shares under the initial share offering (Ewins 
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7.5.1. Project Horizon 
SWP’s Project Horizon – an elevator transition plan announced in 1997 – was 
first estimated to cost $235 million and was expanded to $270 million in 1998. Project 
Horizon announced all of its locations and began building all twenty-two high throughput 
elevators simultaneously.  This was described as a “bold stroke” by industry analysts 
(SWP Annual Report 1997, p. 5).  Several interviewees described constructing the 
elevators all at once as an attempt to lock up the contractors before others could build.116  
The Pool “firmly believed they were going to stop the competition literally by tying up 
all the construction capacity for these high throughput elevators in the short-run”.117  
Project Horizon was based on a “first-mover advantage” wherein the Pool “firmly 
believed they were going to stop the competition from investing because they had already 
invested”, but SWP “didn’t understand the second, third and fourth moves in the 
competitive dance that goes on in a competitive industry”.118   
This “move quickly” approach did not work.  Board members expressed their 
astonishment that companies would build facilities just a few miles down the road from a 
SWP high throughput location.119  To one board member the response by industry to 
build in a market that was overbuilt was illogical”.120  The competition response 
negatively affected the Pool’s revenue projections from grain handling as the Pool had 
“explicitly included in their assumptions that their producers would go to their high 
throughput elevators”.121  
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In July 1998, Loewen was interviewed on the Pool’s decision to speed up the 
Project Horizon construction. In this Western Producer interview, he was quoted as 
saying “Our goals are to be the low-cost grain handler in western Canada and to grow our 
existing market share from 31 to 40 percent” (WP Saskatoon Newsroom 1998). This 
statement shows that the Pool not only believed it would maintain its western Canadian 
market share, but also expand it. 
Interviewees questioned the Pool’s choice to build with concrete; “Did it have to 
be concrete? Was concrete a good choice when competitors were able to build a facility 
for half the price with steel?”122 Steel elevator construction was being utilized by 
ConAgra and Louis Dreyfus. The locations for the SWP elevators “were picked very 
quickly. We had a team out in the country going before it was announced, very quickly 
finding property and buying property and sewing up the property so no one else 
could”.123  Looking back “a number of those locations were not well thought out or well 
researched”, but the “argument was made to do it in a hurry, let’s make it large, let’s tie 
up all the contractors and nobody else will build and we will have a large part of the 
market sewn up. Wrong answer, because the competitors just went ahead and…built 
lower cost facilities that were more cost competitive.”124 
Project Horizon included the belief of urgency and market dominance.  These 
beliefs proved to be inaccurate as competitors still constructed inland terminals in close 
proximity to the Pool’s high throughput elevators.  A case in point would be Davidson, 
Saskatchewan where a Pool and UGG elevator were built on opposite ends of the town. 
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Locations not being well researched are evidence that analysis and decision-making was 
flawed.   
7.5.2. International Investments 
In 1997 the Pool made investments in handling terminals in Poland and Mexico. 
In 1998 the Pool invested in Matrix Trading – a grain marketing firm – in England.  One 
board member is severely critical of two investments; “those would be the two terminals 
that were built in Poland and Mexico. I think whether it was bad analysis or it was a lack 
of insight into the changing environment, I guess not fully appreciating the strategic 
influences in those respective countries and unstable environments.”125  A SWP News 
Release stated unforeseen changes with the rail transportation system in Mexico as a 
reason for the Manzanillo terminal becoming an obsolete distribution point.  Some 
interviewees lay partial blame on “unscrupulous partners” and consulting company data 
that “did not come to fruition”.126  There were interviewees who partly blame the Pool 
because these were areas where the Pool had no traditional operating knowledge.127  
Neither board members nor senior managers had any experience in international 
investments.  Problems with investment partners and consulting companies show a lack 
of due diligence and inexperience in the international business arena.  
Both board members and managers disclosed information about “farming 
operations” and a “farm supply division in Russia and Ukraine”.128  Details were lacking, 
but one senior manager described the investment as “a project where they were going to 
farm a large farm in the Ukraine. That was very short lived. There wasn’t much 
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involvement there in the end of the day. Nothing happened that I can recall. There was a 
farming operation and some combine purchases.”129  Two interviewees believe combines 
were sent over from Canada and as one interviewee stated, “it was a multi-million dollar 
disaster to get those combines over there and get them working and I don’t know where 
they are today”.130  These investments in the Ukraine are not public knowledge and did 
not appear to be common knowledge among interviewees.  As one interviewee said “I 
don’t even know what happened in the Ukraine”.131 
The 1997 SWP Annual Report does make mention of marketing and agrifood 
opportunities in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics because the agriculture 
practices were similar to the Prairies.  However, the annual reports never make mention 
of farming operations in Europe.  In reference to these investments one board member 
stated, “the board wasn’t aware of some of that and consequently when we did find out it 
was too late”.132 
7.5.3. Humboldt Flour Mills 
Even though Humboldt Flour Mills was not the Pool’s largest investment it was 
the investment that began to raise questions about how much the Pool was spending.133  
The acquisition of Humboldt Flour Mills in 1998 was described by one senior manager as 
“a bidding war with Agricore”.134  Rivalry between the two Pools stemmed partly from 
Saskatchewan’s decision to build a few of its Project Horizon high throughput elevators 
in Manitoba and Alberta, which meant it would be in direct competition with its sister 
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Pools.  Alberta Wheat Pool President, Alex Graham, was “miffed about Sask Pool’s plan 
to grab 25% of the Alberta market” and was quoted as saying “That’s the Saskatchewan 
attitude.  It will dominate.  It will run over anyone that’s in the way” (Casey 1997).  
Moving into Manitoba and Alberta was part of the Pool’s repositioning in order to 
solidify its dominance in western Canadian grain handling. 
When Alberta Wheat Pool and Manitoba Pool Elevators expressed interest in 
Humboldt Flour Mills, the Pool “didn’t want the Alberta Wheat Pool in farm supplies in 
innermost Saskatchewan” so the Pool “ended up paying $16 million for Humboldt Flour 
Mills”.135  The Pool “had not done their homework” on this investment, as “a number of 
sprayers, physical assets, trucks, fertilizer equipment…turned out be rental units” and not 
part of the purchase.136  The purchase of Humboldt Flour Mills was an attempt to “keep 
Agricore out” even if that meant paying “far more for Humboldt Flour Mills than what 
made economic sense”.137 The March 1998 offer from Alberta and Manitoba Pools was 
85 cents per share; SWP’s offer was $1.20 per share (McMillan 1998b).  This purchase 
“was the bellwether that told everybody else in rural Saskatchewan that they were out of 
control”.138   
7.6. Summary and Discussion 
The case study evidence presented here in Chapter 7 validates the two 
propositions introduced at the end of Chapter 2.  Proposition 1 stated that the Pool’s 
dominant logic prevented effective adaptation to industry change and significantly 
contributed to its financial failures.  Senior management’s goal to become a globally 
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recognized agri-business co-operative was unsuccessful.  Elements of the Pool’s old 
dominant logic still existed as the industry changed.  The Pool was blind to what to 
expect in the new grain handling industry that was unfolding.  In reconstructing the 
dominant logic for the new environment, the Pool retained some of its established beliefs 
which were no longer accurate. Relying on outdated views and beliefs within the 
organization led the Pool to adopt unsuccessful strategies in response to the deregulation 
of the 1990s that resulted in organizational failure. 
Proposition 2 stated that the principal-agent problem existed between Pool senior 
management and the board members.  Information asymmetry and the inability of board 
members to fully monitor senior management, allowed senior management to gain 
approval on investment proposals that should have been rejected by the board.  The board 
had grown to trust senior management, which increased the incidence for the principal-
agent problem. 
The interview responses strongly suggest the Pool’s revised dominant logic 
contained outdated beliefs that characterized the basis for success achieved in previous 
years. The Pool also relied on the knowledge structures of key decision-makers to 
construct a new logic; some of the new beliefs were not accurate as well.  Interviewees 
recognized the grain-handling industry was undergoing massive change and new 
strategies were devised to remain competitive.  Senior managers forced their beliefs on 
the organization; strategies to move quickly and gain a global presence were part of the 
belief structure among some of the senior managers. There was a strategy to move 
quickly and diversify in order to remain at the forefront of the grain-handling and agri-
business scenes.  There was a belief that the Pool would be just as successful as the large 
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multinationals that were entering western Canada (e.g., ConAgra, Louis Dreyfus, Bunge, 
and ADM).  A natural result of pattern making, the Pool’s successes during the 1970s and 
1980s had established beliefs and views that the Pool’s future would resemble its past.  
The dominance and market share built and maintained over previous decades was seen as 
sustainable. Like all grain companies, the Pool was unable to know for certain what the 
new rules of competition would be and how the industry would evolve under a 
deregulated structure. In essence, the Pool used beliefs and views from its old dominant 
logic in conjunction with newly established beliefs from senior management to devise 
strategies for the new grain-handling environment.  Project Horizon was built on the 
assumption that farmers whose local Pool elevator closed would shift their deliveries to 
the closest Pool inland terminal.  This investment reflects a belief of member loyalty, 
which was established prior to industry change and should have been revised because of 
the deregulation. 
The Pool strongly believed it was prepared for the emerging grain-handling 
environment.  The Pool’s size and past successes were seen as continued certainties 
because they were part of the dominant logic that controlled how the Pool viewed its role 
during and after the changes.  Senior managers convinced board members that speed was 
necessary to succeed. Moving quickly became a competitive strategy and the Pool’s lens 
on the environment said that was the correct move. This was in fact an ineffective 
strategy as the need to move quickly resulted in some investments lacking adequate 
analysis and due diligence.  The analysis may have been jeopardized because employees 
did not want to “rock the boat” by raising dissent. Three international investments were 
announced in 1997 even though interviewees felt management and board members 
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lacked previous experience in the international arena.  Having experience was trumped 
by the belief that the Pool was dominant, it was the big kid on the block, and it would 
make any new venture succeed. 
The interviewee responses strongly suggest the principal-agent problem existed at 
the Pool.  Senior management had more information than board members and were 
thought to discriminate on who was apprised of arising business opportunities.  As the 
Pool expanded and diversified the board was called to make decisions on investments 
that extended way beyond their comfort zone (e.g., grain handling on the Prairies).  The 
speed with which the Pool was expanding increased the information asymmetry.  After 
the share conversion board members felt that information sharing decreased and often the 
President learned things that were not shared with the rest of the board.  Outside advisors 
may have helped the board members in making decisions; unfortunately they were added 
in 2000 after all the investments had been made and the debt loads were becoming 
unmanageable. 
Board members were thought to be lacking the expertise and skills necessary to 
evaluate proposals, which adds to the information asymmetry and opportunity for moral 
hazard.  Senior management was often asked to provide guidance and explanation on 
proposals, perhaps allowing them to more easily gain approval on investments.  Board 
members had an increasingly difficult time analyzing investments as they moved further 
away from the farm gate.  The speed with which the investments were coming to the 
board for approval also challenged the board’s abilities.  But because the board believed 
the Pool needed to move quickly to succeed, approvals were granted that should have 
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been rethought or rejected. The board held the belief of urgency because senior 
management had enforced it and board members trusted management’s perceptions. 
Senior management took advantage of the board’s trust.  The board had grown to 
trust management under the leadership of Milt Fair.  This element of trust enabled senior 
management’s beliefs to become the board’s beliefs and part of the co-op’s dominant 
logic.  Don Loewen was seen as trustworthy, which is why he was selected to take the 
Pool successfully through industry change.  The balance of power, along with the balance 
of information, shifted from President to CEO post-share conversion. Senior management 
appears to have used the vulnerabilities of the board members to push through their 
vision for the Pool.    
Although the impact of a flawed dominant logic, inaccurate knowledge structures 
among key decision-makers and the principal-agent problem have been discussed 
separately they are highly connected.  It was the simultaneous existence of these three 
elements that led to the Pool’s financial failure.  The ramifications of the principal-agent 
problem reinforced the inaccuracies of the newly revised dominant logic.  The board 
members served as the final check and balance on the Pool’s decisions.  To adequately 
analyze an investment the board members drew from their established knowledge and 
beliefs.  Whenever board members were uncertain about a proposal their knowledge gaps 
would be filled by senior management.  The information provided by the senior 
management could be distorted or screened because of the information asymmetry, the 
board’s inability to fully monitor management and management’s desire to see the Pool 
gain global status.  Board members incorporate senior management’s advice and 
explanation into their own belief structures. This in turn becomes part of the Pool’s 
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dominant logic with little debate because board members trust senior management to not 
lead them astray. Inaccurate information further distorts any already faulty beliefs and 
views held in the dominant logic.  With the investments being made quickly and 
simultaneously – three international investments and the Project Horizon all within 1997 
– it took some time before the investment errors began to surface. By the time negative 
financial repercussions were being experienced it was too late and the Pool had a 
financial crisis to deal with.   
The experience of the Pool is not unlike the experiences of the American 
agricultural co-ops discussed in Chapter 2.  Supporting historical recounts of the Pool’s 
response to industry change with interview responses from previous board members and 
management has shown that the deregulation in the 1980s and the move to become 
publicly traded in the 1990s was a starting point for the Pool’s problems.  The Pool held 
market dominance prior to the major industry changes.  Debt leveraging was used to 
diversify the Pool’s business lines in the 1990s.  Declining member commitment harmed 
grain handling market share and played a role in the Pool’s eventual financial failure. 
Diversifying business lines in response to major industry change combined with high 
leveraging, declining member commitment and market dominance were also common 
elements among the failed American agricultural co-ops introduced in Chapter 2.  Chapter 
8 will further describe the linkages between these co-ops and the Pool. 
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CHAPTER 8:  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1. Introduction 
The case study evidence presented in Chapter 7 has established how the Pool 
viewed the grain handling environment and how that view affected the decisions made by 
the Pool. The Pool knew it had to change its strategies, which required a new dominant 
logic to be built. A new CEO was handpicked by the Board to create change, therefore, 
senior management’s views held precedence in the new logic that emerged. The case 
study evidence suggests key decision-makers – Loewen and his new senior executive – 
forged a new logic but they also held onto established beliefs of loyalty and dominance 
because these beliefs would help senior management achieve their vision for the Pool. 
With the grain handling industry changing so drastically, established beliefs should have 
been challenged and re-evaluated before being incorporated into the new logic. 
Management, however, was successful in having board members buy in to the new vision 
set out for the Pool. This may be partly due to what interviewees described as a shift in 
power that occurred after the share conversion and it might be because the board 
members trusted management to not lead them astray. Likely with all of the grain 
handling co-ops undergoing the same pressures and undertaking similar efforts to rebuild 
their infrastructures, the Pool felt confident that the right game plan was in place.  
The discussion has come full circle. In Chapter 2, existing research on failed 
American co-ops – TriValley Growers, Rice Grower’s Association, and AgWay – was 
shared and propositions to explain the Pool’s failure were outlined. The events 
surrounding the Pool’s failure were presented in Chapter 6.  Case study evidence in 
Chapter 7 linked the failure to the propositions from Chapter 2. Cognitive processes and 
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the principal-agent problem have been shown as plausible explanations for the Pool’s 
organizational failure. The next section will show the parallels between the events 
preceding the Pool’s debt restructuring and the events leading up to the failures of the 
three American co-ops. The existence of similarities between the cases makes it 
reasonable to assume that the failures of the American co-ops may also be attributed to 
cognition theory and the existence of a flawed dominant logic and the principal-agent 
problem. 
8.2. Common factors among large failed co-ops 
In determining the linkages that exist between the Pool and the three failed American 
co-ops discussed Table 2.1 (page 12) has been expanded to contrast and compare the four 
co-ops.  Table 8.1 is merely an expansion of Table 2.1 to include SWP.  The following 
sub-sections describe, in greater detail, the similarities between the four co-ops. 
8.2.1. Dominance and member loyalty 
Dominance and member loyalty are to be considered “established” beliefs that each 
of the co-ops retained despite industry change and no assurance that the new environment 
would resemble the past. All four co-ops achieved market dominance in their respective 
sectors. A belief of dominance led to a belief of continued success, and in some instances 
greater success, and made the co-ops confident to expand through diversification. Tri 
Valley Growers was the largest canner and fruit processor in California in the late 1990s.  
During the 1970s and 1980s, RGA’s members accounted for over 70 percent of the 
California rice acreage.  
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There are striking similarities between AgWay and SWP. Both AgWay and the Pool 
established their dominance in the 1970s and 1980s. Agway’s dominant logic included a 
belief that it could make any business work even when others could not.  This parallels 
the Pool’s belief that it could become a “ConAgra of the North” and a real contender with 
the multinationals.  AgWay was also described as focusing too much on size rather than 
maximizing profit.  The Pool also focused on size with its vision to become the most 
dynamic agri-business co-operative in the world.  
Member loyalty went hand-in-hand with the co-ops’ ability to gain market 
dominance.  Unfortunately, each of these co-ops experienced a decline in member 
loyalty.  RGA’s decline stemmed from its decision to send its members bills instead of 
dividends in 1985; the result was a 94 percent decrease in membership from 1986 to 
2000.  AgWay lost membership due to aging members and increasing farm size. AgWay 
also had a membership backlash when it closed its local stores. Similarly, producer 
backlash from the Pool’s closure of local elevators in the 1990s declined its provincial 
grain handling market share.  When the Pool increased its elevator closures some 
members vowed to never do business with the Pool again. 
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Table 8.1. Common factors among four co-op failures.  
Source: a Sexton and Hariyoga 2004; b Keeling 2004; c Fairbairn 2003b; d Anderson and Henehan 2002; e,f  SWP Annual Reports; Ewins 2002; g 
Gatin 1999; Lang and Fulton 2004 
 Tri Valley Growersa Rice Growers Associationb AgWayc,d Saskatchewan Wheat Poole,f 
Industry 
Change 
Change in production areas; 
increased demand for pasta, salsa 
and bbq sauces; new processing 
technology 
Declining government support; 
Domestic branded rice expected to 
grow; bulk export markets 
declined 
Change in market conditions; 
Increased concentration in 
farming; Decline in pelleted feed 
demand 
WGTA removal; rail line closures; 
elevator consolidation; new 
entrants; liberalized trading rules 
Dominance California’s largest canner in 1998; 
largest fruit processor in California 
Controlled +70% of Californian 
rice acreage during 1970s and 
1980s 
Largest ag supply and marketing 
co-op in US during 1970s and 
1980s 
Largest grain handler in Western 
Canada during 1970s and 1980s 
Unsuccessful 
Strategies 
Purchased failed co-ops; Missed 
bulk paste market; underutilized 
plants; raised prices which 
declined sales 
Involved in too many product 
lines; entered highly competitive 
value-added rice market; 
Koreagate 
Diversified where it had no 
previous experience; Belief that it 
could make any business work; 
Focus on size 
Went too far too fast; invested 
internationally without experience; 
Move quickly; incomplete due 
diligence; overbid on HFM 
Member 
Loyalty 
Fruit producers upset that profits 
used to subsidize losing tomato 
division; tomato growers not loyal 
Producers sent bills in 1985; 
Membership decreased 94% in 14 
years from 2500 to 150 members 
Loss of 23,000 members over 12 
years; Lost connection with 
members when it closed stores 
Lang and Fulton (2004) identify 
member loyalty decline; closing 
elevators alienated members  
Diversified Olives; Peaches; Pears; Tomatoes; 
154 peeled products; 22 sauces; 61 
pastes 
Only major California producer of 
short, medium and long grain rice; 
bulk and retail markets 
Retail/Grocery; Energy; Food 
Preservation; Futures Trading; 
Dairy; Seed; Leasing; Airlines; 
Refining 
Grain handling; Livestock 
production and marketing; Farm 
Supplies; publishing; Milling; 
Aquaculture; malting; oil crushing 
Board 
Decision-
Making 
“Blinded to economic realities”; 
Lacked strong business orientation 
and control over management 
Lack of oversight, education and 
financial expertise; failed to 
supervise management; ill-
equipped to scrutinize mgt 
2001 changed election process to 
gain “business-oriented” directors 
with “sound business skills” 
Lacked experience in law, finance, 
and marketing; Relied on 
management for guidance; 
Advisors added in 2000 
Management 
Decision-
Making 
CEO made radical cost-cutting 
measures; Executives lacked food 
processing experience 
Ineffective management; Did not 
fully evaluate decisions; remiss in 
planning for future contingencies 
Selected and poorly executed 
wrong strategies 
Lacked depth; Undertook 
investments outside area of 
expertise; “management running 
astray”g 
Financial 
Trouble 
High debt-to-equity ratio 
prevented necessary facility 
upgrades; long-term debt 
quadrupled; overpaid growers in 
1998 
Net profit declined 94% from 1981 
to 1990; 12 D-E Ratio in 1989; 
missed payroll in 2000; unpaid 
debt lawsuits 
Highly leveraged; Selling 
successful businesses to generate 
cash flow; Losses 8 out of 19 
years, 1984–2002 
5x increase in long-term debt 
1996-1999; Consecutive multi-
million dollar net losses 1999 to 
2003; major divestment after 1999 
Failure Filed Ch. 11 in July 2000 Bankrupt in 2000 Filed Ch. 11 October 1, 2002 Restructured debt January 2003 
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8.2.2. Unsuccessful Strategies 
Each co-op had their cognitive capacities tested when their respective industries 
underwent major change. Strategies by each of the co-ops that later proved unsuccessful 
suggests that the co-ops did not accurately perceive how their industries would unfold in 
response to major change.  For instance, AgWay invested in a fluid dairy company, a 
business where it had no previous experience.  SWP also invested in businesses where it 
had no previous experience – in 1997 the Pool invested in three international investments 
when no one in management or on the board had international experience. RGA changed 
its focus in 1987 to value-added products when its entire knowledgebase and experience 
was in bulk rice marketing. 
The co-ops all pursued efforts to diversify their business lines in the hopes of 
increasing their profit potential and spreading their risk. Yet at times the co-ops held onto 
money losing investments. Did the diversification limit the co-ops’ ability to provide the 
attention required for each of its business lines, therefore causing some to fail? Was 
cognitive dissonance preventing key decision-makers from seeing the true reasons behind 
the business troubles and instead leading decision-makers to attribute poor financial 
performance to circumstances beyond their control?  
TVG nearly made the decision to jettison its tomato processing division rather 
than continue to cross subsidize it with fruit division profits, but opted not to and it was 
this division that caused the most financial hardship for the co-op.  AgWay continually 
focused on being an agriculture-based co-operative, but its agriculture operations were 
money losers in the 1990s (Fairbairn 2003b, p. 15).  Grain handling was expected to 
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become less profitable, but the Pool invested $270 million to rebuild its elevator network 
because grain was a staple ingredient for its downstream investments. 
When the Pool began its capital expenditures in the 1990s, interviewees 
commented how there was a “diversify or die” mentality.  RGA was under the same 
belief; in 1988 CEO Mike Cook said RGA must “diversify or declare bankruptcy” 
(Keeling 2004, p. 15).  AgWay had a new “focus on growth and profitability” (Anderson 
and Henehan 2002, p. 7). All four co-ops had been dominant players in their core 
industries and it was part of their belief structure and dominant logic that this dominance 
would remain if only they diversified. 
Each co-op attempted strategies that did not yield desirable outcomes.  TVG 
attempted to penetrate the peeled and branded products market in the 1990s, but this 
strategy put TVG in direct competition with large, financially strong rivals (Sexton and 
Hariyoga 2004, p. 22).  RGA similarly tried to change its focus from bulk rice marketing 
to value-added, but by targeting the small differentiated market RGA neglected the bulk 
market.  AgWay was venturing into business lines where they had not previously 
operated and they ended up selling those investments due to mounting financial losses 
(Anderson and Henehan 2002, p. 3).  SWP made aggressive investments in pork under 
the subsidiary Heartland Pork. The Pool announced its intention to build twenty-five 
barns worth $12 million each; local investment was said to be a requirement before 
proceeding with barn construction (1997 SWP Annual Report). The desired level of local 
investment never materialized, but the Pool went ahead and built seven barns without the 
proper financial footing (Pratt 1999). The barns were all sold for a reported $22.4 million 
to Stomp Farms in May 2004 because of financial troubles (Briere 2004). 
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8.2.3. Relationships and competition 
Both RGA and the Pool had co-op “siblings”.  Co-op siblings were similar co-ops 
with which RGA and the Pool had an amicable business relationships. When these 
relationships ended for each co-op the sibling co-ops became rivals. RGA had developed 
a “big brother, little brother” relationship with Farmer’s Rice Co-operative (FRC). In the 
early 1980s these co-ops had a falling out over Koreagate and their jointly shared broker 
Grover Connell. Even though they were involved in several successful joint ventures and 
shared contracts, from that point on the strategies of the two co-operatives diverged and 
FRC gained a commanding share of the bulk rice market (Keeling 2004, p. 19).  The 
relationship between RGA and FRC is not unlike the relationship between the sister 
Pools.  The sister Pools operated many successful joint ventures – XCAN, WCFL, Prairie 
Pools – and made a number of merger attempts.  The Pools parted ways after their last 
merger discussions in the mid to late 1990s; SWP built elevators in Alberta and Manitoba 
and outbid AWP on Humboldt Flour Mills in order to keep AWP out of Saskatchewan.  
SWP now directly competes with Agricore United (formerly AWP, MPE and UGG) 
much like how RGA had to directly compete with FRC.139 
8.2.4. Financial troubles 
The reality faced by many co-ops is that there is limited access to capital due to 
obligations to payout patronage equity when members retire or cancel membership. 
When a co-op wants to respond to industry change they may need to find new ways to 
finance their diversification strategies. The Pool became publicly traded in 1996 to 
increase its eligibility for debt capital. RGA was looking to dissolve the co-op and 
                                                
139 On November 28, 2006 the Pool submitted a formal offer to purchase Agricore United (Ewins 2006d). 
 152 
restructure as a for-profit company in 2000. TVG converted to a new generation co-op in 
1996. AgWay had common and preferred shares for its capital base. Changing to a more 
permanent source of capital allows for greater ease when obtaining debt capital. It could 
be argued that if money is easier to obtain then it becomes easier to spend. 
All four co-ops had high debt-to-equity ratios. This is an indicator that they had 
taken on too much debt.  TVG quadrupled its long-term debt in one year, while SWP had 
a five-fold increase in long-term debt over three years.  The debt load became 
unmanageable and net losses were incurred. SWP had consecutive multi-million dollar 
net losses from 1999 to 2003. In the period 1975-1988 RGA’s debt-equity ratio increased 
significantly which Keeling (2004) points out as the co-op taking on “relatively large 
amounts of debt without commensurately increasing their equity base” (p. 26). 
Subsequently, RGA began having lawsuits filed against them in 1989 for unpaid debts 
which forced divestments.  AgWay reported losses in 8 out of 19 years during the period 
1984-2002; net earnings of $41 million were declared in 1998, but only $5.9 million were 
from continuing operations (Fairbairn 2003b, p. 12). By 2002, AgWay’s earnings had 
slipped to a net loss of $98 million of which $85 million was from closing costs 
associated with the sale of discontinued operations. To generate cashflow AgWay sold its 
profitable sunflower business and its profitable leasing subsidiary (Anderson and 
Henehan 2002).  The Pool was in a similar situation; between 1999 and 2004 the Pool 
sold over 20 of its investments including Humboldt Flour Mills, Heartland Pork and its 
three international investments.  All five of these investments were acquired after the 
1996 share conversion. The Pool also sold WCFL, The Western Producer, and 
CanAmera which were successful business ventures for the co-op. The Pool’s debt-to-
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equity ratio was 39:61 in 1994, which is the year Loewen became CEO.  By 2000, the 
ratio was 60:40, the exact opposite of what is normally considered a healthy debt-to-
equity score (40:60). 
8.2.5. Board and management decision-making 
All four co-ops were large, centralized marketing or supply co-ops and their core 
business was in the agriculture industry. With farmers as members, these co-ops all had a 
farmer-elected board of directors.  It has been suggested that the board makeup within 
each of these co-ops lacked business savvy. The Pool’s board members were described as 
lacking financial and marketing expertise.  Interviewees described how Pool board 
members became increasingly dependent on management to provide expertise and 
advice, especially as investments moved beyond primary agriculture.  RGA’s and TVG’s 
board members were also described as lacking strong business orientation and financial 
expertise.  One of the conclusions draw from the survey conducted on former RGA 
affiliates was that the “board of directors failed to actively exercise its duty to supervise 
management” (Keeling 2004, p. 2). In addition, RGA was slow to follow FRC’s lead 
when FRC implemented board education, added financial experts to sit on the board, and 
had younger members join the board. AgWay added outside advisors to the board make-
up in 2001.  Though never publicly admitted by AgWay, some thought this governance 
change was an attempt to gain directors with sound business skills.  Outside advisors 
were also added to the Pool’s board in 2003 as a requirement of its debt restructuring 
agreement. 
The managers at the four co-ops were held equally responsible for the financial 
failures. Management is criticized for their role in the decision-making process in each of 
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these co-ops.  TVG’s CEO is criticized for his radical cost cutting measures, such as 
firing all the experienced plant supervisors.  RGA’s management was described as 
ineffective and unable to guide the co-op through tough times. AgWay management was 
said to have selected and poorly executed wrong strategies (Fairbairn 2003b, p. 11).  The 
Pool management has been described as lacking depth and experience.   
Interestingly, many of the new strategies and investments that preceded each of 
the financial failures for these four co-ops were orchestrated under the direction of a new 
CEO. Shaping a new dominant logic under a new CEO would bring in new experience 
and knowledge, which is key for the co-op in its rebuilding phase. As interviewees shared 
about the Pool, Loewen was hired in 1994 because the board felt confident that he could 
drive change. It is also possible that the other co-ops hired new CEOs because they 
wanted to change or expand the direction of their co-op. TVG hired Famalette in 1995 
and in 2000 the co-op filed for bankruptcy protection. AgWay hired Cardarelli in 1995; 
he specifically mentioned that the co-op’s new focus would be growth and profit and in 
2002 AgWay filed for bankruptcy protection. RGA hired CEO Mike Cook in 1987 and 
that same year RGA shifted its focus from bulk to value-added rice marketing. 
Numerous similarities between these four co-ops strongly suggest the American 
co-ops likely had problems revising their dominant logics when faced with drastic 
industry change.  The decision-making errors on the part of management and board 
members suggest that information asymmetry and principal-agent problem were at play. 
There are other failed co-ops within Canada that need to be researched to see if they too 
were struggling with deeply rooted beliefs, dominant logic inaccuracies and the principal-
agent problem. 
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8.3. Recommendations and lessons learned 
There are lessons to be learned from the failure of the Pool and the American co-
ops.  Agriculture is still undergoing major change and the playing field will continue to 
evolve and alter the rules of competition.  Currently, the federal government wants to 
rescind the Canadian Wheat Board Act, which would once again change the grain 
handling industry.  Corporate governance has become important for all businesses.  
Agriculture co-ops must be mindful of their board structure and to ensure that members 
have the support and continuing education programs to assist them in their fiduciary 
responsibilities. Many co-ops have changed their board make up to include public 
members to serve as impartial industry experts.  For the producer-members of the board 
there should be courses in finance and management provided to ensure an understanding 
of the decisions they are making.  A board with strong knowledge and business skills will 
help to alleviate the risk of information asymmetry and moral hazard. 
Thorough research analysis and complete due diligence must be part of every 
investment decision. Keeling (2004) suggests that co-ops at a critical juncture conduct a 
SWOT – strength, weakness, opportunity, and threat – analysis to “give decision-makers 
a clearer perspective of the cooperative’s internal and external environment and aid in 
strategic planning” (p. 33).  The saying “drastic times call for drastic measures” is an 
anecdote and not a rule for an organization to operate under.  Interviewees expressed that 
at times the Pool forewent adequate discussion and debate on potential investments 
because speed was seen as more important.  A case in point is the Pool’s high throughput 
locations; Hodgeville is often given as an example of a high throughput location that was 
not well thought out because the Pool was in a hurry to get a jump-start on the 
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competition.  Experience among managers and board members is key to deciphering 
strategies for success in a changing environment. 
The future is uncertain. Bounded rationality clearly states that it is impossible to 
know all there is to know and what is known cannot be known with complete accuracy.  
When an organization has developed dominance and achieved prolonged success within a 
market it is natural for the organization to rely on established beliefs to make decisions 
for present and future situations. The risk is that the organization can become blind to the 
realities going on around it and opportunities on the horizon.  Beliefs may become 
outdated because times have changed and a new dominant logic with new beliefs is 
required. A balanced and experienced management team and board of directors will 
significantly help in decreasing the chances of missed opportunities and ineffective 
strategies. New leadership brings new knowledge and experience, but there needs to be a 
balance to ensure that the new beliefs are also not inaccurate. 
8.4. Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research 
Cognition and dominant logic, along with the principal agent problem, are ways 
to explain what went wrong at the Pool. The interview responses support the two 
propositions introduced in Chapter 2. Proposition 1 was that the Pool’s dominant logic 
prevented effective adaptation to industry change and significantly contributed to its 
financial failures. Proposition 2 was that the principal-agent problem existed between 
Pool senior management and the board members.  
There are several ways to explain the failure at the Pool. One should not overlook 
the role of declining member commitment or the difficulties associated with being a co-
operative in the Pool’s struggles.  The need to focus the thesis puts limits on the breadth 
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of the discussion.  Cognitive dissonance is another useful way to approach this problem. 
Recall from Section 3.2.6 (page 31) that established beliefs could cause an individual to 
ignore information that conflicts with their beliefs (Akerlof and Dickens 1982). As the 
level of difficulty increases in decision-making, the belief that a decision is a good 
decision also increases; making it harder to accept information that suggests the decision 
is incorrect (Akerlof and Dickens 1982, p. 310).  It could be argued that the Pool’s 
decisions involved great effort - the Pool was undergoing a quantum shift in its business 
focus - which led management and board members to ignore information signals that 
showed strategies required modification.  
Using personal interviews helped to reveal insights that supported what many had 
already postulated.  An effort was made to conduct interviews that would capture a wide 
range of views from senior management, management and board members and industry 
players.  This was achieved but there are individuals that declined interviews who would 
have been important sources of knowledge and opinion for this research.  
Even though interviewees were asked to take their thoughts and views back to the 
time when they were actively involved with the Pool, this is not always possible. All of 
the interviewees have had a few years to reflect upon the events and decisions that were 
made during the 1980 to 2000 timeframe. Some of the statements made during the 
interviews may include new realizations and understandings that were not part of the 
interviewees’ beliefs and knowledge structures in the 1980-2000 timeframe. This is part 
of the learning and knowledge creation process; the new experiences have reshaped their 
cognitive frameworks making it difficult to separate previous thoughts and views from 
current thoughts and views. 
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The work done in this thesis will become part of a larger study on agricultural co-
ops that includes Agricore, Dairyworld, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, Tri Valley Growers, 
Farmland, and AgWay.  Conducting industry and company reviews to identify the major 
changes and cognition responses in each of the co-ops and their resulting failures may 
assist other co-ops who face similar circumstances.  Background research has already 
been done for Dairyworld, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, Farmland and AgWay.  Personal 
interviews with past personnel helped to reveal views and insights at the Pool that could 
only be known for certain from being a part of the co-op.  Implementing a case study 
approach using personal interviews for some of these other co-ops would be ideal. 
Cognition and agency theory shed some light on the Pool’s organizational failure.  
Exploring the interview responses further and probing for other dynamics at play could 
explain even more of the reasons why the Pool had to undergo debt restructuring.  Further 
exploring the impacts of a loss in member commitment, a paternalistic management style, 
and a centralized structure may be of value.   
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Interview Questions and Script 
for Kathy Lang’s M.Sc. (Ag Econ) Thesis 
 
Intro 
 
We are interested in what happened at the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool from the mid 
1980s until 2000.  This is a period where the Pool went from a dominant player in the 
grain handling industry to an organization in financial crisis.  The Pool had over 60% of 
the provincial market share of grain handlings throughout the 1980s until about 1992 
when market share began its descent to 33% by 2003 (the Prairie market share was 
21.1% according to the 2003 Annual Report).  As well, the Pool had its highest net 
earnings in 1981 ($72.1 million) and it achieved positive net earnings until 1999.  The 
Pool has experienced multi-million dollar net losses each year since 1999, which we all 
know culminated in a massive debt restructuring in early 2003.   
 
We want to discuss with you the decisions being made within the Pool during this 
mid 1980s until 2000 timeframe.   If you will allow us to take your thoughts and views 
back to your experiences at the Pool during this time we would ask that you openly share 
them with us and where possible we ask that you provide a clear example to illustrate 
your point.  We will proceed through a series of six question areas starting with an 
overview of the period. 
 
Overview of the period 
 
Could you take us back to the late 80s and early 90s (depends on when interviewee 
started with Pool) and give us a sense about what challenges the Pool was facing? 
 
1. For example, what were the most important issues/challenges facing the SWP when 
you were a board member/management? 
 
2. Can you describe the environment of the grain handling industry during this time? 
 
Investment decisions 
 
There were approximately three major capital investments in the 1970s, five in the 1980s 
and 12 in the 1990s.  We would like you to provide the assumptions the Pool had about 
the grain handling industry, its role in the industry, etc.  We want to get an idea of the 
assumptions that investment decisions were predicated on, the analysis conducted before 
investing in a new venture, and why these investments were imperative.   
 
If you wish, you can address this section by discussing a specific investment. 
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3. What type of analysis was conducted before investing in a new venture?  What 
objectives did the Pool hope to attain through its investments? 
 
4. The Pool had business lines from doughnuts to ethanol – how was the decision as to 
which venture to invest in made?   
 
5. What were some of the assumptions or considerations used in analyzing investment 
decisions? What type of analysis was conducted before investing in or purchasing 
new business lines? 
 
6. The Pool was once ranked the largest grain handler in Canada; did this influence the 
risks and investments taken?  
 
7. Why was there such a drastic increase in investments in the 1990s compared to the 
1970s and 1980s? 
 
8. Why do you think market share has dropped from 60% to 33% in the last decade 
(1993-2003)?  What factors affected the Pool’s market share in your opinion? 
 
Pool vis-à-vis other grain companies 
 
How would you say the Pool viewed itself in comparison to other grain handling 
companies?  Did the Pool feel it could take greater risks because of its market power? 
 
9. Did the management and/or board feel the Pool could take greater risks because of its 
market power? 
 
10. Why do you think market share has dropped from 60% to 33% in the last decade 
(1993-2003)?  What factors affected the Pool’s market share in your opinion? 
 
Corporate culture, models, framework 
 
In this section we want to get a sense of the thinking in place at the Saskatchewan Wheat 
Pool from the 1980s until 2000.  Decisions in organizations are often based on some 
explicit or implicit model or framework.  This model or framework influences the 
questions asked internally, the data collected, the conclusions reached, and actions 
taken.   
 
11. What was the corporate culture at Saskatchewan Wheat Pool during the 1980s until 
2000? 
 
12. Did the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool base its decisions with a framework or model in 
mind?  Describe the model or framework used in a specific decision if possible. 
 
Decision-making power 
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Could you describe the decision-making process in the Pool?  In your view, who 
possessed the power within the Pool?  What was the general view within the co-op of who 
possessed the decision-making power? 
 
13. How would you describe the decision-making process at Saskatchewan Wheat Pool 
during the 1980s until 2000? 
 
14. Who do you think had the real decision making power in the Pool? The members? 
The Board of Directors? The senior management? On what was this power based? 
 
15. Did the source of decision making power change within the co-op after the share 
conversion? Did priorities shift in the sense that there was now pressure to make a 
return to outside investors? 
 
Outsiders View of the Pool 
 
16. You have already discussed how the Pool viewed itself in comparison to other grain 
companies, how do you think other grain companies (like Cargill) viewed the Pool? 
  
17. Is there anyone else you would suggest that we meet with for an interview? 
 
-THE END- 
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Interview Consent Form 
 
You are invited to participate in a study entitled: Co-operative Structure, Corporate Governance and 
the Failure of Agricultural Co-operatives: A Saskatchewan Wheat Pool Case Study 
 
Researcher:                  Kathy Lang                               (name) 
 
                  306.966.8411                           (phone) 
 
        
Purpose and procedure: I would like to receive your responses to some questions about the Saskatchewan 
Wheat Pool’s decision-making processes, investment decisions, member commitment, market share and 
recent debt restructuring.  You have been selected because of your employment with the Saskatchewan 
Wheat Pool. This research project is co-ordinated by the Department of Agricultural Economics (Dr. 
Fulton), University of Saskatchewan. The results of this research will constitute Ms. Kathy Lang’s thesis 
requirement for a Master’s of Science degree in Agricultural Economics. This research is funded by the 
Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRCC).  
 
The purpose of the research is to explore the factors that led to the financial troubles (e.g., falling market 
share, large debt restructuring) encountered by Saskatchewan Wheat Pool since the late 1990s. This 
research will attempt to understand the role, if any, that co-operative structure and/or the decision-making 
processes that were at work within the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool may have played in the organization’s 
financial hardships.  
 
Your participation in this study is appreciated and completely voluntary.  It is expected that the interview 
should last between 60 and 90 minutes.  You may withdraw at any time without penalty during this process 
should you feel uncomfortable or at risk. All interviews will be audio taped and you have the right to shut 
off the tape recorder at any time if you choose. You should also feel free to decline to answer any particular 
question(s).  Should you choose to withdraw from the study no data pertaining to your participation will be 
retained.  
 
Potential risks: Ms. Lang will make every effort to preserve the confidentiality of your comments (see 
below), but you should be aware that controversial remarks, in the unlikely event they are associated with 
you, could have negative consequences for your relationships with others in the grain handling industry.  
Ms. Lang will try to ensure that your identity is protected in the ways described below.  If for some reason 
Ms. Lang wishes to quote you in some way that might reveal your identity, she will seek your permission 
beforehand.    
 
Potential benefits: Your participation will help document the links between co-operative structure and 
governance and the financial difficulties experienced by several agriculture co-operatives in Canada and the 
United States.  
 
Findings from this research may help to make the co-operative sector more responsive to the needs of its 
members and help to inform policy decisions both within the co-operative sector and government. 
 
Storage of Data: The transcripts and original audio recording of the interview will be securely stored by 
the Supervisor (Dr. Fulton) at the Department of Agricultural Economics for a period of at least five years.   
 
Anonymous data will be aggregated with data gathered from other portions of this research.  
 
 180 
Confidentiality: Your interview will be transcribed by Ms. Kathy Lang or by a confidential secretary.  
After your interview, and prior to any data being included in a final report, you will be given the 
opportunity to review the transcript of your interview, and to add, alter, or delete information from the 
transcripts as you see fit.  Interview transcripts will be seen only by Dr. Fulton and Ms. Lang. 
 
The research conclusions will be published in a variety of formats, both print and electronic. These 
materials may be further used for purposes of conference presentations, or publication in academic 
journals, books or popular press.  In these publications, the data will be reported in a manner that protects 
confidentiality and the anonymity of participants.   Participants will be identified without names being 
used, giving minimal information (for example what co-op they are affiliated with and whether they are 
board members or management) if this information is relevant.  Pseudonyms or composite profiles may be 
used to disguise identity further, if necessary.  In principle, actual names will not be used; however, leaders 
whose position involves speaking on behalf of the organization may be asked if certain comments they 
have made can be attributed to them by name in publications.  Any communication of these results that has 
clear potential to compromise your public anonymity will not proceed without your approval. 
 
Right to Withdraw: You may withdraw from the study for any reason, at any time, without penalty of any 
sort.  If you choose to withdraw from the study, any information that you have contributed will be deleted. 
You will be informed of any major changes that occur in the circumstances of this study or in the purpose 
and design of the research that may have a bearing on your decision to remain as a participant. 
 
Questions: If you have any questions concerning the study, please feel free to contact the Researcher at the 
number provided above. 
 
This study was approved on ethical grounds by the University of Saskatchewan Behavioural Sciences 
Research Ethics Board on July 5, 2004.  Any questions regarding your rights as a participant may be 
addressed to that committee through the Office of Research Services (966-2084). 
 
 
Consent to Participate: I have read and understood the description provided above; I have been provided 
with an opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been answered satisfactorily.  I consent to 
participate in the study described above, understanding that I may withdraw this consent at any time.  A 
copy of this consent form has been given to me for my records.   
 
 
__________________________   _________________ 
(Signature of Participant)        (Date) 
 
 
__________________________   _________________ 
(Signature of Researcher)        (Date) 
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Interview Transcript Release Form 
 
Co-operative Structure, Corporate Governance and the Failure of Agricultural Co-
operatives: A Saskatchewan Wheat Pool Case Study 
 
I, __________________________________, have reviewed the complete transcript of 
my interview responses for this study, and have been provided with the opportunity to 
add, alter, and delete information from this transcript as appropriate.  I hereby authorize 
the release of this transcript to the Department of Agricultural Economics, University of 
Saskatchewan, to be used in the manner described in the Interview Consent Form (a), or 
the manner indicated below.    
 
If you do not check one of the following, it will be assumed that (a) applies: 
 
________ (a) I prefer to remain anonymous, as described in the consent form.  I 
understand that my remarks will not be attributed to me by name. Instead, they may 
be attributed to an unnamed individual (a manager, a board member etc.) or to a 
pseudonym or a composite profile. 
________ (b) The remarks contained in the authorized transcript may be attributed to 
me by name, or used anonymously, at the author's discretion. 
________ (c) I prefer to have all remarks from the authorized transcript attributed to 
me by name if they are used. 
________ (d) Certain remarks I have indicated by initials in the margin are to be kept 
anonymous as in (a) above; the rest of my comments (unmarked in the margins) may 
be attributed to me. 
 
I have received a copy of this Interview Transcript Release Form for my own records. 
 
_________________________ _________________________ 
Participant Date 
 
_________________________ _________________________ 
Researcher Date 
 
Kathy Lang (Researcher) 
Graduate Student, Department of Agricultural Economics 
University of Saskatchewan 
306.966.8411 
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APPENDIX D: SWP INVESTMENTS AND DIVESTMENTS 
 
  
Examples of Saskatchewan Wheat Pool Investments and Divestments in the 1990s, listed alphabetically. 
 
Company 
Interest 
Held 
Year 
Acquired 
Amount 
Invested, in 
millions Date Sold Divestment Details 
Agro Pacific Industries Ltd 40% 1998 unknown 2000 $5.1 million provision 
CanAmera Foods 50% 1992 unknown May 2002 
Sold for $58.4 million ($7.4 million gain) to 
Central Soya of Canada 
CanGro Aquaculture 100% 1991 unknown July 26, 2004 Sold to Nilsson Bros.' Wild West Steelhead 
Can-Oat Milling 
100% 1996 $116   
Equity started at 13.25% in 1996; Increased 
to 34% in 1997 and to 100% in 1998 
Comer. La Junta (Mexico) 50% 1997 $8.5 US June 15, 2004 $24.6 million provision 
CSP Foods 100.0% 1975 unknown February 2002 
Sold to Dawn Foods for $34.57 million 
($21.58 million gain); sale included 
Humboldt Flour Mills 
Europort (Poland) 53% 1997 unknown December 7, 2000 
$35.0 million provision; Started with $8.5 
million initial investment (10% equity), 
grew to 53% by 1999 
Heartland Feeds 100% 1997 unknown November 2001 
Sold to Nilsson Bros. for $11.2 million 
($12.75 million loss); Included mills at 
Taber, Dauphin, Regina, Picture, Bruno 
Heartland Livestock Services 89.8% 1994 unknown August 29, 2001 
Sold for $23.5 million ($5.3 million gain) to 
Nilsson Bros. 
Heartland Pork 89.6% 1997 $75  May 14, 2004 
Estimated $12 million/barn with 50% 
investment; Seven barns sold to Stomp Pork 
Farms' subsidiary for a estimated $22.4 
million 
Humboldt Flour Mills 100% 1998 $26.2  2002 Sold with CSP Foods to Dawn Foods 
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Matrix Trading (England) 50% 1997 unknown 2000 $6.9 million provision 
North Battleford feedmill 100% 1998 $8  January 2000  
Northco Foods 35% 1987 unknown March 1, 2000 
Robin's Donuts parent company; sold to 
Afton Group Inc. of Burlington ON 
Premium Brands 41% 1997 $51.9  July 2001 
Sold for $46 million ($20.1 million loss); 
formerly Fletcher's Fine Foods; 35% initial 
equity 
Western Producer 100% 1923 unknown January 9, 2002 
Sold for $11.6 million to GVIC 
Communications Inc. 
XCAN Grain Pool Ltd 33.3% 1970  unknown January 2001 
Sold for $11 million to remaining 
shareholders 
 
Source: SWP Annual Reports, 1997-2005. 
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